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Nation-Empire: Rural Youth Mobilization Japan, Taiwan, and Korea 1895-1945 
Sayaka Chatani 
By the turn of the twentieth century, “rural youth” came to symbolize the spirit of hard 
work, masculinity, and patriotism. The village youth associations, the seinendan, as well as a 
number of other youth training programs, carried that ideal and spread it all over the Japanese 
empire. This dissertation examines how the movement to create “rural youth” unfolded in 
different parts of the empire and how young farmers responded to this mobilization. By 
examining three rural areas in Miyagi (northern Japan), Xinzhu (Taiwan), and South 
Ch’ungchǒng (Korea), I argue that the social tensions and local dynamics, such as the divisions 
between urban and rural, the educated and the uneducated, and the young and the old, 
determined the motivations and emotional drives behind youth participation in the mobilization. 
To invert the analytical viewpoint from the state to youth themselves, I use the term “Rural 
Youth Industry.” This indicates the social sphere in which agrarian youth transformed 
themselves from perpetual farmers to success-oriented modern youth, shared an identity as “rural 
youth” by incorporating imperial and global youth activism, and developed a sense of moral 
superiority over the urban, the educated, and the old. The social dynamics of the “Rural Youth 
Industry” explain why many of these youth so internalized the ideology of Japanese nationalism 
that they volunteered for military service and fought for the empire. 
This dissertation offers a new perspective to the study of modern empires in several 
respects. It provides a new way to dissect the colonial empire, challenging the methodological 
trap of emphasizing the present-day national boundaries of Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. It 
highlights rural modernity, often neglected in the urban-centric historiography of colonial 
modernity. It also brings together global, regional, and local histories. The seinendan were part 
of the global waves of imperialism, nation-state building, agrarianism, and the rise of youth. I 
argue that the spread of the “Rural Youth Industry” most clearly exemplifies a central 
characteristic of the Japanese empire, which is summarized as its drive to pursue nation-building 
across its imperial domains, forming a “nation-empire.” This dissertation examines the 
operations of the “nation-empire” at the grassroots level by comparing the social environments 
of mobilized agrarian youth. Situating the practices of the Japanese empire in these broader 
contexts as well as the specific local conditions of village societies, it illuminates the nature of 
mass mobilization and the shifting relationship between the state and society in the first half of 
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In the late nineteenth century, youth became the agent of history and symbolized 
everything modern. This global phenomenon continued through most of the twentieth century. At 
every major turn—imperial expansion, capitalist industrialization, nation-state building, world 
wars, decolonization, and democratization—people called upon the youth to stand up. The state, 
undergoing a radical transformation in this period, sought to control youth with strategies of co-
optation, discipline, or confrontation. Youth became a primary target of mobilization in regimes 
of all kinds.  
In the Japanese empire, the state conducted large-scale youth mobilization in the 
countryside of both Japan and its colonies. “Rural youth” embodied the spirit of industriousness, 
masculinity, and Japanese nationalism. They were to resolve the rural and national predicament, 
bind Asia together, and shoulder heavy burdens of the empire. Young farmers, in turn, found new 
opportunities for social mobility arising from the intense attention. This dissertation examines 
how the Japanese empire came to focus on “rural youth” and, more importantly, how young 
people responded to that mobilization—in other words, it shows how youth in peripheries 
consumed the power of the state. I argue that mutual attempts at co-optation by the state and 
youth accelerated mass mobilization in the first half of the twentieth century. Youth used the 
rhetoric of the state to gain leverage in their social relationships. In particular, they employed the 
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ideology of Japanese nationalism to challenge the dominance of urban youth, educated youth, 
and the older generation. Through that social process, the youth often internalized the value 
system imposed by the state. This mechanism radicalized the nationalistic ideology during 
wartime, which in turn deprived the youth of opportunities they initially aspired to obtain. What 
appeared to be the “same bed different dreams” situation between the mobilizer and mobilized—
often seen as a sign of the imperfect power of the modern state—in fact gave flexibility and 
strength to the mobilization.  
I use youth training institutions built in the countryside, particularly village youth 
associations [seinendan], as a lens of analysis. The seinendan began as hamlet social 
organizations widely seen in rural Japan that governed farmers’ lives for centuries. After 
transforming the seinendan into modern imperial youth groups around 1905, bureaucrats and 
activists established a national headquarters and network in the 1910s and 20s. Viewing them as 
an effective model for spreading nationalism, anti-colonial intellectuals in Taiwan and Korea 
copied the seinendan in the 1920s. In the 1930s, the Japanese empire, in competition with them, 
spread the imperial seinendan throughout Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, the South Pacific islands, 
and Southeast Asia. During its military expansion on the Asian continent and the Asia-Pacific 
War from 1937 to 1945, the state relied on youth in the seinendan and other youth training 
facilities, Japanese and non-Japanese, to provide military and industrial manpower. In short, the 
seinendan and its sibling institutions provided a rural basis for Japan’s nation-building, empire-
building, and total war mobilization.  
This dissertation compares three villages in the Japanese empire—one in Miyagi 
(northern Japan), another in Xinzhu (northern Taiwan), and a third in South Ch’ungchǒng 
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(southern Korea). Left behind in the urban-centric modernization, youth in these places hoped to 
alter their social positions through the seinendan and other youth programs. Often in ways 
unexpected by state officials, they transformed themselves from perpetual farmers to career-
seeking modern youth. The outcome of nationalizing mobilization depended on whether youth 
could turn national-imperial policies into opportunities for mobility. While seeking opportunities, 
many young people internalized the ideology of Japanese nationalism. 
Japan’s Nation-Empire and Assimilation Policies 
The way the seinendan spread across the empire captures an important characteristic of 
the Japanese empire: its drive to establish an empire-wide nation-state, or a nation-empire. 
Japanese policymakers in the Meiji period (1868-1912) commonly believed that the empire was 
a powerful version of the nation-state. In his lecture on Japanese colonial policies in 1914, Gotō 
Shinpei elaborated on the relationship between nationalism and imperialism. Educated in 
Germany, Gotō established the colonial administration in Taiwan in 1898 and became the first 
president of the South Manchuria Railway Company in 1906. He was one of the most qualified 
experts to discuss Japanese colonial policies of the time. Gotō viewed imperialism as something 
that grows out of nationalism and argued that Japan finally joined the trend of European 
“national imperialism” :  1
Nationalism, having arisen in the nineteenth century, became truly a major political 
force. This force provides the strong with a supreme weapon, but it is clear that, for the 
weak, it is rather a suicidal weapon. The result of competition for survival among 
European powers is that weak states were forcefully assimilated as nationalism arose. 
The extreme cases include Ireland, Finland, Poland, Bosnia, and Herzegovina.     2!
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 Gotō Shinpei, Nihon shokumin seisaku ippan, Nihon bōchōron (Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha, 1944), 49.1
 Ibid, 48.2
Arguing that population pressures turned strong nations into colonial empires, he continued, 
“Japan was unaware of the trend of the nineteenth century in which the transition from the rise of 
nationalism to national imperialism generated the need for colonial policies,” and, without 
preparation, Japan entered the world of empires.  Gotō was not alone in his view that a modern 3
empire developed from a nation. We see a similar assumption in the Social Darwinist 
perspective, which spread across the world in the nineteenth century, challenging liberal theories 
on the role of the state and emphasizing survival as the goal of nations. In Japan, Katō Hiroyuki 
delivered a theory of survival of the fittest as the basic character of world politics and influenced 
many leaders in Japan and Asia by the 1880s.  A Chinese reform activist Liang Qichao, for 4
example, used the similar concept of national imperialism and the Social Darwinist view to 
explain China’s situation under European imperial powers.   5
The popularity of the Social Darwinist perspective attests how aggressively Western 
powers acquired territory in this period. Europe’s imperialism of the nineteenth century 
threatened enough to trigger an overthrow of the feudal Tokugawa government (1603-1868), 
which led to the establishment of a modern Meiji monarch in Japan. The dismemberment of 
Africa and the Pacific was rapidly accelerating when Meiji Japan joined the world of empires. 
Jennifer Pitts has argued that European imperialists in the nineteenth century, compared to their 
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 Ibid, 50-51.3
 Yoshida Kōji, Katō Hiroyuki no kenkyū (Tokyo: Ōhara shinseisha, 1976), 71-117.4
 Limin Bai, “Children as the Youthful Hope of An Old Empire: Race, Nationalism, and Elementary Education in 5
China 1895-1915,” Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth 1, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 213-214. On the ways in 
which Korean intellectuals and authors were influenced by Social Darwinism, see Vladimir Tikhonov, Social 
Darwinism and Nationalism in Korea: The Beginnings (1880s-1910s): “Survival” as an Ideology of Korean 
Modernity (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010).
predecessors, shared a widespread sense of “cultural or civilizational confidence.”  They had 6
long developed ideological legitimacy for overseas expansion using the language of liberalism 
and universalistic morality—bringing civilization to non-European “barbaric” peoples. The 
unprecedented economic and technological development in Western Europe in the early 
nineteenth century—both a result and an enabler of colonial rule—added to their justification for 
further expansion.  At the same time, the “nation” came to be defined increasingly by racial or 7
ethnic coherence, leading to anti-colonial nationalisms and challenging the earlier logic of 
legitimacy for colonial imperialism.  Meiji leaders faced two equally powerful forces: the 8
civilizational chauvinism of Western imperial powers and a world constituted by nations, or the 
inter-national world. Japan embarked on its modern statehood as a new nation and an empire 
simultaneously.  9
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 Jennifer Pitts, A Turn To Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism In Britain and France (Princeton NJ: Princeton 6
University Press, 2005), 14.
 See, of course, Pomerantz on the argument that Europeans did not become decisively more economically advanced 7
than China until the very late eighteenth century. Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: Europe, China, and the 
Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
 For eighteenth-century liberal thinkers like J.S. Mill, nationhood was “an achievement of civilization,” not 8
applicable to “barbarians.” Pitts, 143-144.
 Political scientist Tomoko Akami argues that we should understand international actors of the late nineteenth 9
century as “the nation-state/empire” and she challenges the dichotomy between the nation-state and empire. She sees 
“Japan as an empire in which the problem of the international society of nation states/empires was manifested.” I 
agree with her that the Japanese empire captured the merge of the two most saliently. See Tomoko Akami, “The 
Nation-State/Empire as a Unit of Analysis in the History of International Relations: A Case Study in Northeast Asia, 
1868-1933,” in The Nation State and Beyond: Governing Globalization Processes in the Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Centuries, ed. Isabella Löhr and Roland Wenzlhueme (Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2013), 
177-208. For discussion on external and internal conditions that drove Japan into imperialism, see Mark Peattie, 
“Introduction” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 1-52 and Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995).
In the late nineteenth century, all empires had to adapt to the rise of racial and ethnic 
nations at home and abroad.  French colonizers in Algeria, while trying to transform living 10
customs and build infrastructure in pursuit of mission civilisatrice, began condemning racial 
intermarriage by the 1870s.  Duncan Bell argues that the British imagined a “Greater Britain,” a 11
global nation-state, consisting of Anglo-Saxon settler colonies in Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and southern Africa.  The crosscurrent forces of empires and nation-states pushed 12
Japan in another direction: the nationalization of its colonial empire. Meiji leaders not only 
pictured the empire as an extension of power of the Japanese nation-state, but also aimed to 
extend its ethnic and racial nation. This drive produced many unique assimilation policies that 
puzzled Western leaders, making the Japanese empire an anomaly in many respects. Despite 
what contemporaries claimed, Japan’s assimilationism did not derive from its cultural or 
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 Other historians have examined the relationship between empire and nation-state. Yamamuro Shin’ichi uses the 10
term “kokumin teikoku,” which could also be translated as “national empire” or “nation-empire.” What he means by 
it is the prototype of modern empires that has the nation-state at home and a multi-racial empire abroad. Yamamuro 
Shin’ichi, “Kokumin teikoku no shatei,” in Teikoku no kenkyū: genri, ruikei, kankei, ed. Yamamoto Yūzō (Nagoya: 
Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2003), 87-128. Gary Wilder uses a term “imperial nation-state” to describe France of 
interwar years. With that term, he highlights the contradiction and tension created by political universalism and 
cultural particularism. Gary Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between 
the Two World Wars (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2005).
 Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa 1895-1930 11
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 20-21.
 But the idea of “race” was still defined by the beliefs, traditions, institutions, behavioral characteristics, rather 12
than “scientific” racial differences until the late nineteenth century. Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: 
Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900 (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), particularly 
113-119.
religious heritage. The early twentieth century concept of the nation-state rapidly took over the 
notion of empire—this historical temporality shaped Japan’s obsession with assimilation.  13
For many Japanese colonial rulers, racial, ethnic, and cultural assimilation [dōka] was a 
sui generis logic of legitimacy.  In the French mission civilisatrice, the avowed goal of 14
assimilation was the implementation of French republicanism, which the French claimed was 
universally applicable. In Japanese colonies, racial and ethnic descriptors defined the goal of 
assimilation, or in other words, the goal was set as to integrate colonial people into the “Yamato 
race.”  The definitions of “Japanese nation” and “Yamato race,” the envisioned degrees of 15
assimilation, and the advocated means to achieve assimilation lacked consistency. Nevertheless, 
Japan’s assimilationism is characterized by its priority to make the colonized similar to the 
colonizer rather than to make the colonized better in the universal scale of civilization—although 
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 Just to be clear, Gotō Shinpei was not a strong supporter of assimilation policy. A number of historians of 13
Japanese imperialism have studied Japan’s assimilationist rule. Many focus on the effects, pointing out their limits, 
contradictions, and forceful nature. See Mark Peattie and Ramon Myers, ed. The Japanese Colonial Empire, 
1895-1945; Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tōgō (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996); Mark 
Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2009), and many other sources offer us excellent analyses in this respect. But, to me, they are short of articulating 
where the drive for assimilation came from, especially in the 1920s and 30s. More recently, Takashi Fujitani argues 
that wartime integration policies meant an extension of governmentality. By comparing Koreans in the Japanese 
empire to Japanese in the United States, his work breaks the boundary of traditional “imperial-colonial” paradigm. 
Todd Henry applies Foucault’s governmentality differently, showing porous and messy assimilation practice in 
“contact zones” in Seoul through ethnographical analysis. I share the same interest in understanding Japanese 
colonial rule as one manifestation of the modern (“postcolonial” as they call) state, which happened to take the form 
of a colonial empire. Takashi Fujitani, Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during 
World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Todd Henry, Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule and 
the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014).
 In English-language scholarship, Mark Peattie’s piece on Japanese ideas on colonialism is still an excellent piece 14
among all. Mark Peattie, “Japanese Attitudes toward Colonialism, 1895-1945” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 
1895-1945, 80-127.
 For more detail on the concepts of race and ethnicity in Japanese imperial rhetoric, see Kevin Doak, "The 15
Concept of Ethnic Nationality and its Role in Pan-Asianism in Imperial Japan," in Pan-Asianism in Modern 
Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders, ed. Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 168-82.
the difference between the two disappeared when measuring the “cultural level” of the 
colonized.   16
This normative goal was particularly strong in the rule over Taiwan and Korea, the two 
longest-standing and geographically closest colonies. The first Governor-General of Korea, 
Terauchi Masatake, defined the assimilation policy in the “Proclamation of Annexation” in 1910: 
“It is the natural and inevitable course of things that the two peoples [of Korea and Japan] whose 
countries are in close proximity with each other, whose interests are identical and who are bound 
together with brotherly feelings, should amalgamate and form one body.”  The same-ness in 17
racial, ethnic, and cultural terms increased in importance and became the premise for Pan-Asian 
unity over time. The kōminka policy implemented in Taiwan and Korea between 1937 and 1945, 
often translated as the “imperialization” or “imperial subjectification” policy, sought racial and 
ethnic conversion or “Japanization.” The term kōminka was already familiar as a policy to 
“Japanize” or “nationalize” Okinawan people in Meiji.  The kōminka demanded that 18
Okinawans, Taiwanese, and Koreans speak, eat, walk, think, and die like ideal Japanese subjects. 
As a rhetorical goal, assimilation bore contradictions in assumptions and policy designs 
leading to confusion in practice.  Nonetheless, the goal was never abandoned and affected 19
policies in the same way that the idea of mission civilisatrice shaped the practice of French 
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 Michael Kim, “The Colonial Public Sphere and the Discursive Mechanism of Mindo,” in Mass Dictatorship and 16
Modernity, ed. Michael Kim, et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2013), 178-202.
 Government-General of Chosen, Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen (Korea) 1910-1911 (Seoul: 17
Government-General of Chosen), 242, trans. Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 
1876-1945 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 116.
 Ōta Masahide, Okinawa no minshū ishiki (Tokyo: Shinsensha, 1976), 341-344.18
 For discussion on the policy of colonial integration and separation, see Ōe Shinobu, et al. ed., Iwanami kōza 19
Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi 4: Tōgō to shihai no ronri (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1993).
colonial rule. Alice Conklin claims that “republican France invested the notion of a civilizing 
mission with a fairly specific set of meanings that set limits on what the government could and 
could not do in the colonies.”  Similarly, the drive for nation-empire and assimilationist goals 20
framed how Japan governed its colonies. Most of the Japanese colonial strategists assumed a 
continuation from the integration of Ezo (Hokkaidō, 1869) and Ryūkyū (Okinawa, 1879) to the 
acquisition of “outer territories,” including Taiwan (1895), Karafuto (1905), Korea (1910), and 
Nanyō (1919). They envisioned Korea as a colony of agricultural settlement similar to 
Hakkaidō.  Okinawans often heard the phrase: “Okinawa is the eldest son, Taiwan the second 21
son, and Korea the third.”   22
Nation-empire building required a thick ruling structure resembling that of the nation-
state. Among the empires, Japan deployed by far the largest number of colonial bureaucrats per 
capita. Colonial bureaucrats in Korea numbered 103,225 in 1942 for a population of roughly 20 
million and 86,212 in Taiwan for a population of about 4 million in 1940.  In contrast, slightly 23
more than 1,200 British bureaucrats worked in the elite administrative division of the colonial 
service in Africa for an estimate population of 43 million. The Indian Civil Service had 1,250 
covenanted members for a population of 353 million.  In French West Africa, the colonial 24
bureaucracy averaged 500 French officials for the population of 15 million in the 1920s. 
Indochina, with nearly 21.5 million people, had a larger bureaucracy, but it only numbered 
!  9
 Conklin, A Mission to Civilize, 2.20
 Uchida, Brokers of Empire, 9.21
 A quote of Higa Shunchō’s memoir “Nengetsu to tomoni,” Okinawa taimusu, March 11, 1964, in Ōta, 337.22
 Okamoto Makiko, Shokuminchi kanryō no seijishi: Chōsen, Taiwan sōtokufu to teikoku Nippon (Tokyo: 23
Sangensha, 2008), 51 and 60.
 John Cell, “Colonial Rule,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume IV The Twentieth Century, ed. 24
Judith Brown and WM. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 232.
5,000.  In addition to state employees, schoolteachers and semi-governmental organizations 25
facilitated dense and intense rule over colonial people. Educators compared the new territories 
and peripheries in the Japanese countryside to strategize assimilation of local people. Moral 
suasion [kyōka] groups operated simultaneously in Japan and its colonies to teach Emperor-
centered nationalism and modern living customs. Youth training institutions were a part of the 
thick apparatus of the empire. 
The diversion from the European norm of colonialism became clear, particularly during 
the interwar years. The world community of empires largely shifted toward indirect or 
associationist rule after World War I. All empires became increasingly sensitive to international 
reputation in the system created under the League of Nations, where they set standards and 
watched one another’s colonial practice.  In this new international arena, indirect colonial rule, a 26
policy propagated by Lord Lugard in his 1922 The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 
became the norm even for non-British empires.  Imperial propagandists depicted indirect rule as 27
more humane, more feasible, more far-sighted, and less costly than assimilationism or 
segregation. Various ideologies and phenomena served behind this global turn, including agrarian 
romanticism glorifying remote villages and tribes, democratic oversight at home over the cost of 
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colonial rule, an increasingly influential international audience, and new racist and eugenicist 
theories, as well as politics among colonial settlers, administration and the metropole.   28
Surrounded by the same international conditions, however, Japan accelerated its 
assimilationism.  The “Wilsonian moment” of 1919—the Korean mass demonstrations for 29
independence and the Taiwanese movement for self-rule—propelled Japan to seek more 
sophisticated means of assimilation rather than turning to the British-style associationist or 
indirect rule. In response to the independence movement, Prime Minister Hara Takashi argued 
that “[t]he desire of most Koreans is not for independence, but to be treated as equals of the 
Japanese. I intend to see to it that the Koreans have such equal opportunities in education, 
industry, and government position, as well as to undertake reform of local government along the 
same lines it has proceeded in Japan.”  During total mobilization for World War II, assimilation, 30
or “Japanization,” became a moral imperative for colonial rulers. Governor-General of Korea, 
Minami Jirō, argued that the initiation of military service in Korea was another step toward 
completion of a united Japan and Korea. He declared, “our country’s rule of Korea is 
fundamentally different from colonial policies of Western powers.”   31
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Placing the Japanese empire in the global perspective highlights another aspect. Japanese 
colonial rule in Taiwan and Korea was more cohesive and uniform than suggested by historians 
who have sought to stress the differences between the two colonies. These scholarly efforts may 
have been driven by the observation that post-1945 memories of the colonial period have 
diverged significantly.  Certainly, many things differed between the two places—but there were 32
a variety of colonial experiences across classes, locations, gender, and generations even under the 
same colonial government. What stands out more is the similar trajectory of the two. Both began 
with resistance battles and chaotic state-building before 1919, “Cultural Rule” after 1919, 
agricultural mobilization in the 1930s, and the Japanization policy after 1937 before colonial rule 
ended abruptly in 1945. This degree of similarity is rare in other colonial empires whose 
territories spread widely across the globe and followed their own chronologies. The cohesion 
emerged more easily because of the geographical proximity of these colonies and Japan. Still, 
Japanese leaders had to pursue it deliberately, given the rivalry between the colonial 
governments and the differences in social backgrounds between Taiwan and Korea. The 
similarity was a product of the aspiration for nation-empire building widely shared by policy-
makers, bureaucrats, popular writers, and colonial teachers.  
This dissertation attempts to show both the similarity resulting from the aspiration for 
nation-empire building and the differences in the reception of the nationalizing or assimilating 
efforts at the local level. Rural youth training was one device to create a nationalistic population 
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in Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. It did not begin simultaneously or achieve the same result. 
Nevertheless, rural youth training shows how the drive for nation-empire produced a broad 
pattern across the empire, creating the unique kind of oppression and social opportunities in the 
rural peripheries. 
Rural Youth as an Analytical Category 
The focus of this dissertation is not the policy formation of nationalization and 
assimilation but the translation of state mobilization to the local context.  I chose rural male 33
youth to analyze the local point of view. They were one of the most important targets of 
nationalization in Japan and assimilation in Taiwan and Korea. Because the popular term “rural 
youth” [nōson seinen] assumed male gender, men experienced direct exposure to the discourse 
and practice of rural youth mobilization. Women were, of course, no less important. Young 
women in the countryside, too, were intensively mobilized, but because their social statuses and 
norms were different from those of their male counterparts, they deserve a separate narrative 
from what this dissertation presents.  34
Viewing the nationalization and assimilation policies from the perspective of young men 
in the countryside helps us maintain distance from “the state’s own prose” and explore “how the 
state appears in everyday and localized forms,” as anthropologists Thomas Blom Hansen and 
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Finn Stepputat advocate.  In all three places, young men in the countryside were called national 35
“pillars” and constituted the majority of military recruits during World War II. Since the rhetoric 
of Japanese nationalism was common in rural youth mobilization, many scholars have taken it at 
face value and focused on the degree to which the state accomplished nationalistic indoctrination 
or identity conversion.  However, their lives were deeply rooted in village society, and their 36
local contexts shaped their desires and emotions more directly than state policies. In order to 
understand the mechanism of mobilization, I propose to break the analytical dichotomy between 
the state and individuals, often overemphasized by concepts such as persuasion, discipline, and 
resistance. I emphasize the need to account for the social tensions surrounding these youth. I start 
with a premise that people’s identities are multi-faceted and context specific.  Youth in the 37
countryside did not live in the binary between national and local identities, or between Japanese 
and Korean (or Taiwanese) identities. Depending on the situation, they saw themselves as 
Japanese, Taiwanese (or Korean), northerner, rural, male, young, and so on. I argue that complex 
combinations of these self-images motivated the youth into the participation in state 
mobilization. Youth came to internalize, often earnestly, the nationalistic rhetoric because it 
helped them achieve other social goals. In short, the perspectives of youth in the countryside 
show us the diversity of their identities and social relationships. However paradoxical it might 
appear, such diversity explains their acceptance of the ideology of Japanese nationalism.  
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Rural villages are important because not only were they intensively mobilized, but also 
the majority of people lived there—roughly 70% of Japanese, 80% of Taiwanese and Korean 
lived in the countryside in the 1930s.  Louise Young claims that urban areas, particularly Tokyo, 38
were the face of modernity, and rural areas became “modernity’s Other.”  In reality, however 39
popular and powerful urban culture was, cities were the Other for most people in the empire. 
This leads us to rethink the implications of colonial modernity as well as urban centrism in the 
historiography. Historians often turn to the cities, particularly colonial capitals, to find both the 
attractive and exploitative aspects of colonial modernity. Yet, for the majority of Taiwanese and 
Koreans, urban modernity—including mass media, urban landscape, and advanced technology—
was a distant image. The Taiwanese and Koreans experienced the cultural hegemony of the 
empire from the standpoint of rural peripheries. In fact, rural populace lived in their own 
globalizing moment—the rise of agrarianism—in the early twentieth century. Borrowing such 
global force, many youth in the countryside attempted to achieve rural modernity—defined 
fluidly by the denial, transformation, or imitation of urban modernity. Their desire to subvert 
urban centrism enabled the state to strengthen its rule over remote villages. 
In the social history of each place, I use the term “Rural Youth Industry” to describe a 
social sphere where youth viewed state mobilization as a means to achieve rural modernity. It 
consisted of young farmers who graduated from elementary school and joined the seinendan and 
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other youth training programs while remaining in the village. In the Rural Youth Industry, 
agrarian youth obtained new job opportunities and enhanced their confidence as rural youth vis-
à-vis intellectuals, urban youth, and older generations. In this sphere, Japanese agrarian 
nationalism resonated among the youth through a shared communicative space, not only in 
Japan, but also in Taiwan and Korea. Scholars have argued that the Japanese military founded a 
popular basis in rural society because it preserved feudal and conservative characters.  Unlike 40
these scholars, I argue that it was the hope of agrarian youth to subvert social hierarchies, 
achieve personal success, and become members of a global community—their desire for a rural 
modernity—that facilitated the spread of nationalistic and militaristic ideology.  
Rural modernity was as much imagined as urban modernity was, and the youth’s desire 
for such modernity reflected the harsh living conditions of the countryside. This does not 
contradict scholarship that emphasizes the exploitation of rural peasants.  Still, the exploitative 41
economic structure was not the only relationship the national-imperial state developed with rural 
populations. Nor was everyday resistance, such as foot-dragging, false compliance, sabotage, and 
pilfering, which James Scott calls “weapons of the weak,” the only means of exercising power 
for these youth.  This dissertation shows that youth lived in complex social relationships, and, 42
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whenever they could, they saw state and anti-state mobilization as the platform from which to 
engage with other social challenges.  
The concept of the Rural Youth Industry helps reinterpret mobilization from the youth’s 
point of view and makes the comparison of nation-building among different villages possible. 
Measuring and comparing the spread of nationalism is a difficult task. Nationalization is a 
continuous process, not something that culminates and moves on. The state did not transform all 
the populations into patriotic Japanese nationals by the end of World War II. The variation across 
places and people raises a number of questions: If the goal was a nation-empire, how similar 
were the processes of nation-building at home and colonial rule in Taiwan and Korea? How 
comparable were Japanese nationalisms expressed by Japanese youth and colonial youth? From 
where did the difference between Taiwan and Korea come? By comparing the emergence, 
development, and demise of the Rural Youth Industry in three villages, this dissertation offers 
some provisional answers. In all cases, local contexts, especially compositions of social 
hierarchy and geographical locations, defined the development of the Rural Youth Industry. 
The Structure of the Dissertation: Villages and Individuals 
Rural youth mobilization in the Japanese empire was not only a set of governmental 
policies and institutions; it was also a social movement. Intellectuals, social reformers, activists 
of various political camps, and youth participated in the mobilization. Together they created a 
social imaginary of “rural youth”—healthy, masculine, and hardworking national “pillars.” In 
Japan, the concept of “rural youth” and the institution of seinendan grew hand in hand. Chapter 1 
discusses how the various interests converged on training of young men in the countryside. The 
twin development of the seinendan and idea of “rural youth” shows the continuous effort to 
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nationalize the Japanese countryside as well as tensions hidden underneath. Once the 
organizations spread in Japan, anti-colonial intellectual youth in Taiwan and Korea viewed the 
seinendan as a tool for nation-building of their own in the 1910s and 20s before they became an 
apparatus to spread Japanese nationalism. To fight colonial rule, many turned to socialist and 
communist support from abroad, leading to ideological splits and complex youth politics in 
Taipei and Seoul. Chapter 2 shows that, although anti-colonial youth leaders shared a belief in 
the importance of mobilizing rural population, the concept of “rural youth” did not help them 
bridge the ideological differences or the gap between elite youth in the cities and illiterate youth 
in rural villages. 
The problems faced by national leaders already show a divide between the headquarters 
in urban capitals and local branches. In rural villages, youth viewed mobilization in light of their 
own social opportunities in their immediate contexts. To examine the gap between national 
movements and youth’s perspectives, I offer social histories of three villages—Shida village in 
Miyagi prefecture in northeast Japan (Chapters 3 and 4), Beipu village in Xinzhu province in 
northern Taiwan (Chapters 5 and 6), Kwangsǒk village in South Ch’ungch’ǒng province in 
central South Korea (Chapters 7 and 8). One might wonder how representative of Japan, Taiwan, 
and Korea these villages are and how comparable they are to one another. I did not aim to find a 
representative village of each country. Nor did I seek perfect comparability among the three 
villages beyond the observation that they were equally small and peripheral in national-imperial 
politics. The primary goal of comparing villages is to challenge the national framework and 
suggest a new way to dissect the empire. These villages show the diversity of experience within 
present-day national boundaries as well as patterns across the Japanese empire. 
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In these chapters, I examine how rural youth mobilization affected the social 
environments of young people, particularly when and how the Rural Youth Industry emerged in 
each local context. There is a large pattern in the process across the three villages. The rise of 
“rural youth” first served dominant landlords. Youth groups then symbolized the new generation, 
consolidating a social status of relatively privileged youth in the countryside. With an expansion 
of state programs on youth training, the Rural Youth Industry emerged for elementary school 
graduates. Rural youth mobilization during World War II entailed both empowerment and 
brutality in all places. Obtaining the highest prestige in the colonial volunteer soldier was 
simultaneously a breakthrough in social opportunities and a vow to kill the enemies of the 
empire and die for its cause. 
At the same time, there are many significant differences. The process unfolded early in 
Miyagi (Japan), reaching the peak of youth empowerment at the 1920s and early 1930s. In the 
colonial villages, the Rural Youth Industry developed in the mid-1930s. Since the Japanese 
seinendan developed based on pre-Meiji youth associations, youth mobilization concentrated in 
the remote countryside from the early stage. In the colonies, the center of gravity for youth 
mobilization shifted from provincial cities and towns to villages in the late 1920s. This was 
because anti-colonial activists operated in towns and cities before the seinendan and other 
colonial programs proliferated in remote villages in the 1930s. Youth training institutions were 
inclusive and mandatory in Japan, but more exclusive and hierarchical in Taiwan and Korea. The 
scope of youth who took advantage of mobilization differed: Average farm youth in Japan and 
Taiwan went to elementary school and joined the seinendan by the 1930s, whereas a smaller 
number of Korean rural youth could do the same in the 1930s. The Rural Youth Industry in Japan 
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and Korea collapsed when the majority of youth left home as soldiers, workers, and colonial 
settlers, physically emptying the Rural Youth Industry in the early 1940s. Taiwanese rural youth 
also met rapid and large-scale mobilization during wartime, but they were still pursuing 
opportunities through mobilization when the war ended. 
I focus on one or two individuals in each place to discuss what motivated them to 
participate in rural youth mobilization.  In Shida, I found personal records of Katō Einojō 43
(1904-1987) in Ōsaki city hall and conducted interviews with his son. Katō was the eldest son of 
a landlord, not an example of an average farmer. He kept detailed records of his private youth 
group called the Aratanome 4-H Club, as well as documents on village administration and 
wartime mobilization. Personal accounts of average farmers of the 1920s are hard to obtain, but 
his group journal provides voices of neighborhood farmers. In addition to his accounts, extensive 
records on youth training facilities housed in the Miyagi Prefecture Archives, the regional 
newspaper Kahoku shinpō, and a large number of local seinendan newsletters help us picture 
how the Rural Youth Industry emerged in rural villages in Miyagi.  
In Taiwan, I focused on stories of Huang Yuanxing (1925-) and Xu Chongfa (1922-). I 
obtained their contacts after consulting local historians in Xinzhu province. Huang and Xu 
belonged to the average class of rural youth who became the main body of the Rural Youth 
Industry. After elementary school, both went to a number of youth training programs in the late 
1930s and early 1940s. They insisted that we speak in Japanese during the interviews although I 
spoke with their families in Mandarin Chinese. Xu kept not only his own graduate certificates 
and personal letters, but preserved many photo albums, newsletters, and student records of the 
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Xinzhu youth training center, where he worked as an assistant instructor.  They still regularly 44
get together with friends from youth training, converse with them in Japanese, and sing Japanese 
songs. 
In Korea, I was fortunate enough to locate and interview Kim Yǒng-han (1920-). I first 
read his extensive interview in Chibang ǔl salda (Living the Local), published by the National 
Institute of Korean History.  Kim grew up as the eldest son of a family in Kwangsǒk village, 45
South Ch’ungch’ǒng. After elementary school, he participated in youth programs and obtained 
jobs in local administration as a “model rural youth.” He kept a few photos and records of his 
youth training and, as a local historian, collected a large number of materials from the colonial 
period. During our interviews, we constantly switched between Korean and Japanese. On the one 
hand, he was careful in narrating his involvement in colonial mobilization. He remained in touch 
with few members of the seinendan partly because many left the region after the Korean War. On 
the other hand, he emphasized the importance of youth training in formative years of his life. He 
sang Japanese military songs in public and wrote the lyrics down without my soliciting. He 
criticized Korean Marxist historians, saying “they don’t know the real situation of the 
countryside,” showing confidence in his first-hand knowledge of village affairs. 
Personal accounts, particularly oral histories, have a risk of inaccuracy and require 
consideration of how their memories were constructed and narrated. My role as an interviewer—
a female Japanese researcher working in an American academic institution—might have 
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influenced what interviewees said and how they phrased it. These individuals escaped fighting in 
a foreign land, let alone being injured or killed, and that good fortune most likely determined 
their willingness to talk and their interpretations of colonial youth training. I also assume that 
postcolonial situations—their relationships with the new rulers and the growth of Taiwanese and 
Korean nationalisms—affected their narratives. Both societies experienced democratization in 
the 1990s; in Korea, accusations against “pro-Japanese collaborators” have arisen, and in 
Taiwan, accusations against the Guomindang (Kuomintang) regime have led to a nostalgia of 
Japanese rule. I believe these contemporary social and political changes have influenced the 
narratives of people’s memories. Despite these issues, the interviewees provided vivid pictures of 
everyday lives in the countryside we would never gain from archival materials. Being able to see 
their expressions and hear the tone of their voices helped me discern more than I could with 
colonial official reports and newspapers—these printed sources, too, have issues in accuracy and 
reflect the intentions of unidentifiable authors. The personal histories of these men show that the 
affection, grudges, and desires formed in social relationships are important if we want to 
understand how these people became “model rural youth” and how mass mobilization of the 








Chapter 1:  
Making of the “Rural Youth” and the Seinendan in Imperial Japan 
!
Among the many semi-governmental institutions that Japanese bureaucrats supervised in 
the pre-World War II era, seinendan (youth associations) were an impressive success. By the 
1920s, almost every village had a seinendan, which included almost all eligible young people as 
members. The national network spread like a cobweb, and county-, prefecture-, and nation-level 
federations regularly organized sport and training events. The importance of youth education 
through the seinendan gained wide recognition and even challenged the centrality of academic 
instruction provided by the school system. Through the political and economic upheavals in the 
1930s, the seinendan provided the core human resources for agricultural production, public 
construction work, and military conscription, as well as the alleged bastion of nationalistic 
ideology. The more remote the village, the more vital a role the seinendan played in maintaining 
stability and morale in rural life.  
Institutions like the seinendan, locally-grounded and centrally-controlled at the same 
time, were key to Japan’s nation-building—not only in Japan but also in the “outer territories” 
like Taiwan, Korea, and Karafuto. By constructing the symbolic image of “rural youth” with the 
seinendan, state officials attempted to inspire and control young people in the countryside. In 
1904-5, officials in Japan found activities of village youth associations useful for mobilization 
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for the Russo-Japanese War. After World War I, the army pushed the government to standardize 
them under the uniform name of seinendan. By the late 1910s, the scale of the seinendan reached 
its height, numbering 18 thousand groups and 2.9 million members, which remained the same 
until World War II. State bureaucrats established the national headquarters, the Japan Youth Club 
[Nihon seinenkan], in Tokyo in 1921. The national network was amalgamated as the Greater 
Japan Seinendan Federation in 1924, which absorbed the seinendan federations in Taiwan and 
Korea in 1938.  It was renamed the Greater Japan Seinendan the following year, and was merged 1
with similar national organizations of young women and boys to form the Greater Japan 
Seishōnendan in 1941.  These successive steps toward centralization corresponded to the effort 2
of the state to intensify mass mobilization. The seinendan were designed to discipline the 
“impressionable” and “immature” sectors of the population and create ideal Japanese subjects. 
Yet, increasing state control over village seinendan was not the only, or even central, 
reason for the success of seinendan mobilization. It owed to the capacious concept of “rural 
youth” —healthy, masculine, and patriotic national “pillars” —that absorbed the interests and 
goals of everyone involved. Different government ministries, such as Home, Education, 
Agriculture, and Army, had a stake in youth education in the countryside. Intellectuals and social 
activists applied ideas of developmental psychology, imperial youth mobilization, and 
agrarianism to seinendan training programs. Soon the concept of “rural youth” became a fighting 
tool for young farmers themselves. Based on their identity as “rural youth,” they imagined a new  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community extending beyond the village, and even the nation, and sometimes challenged 
established authorities. 
By embodying the idea of “rural youth,” the seinendan made it possible for various 
groups to pursue contradictory sets of interests—creating strong soldiers while deemphasizing 
the presence of the army, keeping young people in the remote countryside while fostering their 
desire to connect with the global community of modern youth, and teaching them self-discipline 
while allowing them to rebel against the establishment. It was this multi-dimensionality and 
flexibility in the ideology and practice of seinendan institutions that produced the nationalistic 
population in the Japanese countryside.  
Yamamoto Takinosuke's Inaka seinen 
The modern rural youth group movement in Japan started in the area around Hiroshima. 
In 1896, Yamamoto Takinosuke, a 24-year-old schoolteacher, self-published a book entitled 
Inaka seinen (Rural Youth).  Like many of the young male population at the time, Yamamoto had 1
escaped conscription duty, probably because of poor vision.  Poverty forced him to abandon his 2
dream of either continuing to middle school or going to Tokyo. Instead, he had to count himself 
lucky to work at a village administrative office and elementary school. Inaka seinen was a 
lament about the life of youth in the countryside, giving voice to Yamamoto’s growing 
frustrations during six years of activism aimed at injecting life into local youth groups: 
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Although [the youth of the city and the country] are both youth, one kind is embraced 
warmly and the other is abandoned on the street. The so-called “rural youth” are the 
ones who have been abandoned. They are without school name or diploma... Despite the 
fact that they constitute the majority of the youth of the nation, they are neglected and 
left out of the discussion.  3!
Yamamoto was reacting against what he viewed as a growing attention to youth focused 
on students in urban areas. The late 1880s and early 1890s saw the burgeoning of commercial 
magazines targeting urban youth. The scholar Kimura Naoe argues that seinen (youth) became a 
new category as a counter to sōshi, the mob-like youth who had engaged in violent political 
demonstrations during the Freedom and Popular Rights movement of the 1880s. The most 
influential source of the new idea of seinen was the popular journalist Tokutomi Sohō and his 
magazine, Kokumin no tomo (The Nation's Friend). The magazine was named after the American 
The Nation, which Tokutomi read avidly while attending Dōshisha English School in Kyoto.  In 4
1887, the magazine featured a series of articles entitled “The Youth of New Japan and the 
Politics of New Japan,” which Kimura calls “a manifesto for the magazine.”  In these articles, 5
Tokutomi, only 24 years old at the time, assigned a role to (high school and college) students as 
the engine of a new Japanese politics.  The voice of Kokumin no tomo echoed around the country 6
and reached far beyond urban intellectuals. Many young men formed associations in cities and 
provincial towns, ranging from small groups of ten to fifteen to large organizations with 
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thousands of members. They produced youth magazines, many imitating the design, format, and 
language of Kokumin no tomo.   7
Yamamoto Takinosuke was one of many inspired by the new discourse on seinen. Less 
than a decade later when Yamamoto wrote Inaka seinen, however, the widening gap in status 
between urban and rural youth made this discourse appear hypocritical: “Most of the so-called 
youth magazines published in the cities have no argument, use beautiful and well-crafted 
language, and yet do not convey sincerity or inspiration,” Yamamoto complained. “They use the 
phrase ‘for the sake of the youth of the whole nation,’ but only consider their [urban] 
consumers... no one is really passionate about inspiring the youth in the countryside.”  8
Despite his frustration, for Yamamoto, “youth” was a generational category and identity 
that transcended the social divide between urban and rural. He called on the reader neither to 
detest nor fear urban youth. The real cleavage he perceived was the one between the young, 
“progressive reformers by nature,” and the old (rōbutsu, literally “old things”), who were 
backward, conservative, corrupt, and indecisive.  In order to fulfill their responsibility together 9
with urban youth, rural youth were in need of reform and guidance. In his eyes, they lacked a 
national consciousness and were “wasteful, lazy, weak, sly, obscene, servile, undetermined, 
reckless, and irresponsible,” though he thought that the social circumstances of farming villages 
had made them that way.  Yamamoto advocated reorganizing traditional hamlet youth groups, 10
which had existed for a few centuries but had lost their ability to educate and train the rural 
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youth.  Simple but concrete guidelines—rising early, climbing mountains, taking cold baths, 11
wearing only cotton clothes, reading newspapers, avoiding early marriage—would bring new life 
to rural youth. 
Agrarian Nationalism 
Yamamoto’s activism is usually considered the starting point of a nation-wide movement 
to revive old hamlet youth groups and transform them into the modern seinendan. But the 
seinendan gained wide support and grew rapidly over the next half a century because the idea of 
strong rural youth was crucial for many forces in Japan’s modernizing society. One such force 
was agrarian nationalism. Although the origin of anti-urban pastoralism can be traced to earlier 
eras, rapid modernization and industrialization during the Meiji period (1868-1912) raised 
widespread concerns about social changes, which led bureaucrats, urban intellectuals, 
agronomists, and landlords to develop various strains of agrarianism, or “nōhonshugi.” They 
believed that urban culture and industrial capitalism corroded national spirit, that agriculture was 
the basis for prosperous and harmonious nation, and that the purity of the nation was preserved 
in the countryside.  One of the most influential agrarianists, Yokoi Tokiyoshi, a professor at 12
Tokyo Agricultural College, emphasized the moral, ethical, and physical strength of farmers. He 
argued: 
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In my opinion the vitality of a country is fostered by its middle-class families; it is 
particularly well developed among farm families. Such qualities as innocence, sincerity, 
obedience, vigor, fortitude, trustworthiness, earnestness, and robust health are 
appropriate for solders and for defending the country. Don’t farmers excel in these 
qualities above all? Although you cannot make a country out of land alone, the country 
must not become separated from the soil. Therefore the farmers, who have the closest 
connection with the land, love it the most and thus love the country the most.  13!
Already apparent in this passage from 1897 was the belief that farmers were the basis of 
the nation’s military strength. Yokoi even argued that the Way of the Farmer was the heir to 
Bushidō, the Way of Warrior.  Army officials had already identified the simple way of life in the 14
countryside as more desirable than the cities for preparing healthy and obedient soldiers. Yokoi’s 
agrarianism corroborated their belief. Although not all agrarianists agreed with Yokoi, as the 
army grew confident in its power to influence domestic and international spheres after victories 
in international wars in 1895 against Qing China, 1905 against Russia, and 1915 against 
Germany in China, agrarianists and army officials increasingly shared common interests and 
goals. By the early 1930s, when Japan launched an all-out war on the Chinese continent and 
established the puppet state of Manchukuo in northeast China, agrarianism provided the rhetoric 
that appealed to Japanese farmers to support imperial expansion. Katō Kanji, the main proponent 
of agricultural migration to Manchuria, argued in 1936: 
Nothing is more important than hardening the spirit of Japan, the spirit of Yamato. 
Accordingly, precisely by taking charge of agriculture as Japanese and devoting 
themselves to increasing the prosperity of the country, the true farmers living in this faith 
will for the first time be able to become imperial farmers. For this reason the farmers 
must for a time spring up, lay aside their sickles, and take up swords. The unity of 
agriculture and the military is a natural thing. The true farm spirit is the sprit of 
Yamato.  15
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Other agrarian ideologues criticized this alliance between agrarian and militaristic goals. 
Yet they also envisioned communalism and collectivism in farm villages—the values 
emphasized by army leaders—as a powerful antidote to the poisons of urban corruption and 
moral decay.  Yanagita Kunio, the founder of modern Japanese ethnology, while criticizing 16
Yokoi as an extremist, also viewed the countryside as the repository of Japan’s native culture. 
Yanagita, then a bureaucrat of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, was alarmed by the 
widening gap between urban and rural society in terms of material development. His agrarian 
romanticism grew stronger as he went on a “pilgrimage” of rural villages and began to write 
more as a folklorist. Popular Meiji novelists also romanticized rustic life and waxed poetic about 
the superiority of farming villages over cities. Tokutomi Roka, Miyazaki Koshoshi, and Kunikida 
Doppo exalted the pure and moral life of rural society in opposition to the emptiness of urban 
life. “Freedom is found in the mountains and forests,” Kunikida Doppo wrote in 1897.  The 17
folkloric turn and pastoral romanticism in Meiji fiction—both the products mostly of urban 
intellectuals—contributed to the deepening stream of agrarianism in imperial Japan. 
Yamamoto Takinosuke’s Inaka seinen reflected both an embrace of agrarianism and a 
critique of pastoral romantics. For him, the discourse of a morally superior countryside had done 
little to boost the self-confidence of rural population. Yamamoto described the mindset of 
villagers that detested everything “rural”:  
The worship of cities among country people has remained unchanged now and in the 
past... People consider it the greatest shame to be called “country bumpkins (inaka 
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mono);” they have changed the name from inaka (countryside) to chihō (local) without 
notice, and avoid uttering the word inaka... When discussing the budget for education of 
a village I know, some argued that, in determining qualifications of elementary school 
teachers, since local teachers do not have correct pronunciation, we should abolish [the 
recruitment of local people] and recruit teachers from Tokyo. Our language in the 
countryside has been gradually corroded by shallow urban language—no inaka 
language, no inaka morals, and in the end they even deny being inaka.   18!
The feeling of being left behind was exacerbated by the extreme poverty of many rural 
areas. Owing to the new tax system, effects of the monetary economy and the deflation of the 
1880s, tenancy increased from about 27% of arable land in 1868 to 45% in 1908.  Famine 19
repeatedly struck Japan's northern regions, where poverty was widespread.  Although conditions 20
in Hiroshima, where Yamamoto lived and wrote, were not as severe as those in northern Japan, 
the nation-wide deflation in the 1880s had already forced many small farmers to sell their land 
and revert to tenancy.  The poverty of farming villages alarmed the government, especially after 21
the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5 drained national resources. In addition to measures taken by 
the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry, the powerful Home Ministry launched the Local 
Improvement Movement (1906-1918) and implemented a number of programs to raise 
agricultural productivity and farmers’ morale. Agrarianism, in the form that promoted diligence 
and discipline of farmers, was invoked every time Japan faced a rural crisis throughout the 
decades before 1945. 
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Insofar as the seinendan became an icon of imperial masculinity and the carrier of 
agrarian ideals, they were a part of a larger global trend hailing the exposure of youth to nature. 
In the view of agrarian ideologues, whether militant or anti-militant, the seinendan embodied 
Japanese national spirit that could only be nurtured by engaging with soil, water, and the rural 
environment. The seinendan were a symbol of rural imperial stocks that stood against the 
“decaying national soul” represented by urban consumer culture of the 1920s and 30s, with its 
jazz, cafes, and “modern girls.” The feminizing effect of urban culture on young men was a 
globally observed phenomenon. Robert Baden-Powell established the British Boy Scouts in 1907 
as a response to “the weak, stunted, over-excited, and too often diseased” slum children in urban 
cities.  Baden-Powell and other educators believed that the exposure to fresh air and nature 22
would transform these urban youth. Other youth groups around the world in the early twentieth 
century, such as the German Wandervogel and the American 4-H Club, implemented similar 
programs, linking agrarian ideals to new educational theories. The seinendan not only responded 
to this trend, but put its agrarian ideals into practice even more intensively than their 
counterparts. This was because, unlike Europe, the members were themselves rural residents who 
constituted the main labor force in agricultural production. 
Moral Suasion, Moral Training, and Social Education 
Agrarianists held various opinions regarding the role of army and state officials in 
fostering harmonious rural communities. All their lectures to seinendan members, however, 
came to the same conclusion: you must work hard, and hard work is sacred. Yanagita Kunio 
argued retrospectively in 1930 that “what brightened the future of new Japan [in Meiji and 
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Taishō (1912-1926)] was the development of the seinendan,” and that their foremost strength 
was their work ethic. “They demonstrated robust and pleasant labor for road repairs, tree 
planting, or rescue operations. The pleasure of engaging in collective labor with a cheerful mind 
was a healthy interest and stimulation for the members as well.”  The “hardwork-23
ism” [kinrōshugi] defined seinendan activities and was re-interpreted many times during cycles 
of economic and wartime mobilization in the first half of the twentieth century.  
Hardwork-ism became the core principle of the seinendan mainly through the activities 
of the Hōtokukai (Society of Repaying Virtue). The Hōtokukai began as local organizations to 
implement the teachings of Ninomiya Sontoku (1787-1856), a philosopher and practitioner of 
agrarian morality, in the late nineteenth century. His followers preached honesty, diligence, 
communal values, and most importantly, the harmony between moral and economic incentives 
by emphasizing the virtue of labor. State officials, particularly those in the Home Ministry, 
enthusiastically supported the establishment of Hōtokukai groups in 1905, the same year that the 
seinendan became a national movement. The Hōtokukai quickly spread through the nation to the 
extent that, in 1911, there was reportedly no local area that did not have a Hōtokukai branch.  24
The Hōtokukai were a twin of the seinendan that translated an abstract agrarianism into a set of 
disciplining measures not only for the youth groups, but also for elementary schools and village 
administrators to adopt. 
Discipline provided by the Hōtokukai was useful, particularly from state officials’ point 
of view, in promoting governmental moral suasion [kyōka] campaigns. Originally a Buddhist 
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term, kyōka for Meiji Japan meant ideological education to create diligent and loyal subjects 
dedicated to the cause of the nation.  In the Local Improvement Movement, local officials and 25
leaders conducted various moral suasion campaigns in both urban and rural communities.  Its 26
ideological principles were written in the Boshin Imperial Rescript (1908): Emperor-centered 
nationalism, hardwork-ism, and the spirit of frugality. Through kyōka campaigns, these values— 
or “the state’s prose and propaganda”—became familiar rhetoric in people’s everyday lives.  27
The Hōtokukai took charge of designing many kyōka campaigns, and regarded the seinendan as 
the engine of kyōka in rural villages.  
In order to turn young farmers into reliable pillars of Hōtokukai-led kyōka programs, 
seinendan leaders and schoolteachers conducted shūyō (moral training, self-cultivation). As an 
umbrella term for non-academic youth education, shūyō usually meant reading and listening to 
tales of “the spirit of sacrifice, beautiful morals of obedience, good customs of simplicity and 
thrift, and an ethic of discipline and moderation.”  Through shūyō, seinendan members were 28
supposed to understand the importance of agriculture and find passion in improving the 
conditions of rural villages. Shūyō was also considered a counter-measure to mass youth 
migration to big cities, a grave concern for officials and agrarian activists alike. The term, “city 
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fever,” was evoked by seinendan advocates because of the way in which urban life changed the 
body and personality of the migrant: 
Those who migrate to cities soon experience a deterioration of their health... Moreover, 
those who have already acquired the taste for urban life do not return to the village no 
matter how difficult their lives are, and even if they move back, there is little possibility 
that they will become good farmers.   29!
By internalizing Hōtoku discipline through shūyō, seinendan members were expected to remain 
in the countryside and shoulder kyōka campaigns in the village.  
In the 1920s and 30s, kyōka campaigns and shūyō programs further expanded under the 
name of “social education”—a term coined by state officials in the Ministry of Education in 1920 
in order to promote education among working teenagers.  Officials had recognized the need for 30
academic guidance outside school since the Russo-Japanese War. A survey of the academic 
achievements of elementary school students in 1905 Tokyo showed how quickly their abilities 
deteriorated after they graduated from school and how low their success rate in the conscription 
exam had fallen.  In the 1920s, facing increasing political activism by socialist and communist 31
leaders, widespread tenant disputes, and heightening labor movements, the Ministry of Education 
set up a bureau of “social education” (1924) to expand the education of working teenagers 
outside school. The Ministry launched a program called “Kyōka Total Mobilization” in 1929 to 
take a stronger state initiative in kyōka campaigns rather than leaving them to activists and semi-
private entities.  32
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The emphasis on “social education” reflected a conscious effort by state officials to 
engage with an increasingly complex “society.” Norisugi Yoshihisa, an education official who 
founded the social education administration, theorized about “society” and the purpose of social 
education in many of his writings. “A critical discovery in modern scholarship, an equivalent of 
the discovery of a new continent by Columbus, is that of the fact and concept of ‘society,’” he 
argued. He considered it miraculous that social education became part of the Ministry’s work in 
1920 because “until several years [before], government authorities did not have a good feeling 
about the word ‘society’ itself.” For him, society was “an organic group consisting of people who 
share a collective purpose.” Social education aimed at helping individuals acquire qualities to be 
good members of society, including the spirit of social cooperation, public service, and self-
reliance.  In effect, social education was continuation of previous kyōka campaigns and shūyō 33
programs in a more institutionalized fashion, and both these terms remained central in social 
education. Norisugi and other education officials continued to regard the seinendan as a central 
institution of social education. They viewed the deep roots of youth groups in village societies as 
best suited to the goal of transforming the members and villagers into modern social and national 
citizens. 
The Influence of the Military and Taishō Democracy 
The rising importance of the concept of “society,” as reflected in the term “social 
education,” revealed how the role of the state vis-à-vis its people was changing in the 1920s. The 
social sphere expanded and challenged bureaucracy, particularly in the form of contentious 
politics—rivalry between political parties, tenancy and labor disputes, heightening socialist and 
!  36
 Matsuda Takeo, “Norisugi Yoshihisa no shakai kyōiku ron no keisei to sono tokushitsu,” in Gendai Nihon shakai 33
kyōikushi ron, ed. Shinkai Hideyuki (Tokyo: Gakujutsu shuppankai, 2002), 56-59.
communist activities—of the period of “Taishō Democracy.” Intellectuals and liberal activists 
criticized the steady development of the influence of the military over politics and society during 
this period. The seinendan played a unique role in this milieu. Born out of Japan’s wars against 
China and Russia, the seinendan were the key institution between the army and the rural 
population. At the same time, village seinendan members saw their groups as a means to 
participate in contentious politics. Because of this apparent dual characteristic of the seinendan
—shouldering the army’s goals and bringing democratic activism to the grassroots level—, 
historians’ evaluations of the role of the seinendan are also divided. Scholars such as Ōe Shinobu 
and Richard Smethurst consider the spread of the seinendan as an indicator of rising militarism, 
while others, including Kanō Masanao, Ōkado Masakatsu, and Ōgushi Ryūkichi, see it as a sign 
of growing democracy.  34
The army’s involvement is central in the development of the seinendan. An important 
Meiji leader, Yamagata Aritomo, believed in the socialization effect of military training and set 
up the army conscription system in 1873. Yamagata’s protégé and future Army Minister and 
Prime Minister, Tanaka Giichi, established the army reservist associations (zaigō gunjinkai), 
tying together former conscripts throughout the country in 1907. These leaders viewed the army 
as “the final national school” that teaches loyalty, discipline, and patriotism among the 
population.  World War I prompted Tanaka Giichi, then the chief of Administration Bureau of 35
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the Army Ministry, to strengthen and centralize the seinendan. Tanaka studied the mobilization 
of various youth groups while touring in Europe during the Great War, and was convinced that a 
firm grip on youth was of critical importance if the nation were to avoid a major ideological 
upheaval at a time of war. He energetically promoted this view in writing, including his 1915 
book, Social National Education: 
Youth education is not just an issue of pedagogy, but that of national survival. On this 
large point, all nations share the same conclusion. Therefore, people in every nation 
realized that youth, shouldering the future of the nation, have to be guided with special 
purpose and caution that does not overly emphasize academic or physical education. It is 
a trend to believe that this is most needed in order to develop the nation. At the same 
time, all nations also share the conclusion that guiding them appropriately strengthens 
national defense.  36!
The strength of German troops, in particular, left a deep impression on Tanaka and other 
government leaders despite their eventual defeat in World War I and Japan’s confrontation with 
them in China. Norisugi Yoshihisa was in awe of the degree of mobilization of students and 
youth in Germany: “In the prewar period, there were 60,346 college students [in Germany], of 
which 38,400 went to war, which amounts to 64%. Moreover, most of these students volunteered 
to join the military.” In contrast, in Japan during the wars of 1894 and 1904, “college students 
who volunteered to fight were extremely few.” In Germany, even elementary school students 
became “soldiers fighting in the farming fields.” Norisugi quoted a German slogan, “the ridges 
of the farming fields are your trench, the potatoes that you plant are your supply, the weeds in the 
fields are your enemies to defeat, and we are German soldiers knowing no fatigue!”  Officials 37
such as Tanaka and Norisugi envisioned that the network of seinendan, along with the army 
!  38
 Tanaka Giichi, Shakaiteki kokumin kyōiku (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1915), 88.36
 Norisugi Yoshihisa, “Senji ni okeru Doitsu seinen o ronjite wagakuni no seinen ni oyobu,” Miyagi kyōiku 235 37
(March 1917): 16-20.
reservist associations, would similarly ensure national sentiment and produce healthy soldiers in 
the countryside.  This belief was strengthened in the face of radicalizing leftist activism among 38
urban college students in the 1920s.  39
The army’s active involvement in youth education did not stop at the seinendan and 
reservist associations. Ugaki Kazushige, who succeeded the position of the Army Minister after 
Tanaka Giichi, established youth training centers [seinen kunrenjo] in 1926. Attached to 
elementary schools, youth training centers targeted working male youth between the ages of 16 
and 20. In close collaboration with the village seinendan, they provided 800 hours of instruction 
in academic subjects, vocational training, and military drills. They were considered a part of 
expanding “social education” and put a strong emphasis on self-cultivation [shūyō]. Although 
enrollment was not mandatory, the army encouraged farm youth to participate by allowing 
shorter conscription terms for the graduates. Touting agrarian nationalism as a core principle, 
youth training centers, like the seinendan, spread in the countryside. Both their goal of 
“improving youth’s qualities as superior national and public subjects” and their methods of 
agricultural and military training showcased the fusion of agrarianism, military goals, and social 
education.  While youth training centers turned into more comprehensive youth schools in the 40
1930s, the idea of governmental youth education traveled to colonial Korea through Ugaki. As 
the Governor-General in Korea from 1931, he launched an agrarian campaign with a strong 
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emphasis on rural youth training, including the establishment of village youth associations and 
youth training centers. 
The extension of the army’s influence over youth education in the name of shūyō alarmed 
many politicians and seinendan advocates. The 1915 decree on the seinendan, issued after 
Tanaka Giichi’s powerful lobbying, stirred controversy because it limited the membership of 
seinendan to those between ages 12 and 20. Despite the fact that the decree defined the 
seinendan strictly as an institution of moral training to spread patriotism, to many people the age 
limit signaled a link to conscription. In the National Diet, a Seiyūkai politician Hikita Eikichi 
harshly criticized the army’s intention: “I cannot help but oppose the attempt to put more than 
30,000 youth associations in Japan under control of military officers.” He argued that, in reality, 
the village seinendan often included those between 20-40 years of age, or even above 50, so the 
age standardization would destroy these groups.   41
In the face of such criticism, army leaders tried to tone down their interest in youth 
education and emphasized the development of physical strength of young citizens instead. 
Tanaka Giichi himself argued, though not convincingly, that preparatory military training would 
potentially harm the army (because youth might lose earnestness by the time they served the 
army) so youth education should focus instead on enjoyable physical exercise and the building of 
bodily strength.  Army officials constantly denied the military ethos in youth training centers. 42
Nagata Tetsuzan, an army officer who had written a famous report on the prospect of all-out war 
mobilization in 1920, for instance, argued that youth training centers “were not born out of a 
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stupid idea to turn people into incomplete soldiers through incomplete military education,” but 
rather “to prepare youth with robust bodies and mentalities instead of teaching them battle 
techniques in peace time, and to send those of best quality to the military camp and educate them 
according to the needs of the time.”   43
Other advocates of the seinendan attempted to establish an image of the seinendan as 
disassociated from the army. One successful form of public advertisement was the construction 
of the Meiji Shrine in Tokyo by seinendan members. Tazawa Yoshiharu, a top official in the 
Home Ministry later called the “father of seinendan,” organized this project between 1919 and 
1923. A total of 16,443 volunteer youth traveled from seven prefectures, camped outdoors, 
cooked for themselves, and engaged in strenuous construction labor for 10-15 days at a time. The 
construction was more dangerous and tougher than the volunteers originally imagined. Many 
were injured or became sick during their service and barely endured the harsh working and living 
conditions. Despite that, for Tazawa and top leaders, this project not only provided free 
construction labor to the government, but also “spiritually linked the Meiji Shrine to the 
seinendan.”  The Meiji Shrine symbolized the direct and deep connection between the Emperor 44
and “rural youth” and increased its importance during World War II. Even village youth in the 
colonies learned about the construction project as a model case of youth’s hardwork-ism, and the 
Shrine became one of the most popular sites to visit during their study trips to Japan.  Through 45
this project, as well as sports festivals and other events held at the Meiji Shrine Stadium, the 
seinendan emphasized their link to the imperial household—a presumably safer kind of 
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patriotism than militarism. Historian Hirayama Kazuhiko argues that it had an effect of 
concealing the military’s involvement in youth programs under the surface of the Emperor-
centered nationalism.  46
In addition to these efforts, some policy changes were also made to respond to public 
concerns about the influence of the military on seinendan. The 1920 government decree on the 
seinendan emphasized the “autonomy” of seinendan members and changed the upper age limit 
to 25. “People-centered and people-based [minshu minpon] ideologies—or the so-called 
ideologies of democracy” triggered this change, Moriya Eifu, another official of the Home 
Ministry involved in the seinendan centralization, later explained.  In fact, this decree marked 47
the beginning of a new phase called the “autonomy movement” in the institutional history of 
seinendan. Although the army did not loosen its grip over rural youth, the rise of socialist and 
communist activism made many youth aware of their political leverage against administrative 
authorities. Some seinendan groups, most famously those in Nagano prefecture, sought more 
independence for young people and local branches from the bureaucratic national network, and 
others attempted to increase youth’s responsibility within the given institutional framework. 
Popularity of the Seinendan in the “Success” Paradigm 
It is hard to know, and impossible to generalize, how young people in the countryside 
viewed the heightening ideological and political interests—agrarian nationalism, moral education 
and training, military needs, and leftist activism—that converged in the village seinendan. But 
one observable fact is that the number of youth groups skyrocketed after 1905. Maeda Ujirō 
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observed that youth groups increased by about 1,000 every year and numbered more than 7,000 
by 1912.  In 1918, the Ministry of Education recorded the total number of seinendan as 18,482, 48
with their members reaching almost 2.9 million.   49
The rapidity and scale of the expansion of seinendan cannot be explained merely by the 
fact that the army and state officials encouraged the formation of seinendan groups. Another 
catalyst was the widespread excitement about Japan’s hard-won victory against Russia in 1905. 
The exhilaration all over the country pressured youth to pass the conscription exam. Joining local 
seinendan and attending their study sessions raised the chance of becoming successful 
conscripts. The rapid rise in the number of seinendan groups was also a sign of their continuity 
from pre-Meiji hamlet youth groups. Although Yamamoto Takinosuke argued that traditional 
youth groups no longer functioned, they were still the most important governing institutions in 
rural hamlets. In fact, the Meiji government initially banned the traditional hamlet youth groups 
because they appeared too autonomous, taking charge of community policing, village festivals, 
fire control, and sometimes engaging in violent mob-like political acts. These hamlet-based 
youth groups did not suddenly disappear, but changed their names and adjusted their activities in 
accordance with the new policies of the Meiji state.  Soon the long tradition of youth groups 50
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itself became a proof of legitimacy and strength of the seinendan, serving as part of the nation’s 
invented traditions.   51
On the surface, seinendan groups that formed in the countryside appeared to share a 
uniform set of activities and purposes. They typically consisted of elementary school graduates 
and were headed by schoolteachers. Around 1910, the Ministry of Education started to gather 
information on various youth group activities and published lists of “model seinendan.” Its 
“Report on Conditions of Youth Groups in Western Prefectures” (1910) argued that all of the 56 
selected groups had similar programs: study sessions, monthly meetings, competitive production 
of agricultural goods, physical exercise, and improvement of public morals.  Other lists of 52
“model seinendan” also gave standard goals: study sessions aimed at improving the success rate 
at the conscription examination and regular meetings intended to improve communal spirit.   53
These national surveys, however, failed to register the popularity of one particular 
activity promoted by the seinendan: night study groups, or yagakkai. Gunma prefecture alone, 
where the total population was less than one million, counted 11,061 night study groups in 
1909.  A booklet of night study group regulations from Shinjō in Akita prefecture from the same 54
year, written with brush and ink, provides a glimpse of its goals and study plan. A new form of 
the Shinjō seinendan, this night study group unanimously agreed to impose mandatory 
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participation for all male residents under 20 years of age in the village. It had two teachers: one 
was responsible for teaching classical Chinese texts and composition, and the other taught 
arithmetic. Twelve organizing members took responsibility for management, and another 21 
members co-signed the new regulations. The study group functioned almost as a regular school, 
except that it adjusted its hours to the farmers' schedule. The teachers offered 48 hours of classes 
per month, dividing students into three levels: preparatory, regular first-year, and regular second-
year. The regulations required members to take graduation exams and expelled them if they 
missed classes more than three times a year. Members had to pay a form of tuition every month, 
consisting of either a batch of homespun straw rope or six pairs of straw sandals.  55
None of the standard reasons given in the national surveys to explain youth group activity 
appeared in these night study group regulations—no mentioning of conscription or public morals
—although the age limit matching the conscription age corresponded to the military’s need. The 
Shinjō night study group’s goal was phrased in larger terms: to catch up with the trends of the 
time and be ready for Japan’s new exposure to international society. The section outlining its 
purpose argued, “now together with the post [Russo-Japanese] war development, the need for 
learning is even more evident. Despite that, what is this condition in which we still cling to the 
obsolete system?”  Transforming the entire group into a study group was a way to bring 56
modernity to the village. For youth in Shinjō, the goals that government officials envisioned, 
such as improving the conscription rate and abandoning old customs, were means to the end of 
achieving rural modernity. They considered the key to modernity lay in opportunities to learn. 
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Education defined success in Meiji society, which drove many rural youth to migrate to the cities 
in the first place. The youth studied classical Chinese texts, which national leaders considered an 
antiquated body of knowledge. Despite such gaps in their conceptualization of what constituted 
“modern,” the night study group provided a possibility—no matter how slight it might have been
—to pursue an alternative path of education for those who did not have means or time to 
continue attending school.  
The aspiration to succeed remained the main source of energy for many seinendan groups 
in the 1920s. Youth in the countryside criticized the prevalent ‘city fever’ because the “real road 
to success” was hard work, not formal schooling. “I would like to say to youth who study by 
themselves [without going to school] —Never despair, carry out your original goal!” One town’s 
seinendan newsletter in Akita quoted the politician Nagai Ryūtarō, who pointed to the 
biographies of such well-known figures as Lenin, James MacDonald, and Mussolini as evidence 
that youth could become powerful politicians by working hard, even if they could not attain a 
formal higher education.  Rural youth wrote many essays that called for patience and diligence. 57
Titles such as “A Youth's Roar: Life is Effort” and “Success Comes from Hard Work” appeared 
in almost every issue of their newsletters.    58
Rural youth re-imagined “risshin shusse” (“rising in the world”), a phrase often used to 
describe mobility pursued through education and positions in bureaucracy in the cities, as their 
own paths as modern farmers and villagers. Scholars have discussed how devotion to moral 
training [shūyō] in the discourses of mass magazines made the goal of ‘risshin shusse’ accessible 
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to middle-class men, as well as women. Maeda Ai, for example, labeled shūyō the “love child” of 
risshin shusse.  Magazine writers and readers attached complex meanings to the word shūyō so 59
it would allow them to challenge the monopoly of success by upper-class men who had access to 
higher education.  Young farmers in the countryside created their own shūyō discourse within 60
the popular “success” paradigm, where individuals’ morality and success were interlinked with 
the nation’s prosperity. 
Career success while living in rural villages did not remain a fantasy in the discursive 
realm. There were real models of farming youth climbing a social hierarchy traditionally 
determined by family pedigree or wealth. Military service was one of the main sources of new 
opportunities. Conscripts acquired a more complete education in writing and reading and gained, 
for example, training in advanced techniques of surveying and map reading. For many young 
men the army offered opportunities for promotions based on their abilities, which often gave 
them a greater sense of self-achievement than a patriotic sense of serving the nation. Moreover, 
soldiers who went abroad to fight in northern China or were stationed in Taiwan and Korea were 
treated as cosmopolitan figures in the village. Their achievements while in service helped 
returned soldiers attain positions in local offices and other institutions. Agricultural schools that 
mid-level farmers could send their sons to also expanded during the course of the 1920s. The 
graduates of these schools rose in the social hierarchy as agricultural experts and teachers.  61
These model figures showed young men in the countryside that “rural youth,” defined by their 
!  47
 Maeda Ai, Maeda Ai chosakushū, vol.2 (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1989), 191, trans. and quoted in Barbara Sato, 59
“Commodifying and Engendering Morality: Self-Cultivation and the Construction of the ‘Ideal Woman’ in 1920s 
Mass Women’s Magazines,” in Gendering Modern Japanese History, ed. Barbara Molony and Kathleen Uno 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 105.
 Barbara Sato, “Commodifying and Engendering Morality,” 99-130.60
 Ann Waswo, “The Transformation of Rural Society 1900-1905,” 561-562.61
specialized knowledge in agriculture and military training, could pursue new career paths of their 
own. The seinendan groups were the first step on this path to success.  
Youth Identity and Rural Modernity 
In the institutional history of seinendan associations, World War I marked the start of 
rapid centralization of village seinendan groups. Government officials supervised their training 
methods, ideologies, awards, and communication across the country. But, as in the spontaneous 
nature of the night study groups before World War I, the standardization of seinendan did not 
mean that youth blindly succumbed to state-centered mobilization. Quite the contrary, many 
youth continued to undertake their own activities, often beyond the scope of officials’ control. In 
fact, annual conventions of the Greater Japan Seinendan Federation saw heated debates by young 
representatives challenging state bureaucrats. Youth took advantage of the national network and 
the improved status of youth in village affairs. For them, youth group activities provided a 
window to the national and global spaces beyond their own villages.  
Centralizing forces grew stronger over the course of the 1910s and 20s. Yamamoto 
Takinosuke, Tanaka Giichi, and officials of the Home and Education ministries re-organized the 
locally formed youth groups into a national network. The nationalization process was 
accompanied by a more forceful standardization. Government funding encouraged many youth 
groups to adjust their goals to closely match those proclaimed at the national level, especially the 
goal of improving the success rate at the conscription exam.  Shūyōdan (The Moral Training 62
Group), a rapidly expanding network of educators led by Hasunuma Monzō, offered blueprints 
of new youth training programs for seinendan activities. In August 1915, for example, shūyōdan 
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gathered 83 rural youth and conducted the first “mock self-rule village” training at Lake Habara 
in Fukushima for eight days. The participants were assigned to small tents representing 
households and ran both the households and the village through consensus-building exercises. 
The shūyōdan educators adopted the use of tents from German Wandervogel activities and 
torches from the British Boy Scouts, and also taught Shinto-style misogi prayers in the water.  63
Tazawa Yoshiharu, the first director of the Greater Japan National Seinendan Association 
founded in 1924, enthusiastically incorporated the training of shūyōdan. Their methods of 
teaching frugality, hard work, and a communal spirit became the mainstream of training 
throughout the prewar period, to the extent that Yamamoto Takinosuke argued that shūyōdan 
were the executive leaders of seinendan.  64
While the impact of these forces of standardization on the life of rural youth varied, one 
phenomenon stood out: young people in the villages began writing. Seinendan members all over 
the country produced an enormous number of newsletters [seinendanpō] during the 1920s and 
30s. These took different formats; some were collections of handwritten essays, others were 
more well-formatted works obviously edited by professional publishing companies. Some had a 
larger number of essays written by youth themselves compared to others that mainly served the 
function of a news bulletin board. 1.3 million issues of seinendanpō produced in various 
locations are archived today.  65
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The medium of seinendan newsletters gave rise to a new practice of identity construction 
as “rural youth.” The phenomenon was analogous to the proliferation of youth magazines in the 
1890s. Scholar Kimura Naoe points out the importance of the act of writing in the creation of the 
concept of “youth” (seinen), arguing that for seinen, the act of writing itself—filling the easily 
accessible media with youthful slogans—rather than the content of their writing, nurtured youth 
identity.  Similarly, seinendan members used the act of writing and the space of newsletters to 66
practice their identity as “rural youth.” One commonality in their writings was to regard youth as 
a distinctive group that had always existed in history. One newsletter put it, “now society, which 
had forgotten about seinen for a long time, has recognized the power of seinen again. Whether it 
was thanks to the seinen's own power or the force of the time, either way the seinen who have 
been quietly thinking and quietly disciplining themselves are now expected to take the grave 
responsibility of carrying out social reforms.”  They also used seinendan newsletters to develop 67
more abstract philosophies. The appearance of essays like “Why Thou Dost Live” and “Hope is 
the Life of Youth,” which had no reference to practical problems, revealed that, in addition to the 
act of writing, such acts of philosophizing became another attribute of rural youth.   68
Gaining knowledge about foreign counterparts also became an important marker of 
seinendan members. Leaders and bureaucrats in Tokyo often introduced German and other 
European youth groups in the national seinendan journal Teikoku seinen (Imperial Youth), 
flooding almost every issue with their feelings of admiration for and rivalry with these groups. 
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The hierarchical passage of information from the center to localities was not the only path of 
foreign influence. Many rural youth spontaneously learned about and adopted foreign 
movements at the grassroots level. Another youth newsletter in Akita, for example, published a 
letter from Mussolini addressed to Japanese youth. Mussolini praised the Japanese empire for 
absorbing Western culture and introduced the Blackshirt Fascist youth to the reader.  The youth 69
often used expressions from foreign literature. Goethe and Tolstoy were two of their favorites: 
“As Goethe says, the fate of Germany rests on the shoulders of German youth… The 
development of our desperate village now rests on our shoulders, the shoulders of youth,” wrote 
a seinendan member.  These youth absorbed the information coming from outside their living 70
space—whether national or international—with eagerness.  
Adding to their intensifying identity as rural youth was the destruction of the urban 
capital in the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923. Witnessing the devastation of metropolitan 
Tokyo, many people started questioning the value of material wealth and the definition of 
national strength. One young farmer recorded his belief in his diary that this natural disaster had 
been destined to happen to punish a sinful urban culture:  
Of late the vainglorious striving of [those] city people had reached extremes that caused 
poor, simple farmers no end of anxiety. With their elegant clothes and their gold teeth, 
gold rings and gold watch chains, they flitted from one lavish social affair to another. 
They would go off on trips to the seashore or the mountains to escape the heat . . . and 
tour the famous sites. But now all that has vanished as if in a dream, consumed by fire, 
and suddenly they find themselves reduced to misery. It seems that Heaven found it 
necessary to chastise them with a natural disaster in order to protect the nation.  71
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The government policy of seinendan standardization, the destruction of urban modernity 
in the earthquake, and the ability of young people to make contact with the outside world gave 
village youth a sense of belonging to the national and global stage. It expanded the space of 
imagination for rural youth far beyond the village boundaries. Many other elements associated 
with centralization affected this new identity. New military-like uniforms, flags, and seinendan 
songs created by nationally famous composers symbolized the network of modern youth. 
Although the earlier youth groups struggled to bring modernity to the rural countryside, by the 
1920s, they turned the definition of “success”—even “modernity”—from an urban-centered one 
conditioned by higher education to a rural-based lifestyle with new assertiveness in their 
communication sphere. 
The Politics of Age  
The rise of “rural youth” as a new category in and outside the seinendan encouraged 
young farmers to engage in various social confrontations in the 1920s. Many participated in 
tenant disputes, rice riots, as well as socialist and communist party activities, directly challenging 
the police and national seinendan leaders. In the institutional history of seinendan, these 
confrontations are considered parts of the “autonomy movement.” Despite the broad scope of 
their goals and activism, both youth themselves and seinendan bureaucratic leaders framed the 
new assertiveness of these farmers as the increasing power of the young generation against older 
ones, rather than rural against urban, local branches against the central bureaucracy, or leftist 
ideals against capitalist-industrialist state goals.  
!  52
Most famous in the “autonomy movement” were the youth of the Shimoina county youth 
group in Nagano prefecture. They argued that their youth group was a voluntary, autonomous 
group not controlled by bureaucrats or military cliques and that youth, “the engine of social 
progress and creation of history in any era,” shared “the same stance with the general masses.” 
They incorporated the arguments of Ōyama Ikuo and Yamakawa Hitoshi, liberal and socialist 
thinkers of the 1920s, asserting that youth education should adopt “scientific research methods,” 
and that youth deserved “freedom to study social issues of all regions, past, present, and 
future.”  The Shimoina youth group was greatly influenced by the Liberal Youth League, 72
formed in 1921 to put into practice Yamakawa’s socialism in the Shimoina region. With the 
League members, the youth group organized demonstrations to demand universal suffrage and 
oppose the Peace Preservation Law, and invited Ōyama Ikuo, Fuse Tatsuji, and other high-profile 
social activists to speak about youth’s autonomy.  To resist bureaucratic control, the Shimoina 73
youth group did not join the Greater Japan Seinendan Federation for more than a year after it was 
established in 1924. Shimoina’s example inspired some seinendan groups in other regions to 
resist official control, particularly those in provincial towns that were already exposed to leftist 
activism.  74
The issue of age limit, yet again, became the central point of contestation in the 
autonomy movement, but for a different reason from the 1915 decree: the youth insisted that 
membership be strictly limited to those under 25 of age and not allow older leaders to have a say. 
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The Shimoina youth group already presented the youth-centered principle, stating that “the 
seinendan has to be for the youth and by the youth” during the discussion on “methods to 
establish autonomous seinendan” in the Second National Seinendan Convention held in 1923. At 
the 1925 Convention, Okano Kenzō, a representative from Kanagawa prefecture, criticized 
Tazawa Yoshiharu’s presence and participation in discussion: “We would like someone who has 
children or grandchildren to refrain from making comments. We would like, just among us 
young people, to discuss slowly and thoroughly and proceed with the convention spiritedly.” His 
remark was met with applause from the audience. The argument that supported the strict age 
limit came up repeatedly during the conventions in these years, but was voted down by the 
bureaucratic leaders each time.  75
The initiative of young people to politicize their age shows how the category of “youth” 
had become a force of its own by the 1920s. At the turn of the twentieth century, education 
experts and government officials had defined the stage of life between children and adults—
adolescence or youth (both translated as “seinen”)—as something distinctive. They imported the 
popular theory of the leading American psychologist, Stanley Hall, who applied the Darwinian 
developmental theory to human life stages moving from primitive to civilized. In his theory, 
adolescents exhibited various traits—impulsive, violent, aggressive, easily manipulated, and 
prone to hysteria—during physical and psychological transitions. Most importantly for these 
experts, teenagers needed structured discipline and guidance to get through this difficult stage.  76
!  54
 Dai Nihon rengō seinendan, Danpō 1 (July 1925): 40-94. Hirayama, Seinen shūdanshi, 92-93.75
 See David Ambaras, Bad Youth: Juvenile Delinquency and the Politics of Everyday Life in Modern Japan 76
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 86-87. State officials continued to list up the “youthful” traits in 
the 1920s and 1930s. See Kubo, Nihon fashizumu kyōiku, 180, on a governmental report on “Youth’s 
Psychology” (1931).
Hall’s theory dominated European youth education, breaking class-based demographic 
understanding and “democratizing” the concept of adolescence as applicable to all the 
teenaged.  Yamamoto Takinosuke’s advocacy of the modern seinendan equally embraced the 77
need to provide structure to youth and, at the same time, aimed at applying the concept of youth 
across economic and regional hierarchies. By the time of the autonomy movement in the 1920s, 
both youth education experts and seinendan bureaucrats realized that this demarcation of youth 
and adolescence as a separate and independent category had become a double-edged sword, now 
providing a weapon for youth themselves. Young people no longer appreciated the model of 
“experienced farmers” [rōnō], exemplified by Ninomiya Sontoku, in the way agrarianists and 
Hōtokukai activists had envisioned.  Seinendan members started to believe that being under 25 78
years old had given them legitimacy and the power to challenge the establishment in the family, 
village, and state. 
Conclusion 
In discussion on Japan’s assimilation policy in its colonies, scholars rarely question how 
assimilation, or nationalization, of the populace in Japan took place in the first place. As a 
powerful device that spread a national consciousness in Japanese rural peripheries, the seinendan 
highlight a few elements about its nationalizing process. Emperor-centered nationalism spread 
not only because it was taught through the Boshin Imperial Rescript, school curriculum, and 
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propaganda, but because it was carried by concepts like “rural youth” that attracted various 
people and groups. The idea of “rural youth” mediated conflicting interests among government 
officials, the army, and youth themselves. One example is the overlap of interests between the 
army and youth in adhering to the age limit. The army’s demand for an age limit on seinendan 
membership generated a new consciousness about age among young people, triggering the 
“autonomy movement” against bureaucratic control. The concept of “rural youth” became a field 
of contestation in the national discourse because it could be deployed for and against the 
establishment. 
Another element apparent in seinendan mobilization is that ideological education was a 
continuous process. The terms such as “kyōka” (moral suasion), “shūyō” (moral training), and 
“social education” remained important throughout the pre-1945 period. The increasing emphasis 
on these terms, as well as the rapid institutional expansion of the seinendan, mirrored the 
challenge and need felt by state officials to counter the rise of “society” in the 1910s and 20s. 
While the colonial governments accelerated assimilation policy in Taiwan and Korea through 
Cultural Rule, the home government was also experimenting new strategies to nationalize youth 
in Japanese rural peripheries. 
The attraction of the seinendan for village youth derived from a possibility for achieving 
a rural modernity, in which the presence of the army was irreplaceable. The military pressured 
state officials to allocate resources for youth education in the countryside. The influence of the 
military was not limited to the institutional support, the education given to conscripts, or the 
modern uniform and discipline that impressed people. In the world of aggressive empires, where 
military capability determined the strength of the nation, army officials called for “rural youth” 
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to shoulder that burden. Through the symbolic image of the world-class military, youth pictured 








Chapter 2:  
Youth Discourse and Agrarianism in the Colonies 
!
While Japan mobilized “rural youth” to spread the ideology of Emperor-centered agrarian 
nationalism to strengthen its empire, the colonized parts of East Asia deployed the idea of 
“youth” to counter imperial forces. Colonial intellectuals often used the metaphor of a human 
lifespan to make sense of their colonial status in a Social Darwinian world. “Childhood,” 
“youth,” and “the old” represented the nation’s vulnerability, vitality, and weakness respectively. 
Liang Qichao, a leading reformer in late Qing China, famously applied this metaphor in his 
Young China of 1900. Liang argued that, as a dynastic empire, China was old and weak, but as a 
nation-state, it was young and had hope for the future. “If youth of the entire nation act 
youthfully, China will become a country of the future; its progress without bounds,” he wrote, 
“but if youth of the entire nation act like the aged, China becomes a country of the past, and will 
soon meet its demise. Therefore, the responsibility for the day rests completely upon our youth 
alone.”  1
Japan’s colonization of Taiwan and Korea drove young intellectuals to adopt youth 
discourse in the hope of establishing national sovereignty. Highly educated Korean and 
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Taiwanese students studying in Japan and China saw powerful youth—particularly Meiji leaders 
—as the secret to national strength. They were also inspired by ideologies popular in the early 
twentieth century, and many turned to socialist and communist ideas. They joined with reformers 
in Japan, China, and sometimes the Soviet Union in the global wave of youth activism. This in 
turn threw them into complex youth politics, however. Nationalist youth advocating nation-
building through modernization and social reform viewed the recent expansion of the seinendan 
in Japan as a model to emulate. Socialist youth, in contrast, criticized these “bourgeois” 
enlighteners for romanticizing the countryside. While competing against each other, they agreed 
on the importance of mobilizing “rural youth” in restoring national sovereignty. 
Their ideological principles, as well as their generational identity as “youth,” forced these 
intellectual youth to struggle on multiple fronts: against Japanese colonizers, older generations, 
the traditional landlords, and other anti-colonial groups in a battle over legitimacy and 
leadership. For them, more than the crackdown by colonial police, the widening gap between the 
students and farmers constituted a major challenge. Despite their attempt to align with youth in 
the countryside, the urban students had little to share with impoverished, illiterate tenant farmers. 
Even those who joined the youth group movements in larger provincial towns were mired in 
their own politics in the local contexts, instead of operating as agents of youth leaders in Taipei 
and Seoul.  
In retrospect, this chasm between colonial intellectuals and the rural population and 
between elite youth leaders and local youth groups provided an opening for Japanese activists of 
seinendan mobilization. Despite the confrontations and crackdowns, the colonial authorities 
never sought to suppress the youth-centered discourse and agrarianism spread by the anti-
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colonial youth. Instead, by investing more resources and deploying familiar tactics of seinendan 
mobilization, the colonial officials propelled the trend further. In other words, imperial youth 
mobilization in the 1930s took advantage of the foundation established by anti-colonial 
intellectuals in the 1920s. 
Korean Students and Modern Youth 
If the seinendan movement in Japan was part of the global trend of youth mobilization, so 
too were youth movements on the Korean peninsula. Japan constituted a large component of the 
international context that affected Korea. Since the mid-nineteenth century, Japan was the focus 
of profound interest among Korean leaders as it simultaneously represented the possibility of an 
independent Asia and a serious threat to Korea's independence. Japan rapidly transformed itself 
from an old feudal system to a modern Western-style polity, aggressively absorbed Western 
knowledge, and intervened in Chinese and Korean politics. It turned Korea into a protectorate by 
1905 and formally annexed it in 1910. Yet, despite the heightening political tension, the pressing 
threat of Western imperialism and the proximity of Tokyo led many Korean leaders to look to the 
model of Meiji Japan. 
The concept of “youth” [ch'ŏngnyŏn] as an engine of modernity was introduced to Seoul 
by Korean students studying in Japan. Having been sent to Japan by the Chosŏn government at 
the age of 14 in 1904, Ch'oe Nam-sŏn, for example, avidly read Japanese and Western magazines 
in Tokyo.  Upon his return, he created the first modern mass magazine in Korea, Sonyŏn (Youth, 2
1908-1911). Inspired by Taiyō (The Sun), a popular Japanese magazine in the 1900s, Sonyŏn was 
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a magazine of literary and social commentary targeting urban youth. In some ways, it possessed 
a novelty similar to Tokutomi Sohō’s Kokumin no tomo (The Nation’s Friend), a pioneer youth 
magazine and catalyst of youth movements in 1890s Japan. After working on a number of youth 
and children’s publications, Ch'oe started another youth magazine, Ch’unch’ŏng (Youth, 
1914-1918).  Through these magazines, Ch’oe Nam-sŏn and Yi Kwang-su, who both became 3
influential cultural leaders of Korea in the subsequent decades, attempted to inspire youth to 
become the protagonists of a modern society.  Korean-language newspapers embraced the 4
youthful forces of the time. In both the main newspapers, Hwangsŏng sinmun (Capital Gazette) 
and Taehan maeil sinbo (The Korea Daily News), the number of articles that discussed 
ch'ŏngnyŏn increased rapidly during the course of the first decades of the twentieth century.  5
These publications defined Korea as an old, debilitated nation: “Our nation Korea is more 
than 4000 years old—politics is old, the bureaucracy is old, people are old, [as doddery] as a man 
of seventy or eighty years.”  Its age was also associated with corruption and laziness, which the 6
strong and healthy youth were “responsible for cleaning up” to “realize the world of reform and 
civilization.”  The authors were well aware that the new attention to youth emanated not only 7
from Japan, but was a worldwide phenomenon. In an article, “Advice to youth,” in the Capital 
#  61
 Yi Kwang-su is a controversial figure in the literature in modern Korean history. He is known as the founder of 3
modern Korean literature during and after the colonial period (1910-1945), and became infamous as a pro-Japanese 
collaborator in the post-liberation period.
 Yun Se-jin, “‘Sonyŏn’ kwa ‘Ch’ŏngch’un’ kkaji,” 23-30. Sonyŏn and ch'ŏngch'un can be both translated as “youth.” 4
Sonyŏn indicated a young generation or a young man and was used interchangeably with ch'ŏngnyŏn in this period. 
Ch'ŏngch'un means a “spring” period in one's life, similar to adolescent years or youthful years.
 In Hwangsŏng sinmun, it increased from 12 in 1905 to 93 in 1908. The youth-related articles in Taehan maeil sinbo 5
also numbered 127 in 1908 and 177 in 1909. Kee-hun Lee [Yi Ki-hun], “Ilcheha ch'ŏngnyŏn tamnon yŏn’gu (A 
Study on the Youth Discourse in Korea during Japanese Colonial Rule)” (PhD diss., Seoul National University, 
2005), 39-40.
 “Syonyŏn ŭi Han’guk,” Taehan maeil sinbo, July 1, 19106
 Yi Sun-jong, “Ch'ŏngnyŏn ŭi chagi” Hwangsŏng sinmun, March 4, 1905.7
Gazette in 1905, the author divided human life into four stages, in the same way as American 
scholar Stanley Hall and others conceptualized it at the time, and argued that the second stage, 
youth, was the key period for education. He explained that “civilized and educated men in the 
Western powers studied youth education and designed youth groups,” and “this wave reached 
Japan, China, as well as our Korean capital.”  To these Korean authors, youth education was a 8
new global standard of civilization to which Korea should be ready to adjust. 
In applying the generational category of youth to the Korean situation, these authors 
contrasted the progressive nature of youth to the incompetent older generations. In June 1910, Yi 
Kwang-su, then an 18 year-old student studying in Japan, captured the feelings of intellectual 
youth in an article, “Circumstances of Korean Youth Today,” published in Sonyŏn. “We youth do 
not have predecessors who can teach and lead us as older generations did,” he argued, “it is a fact 
that nine out of ten schools are clearly not qualified to teach us.” His negation of earlier 
generations was probably attributable to the failure of the Kabo reforms attempted by earlier 
leaders in the 1890s. These modernizing reforms were not able to prevent Korea from losing its 
national sovereignty. Annexed by Japan and surrounded by multiple imperial forces, Korean 
youth, “compared to those in other countries or other times, need to make tens or hundreds times 
more effort” in order to construct a new Korean nation—“whether we youth are aware of our 
own situation determines the line between the prosperity and decline of the Korean nation.” This 
was a time of crisis surely, but also an opportunity for youth to achieve greatness because “it is a 
time like this that made Napoleon a Napoleon, and Washington a Washington.”   9
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The drive to develop themselves was common among these educated youth. Yi Kwang-su 
advocated “self-training and self-cultivation” [chasu chayang] both as individuals and in groups. 
Yun Chi-ho, an American-educated Christian leader, established a youth group among students in 
1909—or what they called “one large spiritual circle of committed youth” —to exchange 
knowledge and become leaders of society.  Similar kinds of intellectual youth groups had been 10
formed among students studying in Tokyo in the 1890s.  Although not as numerous as the youth 11
groups formed in Japan in the 1890s, reports of voluntary gatherings and lecture events by 
“motivated youth” in the Korean homeland appeared in newspapers in the 1900s and 1910s.  12
Some youth saw the generational force as more important to successful nation-building 
than the national roots or tradition. Meiji Japan, in their view, presented a strong case that linked 
youth initiatives to national independence. Despite Japan’s colonial rule over Korea, their 
fascination with the success of the Meiji leaders in repelling Western imperialism persisted in the 
writings of Korean students.  
The day when the American fleet arrived in Urawa Port was, indeed, a crisis that 
challenged Japan’s national survival... and the Japanese nation analyzed this enormous 
problem and brought about a breakthrough... that was no one but the Japanese nation – 
[or rather] Japanese youth – that solved their own problem… We have to be like 
Japanese youth of 40 or 50 years ago, rather than like those of today.  13!
Many of these students engaged in anti-colonial movements, but they also believed that 
the crisis should be dealt with by emulating Japanese youth who had faced a similar challenge 
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half a century before. Korean nationalist youth regarded the modern nation-state as a product of 
generational achievements in the world of Social Darwinian competition.  They turned to the 14
young figures in Japan's recent history or to Europe's imperial examples rather than to their 
ancestors in the long, allegedly continuous, history of Korea.  Embracing a strong generational 15
identity, these youth did not consider it contradictory to be fascinated by the Japanese nation and 
simultaneously engage in the anti-colonial activities, which culminated in the March First 
Independence Movement of 1919. 
Local Youth Groups After the March First Movement 
The March First Movement sparked changes in colonial rule and triggered a new youth 
activism. Urban youth—mostly students—played the leading role in the movement. Inspired by 
Woodrow Wilson's speech on self-determination, Korean students in Seoul (and Tokyo) drafted 
declarations of independence, conducted school strikes, and led street demonstrations which 
spread across the peninsula within a couple of weeks.  The official record states that nearly 16
13,000 students in public and private schools participated in the movement.  The literary leaders 17
who created Korea’s youth discourse were actively involved in organizing the nation-wide 
mobilization. They included Ch'oe Nam-sŏn, whom the colonial authorities defined as “the most 
trusted person by youth and students.”  18
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After these demonstrations were quelled, Korea saw a surge of youth groups at the local 
county level. “At least 10 youth groups are being created around the country every day, and there 
are more than 70 groups just in Seoul right now,” The newspaper Tonga ilbo reported in June 
1920.  Both Korean reporters and colonial officials described the rapid growth of youth groups 19
as “sprouting like bamboo shoots after a rain.”  The government counted 251 youth groups 20
[ch'ŏngnyŏnhŏe] in 1920, 446 in 1921, and 488 in 1922.  It was not an exaggeration when 21
Tonga ilbo wrote in December 1922 that “purely social youth groups flourish and have reached 
more than 500 in number. Every county is witnessing an expansion of youth groups, and 
including religious youth groups, there are more than a thousand organizations.”  22
The rise of youth groups in county capitals reflected the changes underway in Korean 
society in the post-March First period. One was the formation of new alliances between 
traditional landlord families and younger elites outside Seoul. During the demonstrations, the 
student generation began to collaborate with local land-holding leaders. Many sons of the landed 
class were in schools in urban areas, and through their student networks, the landed class 
mobilized rallies in rural areas. In fact, 56% of arrests during the movement were of people in 
the agricultural sector, whereas students and teachers comprised only 13% of the arrests.   The 23
failure of the independence movement made the young leaders realize the need to expand 
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institutional support in the countryside in order to achieve their goal of recovering sovereignty.   24
The new colonial policy called “Cultural Rule” facilitated the spread of youth groups and 
also created a shared space for colonial officials and Korean activists. Cultural Rule intended to 
expand education and promote cultural assimilation of the Korean population. At the same time, 
it attempted to placate anti-Japanese forces by allowing Korean-language publications and giving 
Korean leaders greater access to capital and governance. Two national newspapers launched in 
April 1920, Tonga ilbo and Chosŏn ilbo, served as the major medium and catalyst for the spread 
of local youth groups. Learning from the reports, youth groups copied one another. Typically, the 
landholding class who had donated a significant sum of money formed a preparatory committee. 
For the inauguration ceremony of the associations, they organized events like sports festivals and 
public lectures. Their attitude toward colonial authorities was ambivalent, if not overtly 
supportive. They invited Japanese and Korean officials—the county head, president of financial 
union, chief of police, school principals, and other powerful figures in the county.  Like the 25
Japanese seinendan, their goals stated “to improve knowledge, ethics, and body of the youth,” 
“to expand modern education,” and “to improve social morals.” They pledged to engage in 
lectures, debates, amateur plays, tennis competitions, and night schools for uneducated 
villagers.   26
These youth groups not only mediated between colonial officials and Korean leaders, but 
also bridged generations in local leadership. The example of Chaenyŏng county in Hwanghae 
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province shows that through the new county youth groups, the traditional local (landed) elite 
sought modernization within the conservative social hierarchy. In Chaenyŏng, a small number of 
landlords initiated the youth group movement in May 1920. These leaders worked as Tonga ilbo 
representatives in the region, and formed the Chaenyŏng landlord association at the same time. 
They advocated modern education; “we should alter the previous use of the hyanggyo (local 
Confucian academy)” and “establish a school that could absorb new customs and new thinking, 
sometimes provide lectures and debates, and spread new knowledge.”  Rather than challenging 27
the old Confucian social order, scholar Tsuji Hironori argues, this youth group functioned as a 
forum for collaboration between old and new forces in the local community.  Perhaps these 28
groups also provided a way to re-absorb highly educated but jobless youth back to the local 
social order.  These youth groups led by multiple generations and supported by both Korean and 29
Japanese leaders played a mediating role among many parties in county politics.  
Young intellectuals in Seoul who were more overtly anti-colonial did not miss the chance 
to network with these local youth groups. They established the Korea Youth Group Association 
[Chosŏn ch'ŏngnyŏnhŏe yŏnhaphŏe] in December 1920. Soon one fifth of the local youth groups 
on the peninsula joined this national association.  The core organizers of the association 30
consisted of well-known anti-colonial activists, such as Chang Tŏk-su, Kim Myŏng-sik, O Sang-
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gŭn, Kim Sa-guk, and Yi Yŏng, some of whom were also known as writers for Tonga ilbo.  31
They had come to embrace a Korean national consciousness, socialist ideas, or both, while 
studying in Japan and became vocal negotiators with the colonial authorities upon returning to 
Korea. O Sang-gŭn, the president of the association, pointed out the need for a national 
association for youth groups to “unite the spirit, principles, and activities” of these important 
local forces.  In order to improve cooperation among youth groups, the association planned to 32
support publications, lectures, workshops, night schools, and sports festivals. They placed the 
strongest emphasis on the reform of old customs and assistance for youth’s schooling.  Although 33
the membership was smaller than the leaders were aiming for, their close connection with Tonga 
ilbo allowed them to exercise large influence on other groups that paid close attention to their 
voices and activities. 
It was no coincidence that the activities and structure of both individual youth groups and 
the national association resembled those of the Japanese seinendan. These young nationalists had 
witnessed with their own eyes the expansion of the seinendan institutions and their agrarian 
nationalism in Japan. The seinendan served as the clearest reference point for the leaders of the 
Korea Youth Group Association. “European countries, following Germany, are all trying to 
organize youth groups. Especially in a country like Japan, they ally with people who have 
prominent social stature in order to organize youth groups everywhere and train youth,” wrote O 
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Sang-gŭn a few months after launching the association.  “In Japan and other countries, youth 34
groups developed in each and every village, spreading like a cobweb. Considering that, our 
current status may not be a cause for pride, yet as a new-comer, the growth [of youth groups] in 
such a short period is a world record,” wrote Tonga ilbo on the second anniversary of the 
association.  Despite their empire-colony relationship—or perhaps because of it—the format of 35
the seinendan attracted Korea's young elites who hoped to nurture national consciousness among 
the wider population in the same way that it had attracted state officials and social reformers in 
Japan.  
Taiwanese Students Between Japan and China 
While county youth groups were spreading in the Korean peninsula, the idea of “youth” 
also circulated among the intellectual youth in another Japanese colony, Taiwan. Taiwanese 
students studying in Tokyo started a journal, Taiwan qingnian (Tâi oân chheng liân, Taiwanese 
Youth), in 1920. Like the spread of youth groups in Korea, this journal reflected the post-World 
War I global slogan of self-determination as well as the new Cultural Rule that was also launched 
in Taiwan. As the first organized voice advocating self-determination and Taiwanese nationalism, 
Taiwan qingnian occupied a unique place in the modern history of Taiwan. In this historic 
publication, its editors defined the writers and readers as “youth.” 
The term “youth” or “qingnian” first appeared in Taiwan earlier than the journal itself 
and represented the generation educated in Japanese and Chinese institutions. “Youth circles” 
became a common phrase used in Taiwan nichinichi shinpō, a bilingual newspaper of the 
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colonial Government-General of Taiwan (GGT), in 1905. It referred to the elite youth who 
obtained a modern school education and Japanese language skills in addition to training in the 
traditional Chinese classics. Since the acquisition of Taiwan in 1895, the GGT had been 
attempting to subvert the prestige of the civil service exam of Qing China and supply a new 
status symbol with its own institutions. Toward this end, the GGT established an elite Japanese 
language school and gave titles of honor to local leading figures. By 1905, a decade of colonial 
rule and the recent victory in the Russo-Japanese War had produced a small group of bilingual 
youth among the upper classes. Taiwan’s traditional elite classes expected these “youth circles” 
to more effectively negotiate with the colonial authorities.  
The new focus on “youth,” however, had an effect of disturbing the vertical age hierarchy 
common among Taiwanese elites. The new generation aimed at a transition from the privilege of 
seniority to youth-centered nation-building. Chen Boyu, for example, expressed in the article 
“Taiwan’s Youth Circles” in October 1905: “There are old people [lao], youth [zhuang], and 
children [you].” He explained the division of ages in classical Chinese terms, but then claimed 
that “those who represent the nation [guomin]” and “take on the great responsibility” are the 
youth—expressed in the new term, “qingnian.” Chen did not extol the masculine, militant 
characteristic of youth that the Japanese public was celebrating at the time. Rather, he warned the 
reader against the danger of reckless acts that had characterized Taiwanese youth’s resistance 
against the Japanese, as well as the meaningless deaths of many Japanese soldiers fighting the 
Russians. Youth should observe the “large forces of the world” and “become a citizen of the 
greater nation”—to achieve the goal of the nation, “never give up, but study.”  36
#  70
 Chen Boyu, “Taiwan zhi qing nian jie,” (Han wen) Taiwan ri ri xin bao, October 28, 1905, 9. 36
“Youth circles” not only challenged the age hierarchy among Taiwanese elites, but 
worked more closely with Japanese colonizers than the older leaders expected. They formed 
youth groups in the 1910s under auspice of colonial authorities. Many were created to 
compensate for a shortage of schools. At the same time, new Taiwanese leaders like Lin 
Xiantang, supported by Japanese social activists, advocated a movement to “reform the old 
customs” and “learn the Japanese language.” To be part of this trend, an increasing number of 
local elites created youth groups, although still dominated by highly educated youth.   37
To this steady expansion of GGT-sanctioned youth education, the journal Taiwan 
qingnian delivered a powerful blow. Against the pro-colonial character of these youth groups, the 
Taiwanese students in Tokyo tied the category of youth specifically to Taiwan’s national 
consciousness. More than the Taiwanese writers, the Japanese contributors, including famous 
Taisho democracy activist Yoshino Sakuzō and professor of Meiji University Izumi Akira, 
advocated the value of Taiwanese ethnic identity. “Taiwan is not GGT’s Taiwan. I demand that 
Taiwanese people be self-aware of being Taiwanese,” Izumi argued, and in the inaugural issue of 
the journal, he defined their goal as “self-ruled Taiwan.”   38
Nevertheless, the task of building an ethnic consciousness was anything but 
straightforward. Nationalist activists who allied with the students abroad established the Taiwan 
Cultural Association as their operational base in Taiwan in October 1921. Both these students 
and activists faced similar challenges. Their imagination of Taiwan started from a bitter 
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realization that it was a tiny island located on periphery of the world.  To make up for this, they 39
identified themselves as Han Chinese, proud of the magnificent history and culture of the 
mainland. “The 3.5 million current Taiwanese residents are part of Han ethnicity, which enjoys a 
long history of more than four thousand years,” Lin Chenglu claimed in his article on self-
awareness of Taiwanese youth, “needless to say we are totally different from the 80 thousand 
uncivilized barbarians inhabiting the Central Mountains and Taidong mountainous region.”  40
Even Cai Peifeng, who was more reflective about Taiwanese discrimination against the 
aborigines in his advocacy of equal treatment between Japanese and Taiwanese, proudly 
presented the “Han Group’s Distinctive Features” as “loving peace, admiring ancestors, valuing 
substance, and forbearing.”   41
These Taiwanese youth were drawn to the anti-colonial revolutionary movements of early 
1920s China. A pioneering magazine for these Chinese movements, New Youth (Xin qingnian, 
started in Shanghai in 1915 as Youth Magazine), was an obvious source of inspiration. The 
Taiwanese journal reprinted a copy of the article “Call to Youth,” which the leading 
revolutionary Chen Duxiu published when he founded Youth Magazine: 
Youth is like early spring, like the rising sun, like trees and grass in bud, like a newly 
sharpened blade. It is the most valuable period of life. The function of youth in society is 
the same as that of a fresh and vital cell in a human body… I only, with tears, place my 
plea before the young and vital youth, in the hope that they will achieve self-awareness, 
and begin to struggle. What is this self-awareness? It is to be conscious of the value and 
responsibility of one’s young life and vitality, to maintain one’s self-respect, which 
should not be lowered. What is the struggle? It is to exert one’s intellect, discard 
#  72
 Starting from the opening words of the inaugural issue of Taiwan qing nian, it was repeatedly mentioned. “Kantō 39
no ji,” Taiwan qing nian 1, no.1 (July 1920), 1.
 Lin Chenglu, “Shin jidai ni shosuru Taiwan seinen no kakugo,” Taiwan qing nian 1, no.1 (July 1920): 29.40
 See Cai Peifeng “Wagatō to warera,” Taiwan qing nian 1, no.4 (October 1920): 13-24; Cai Peifeng, “Han zu zhi 41
gu you xing,” Taiwan qing nian 2, no.3 (March 1921): 24-28.
resolutely the old and the rotten, regard them as enemies and as the flood or savage 
beasts, keep away from their neighborhood and refuse to be contaminated by their 
poisonous germs.  42!
The connection with Chinese youth activists brought a challenge to the Taiwanese elite 
youth who valued the lineage of Han culture. Chen Duxiu and other Chinese authors were 
waging a war against the Confucian system of knowledge and governance. Attracted to their 
revolutionary attitude, Taiwan minbao also adopted ‘vernacular’ Mandarin Chinese as the main 
language of publication in 1923. But Taiwanese elite youth still quoted ancient sages and 
warriors in the original literary Chinese.  They hesitated to deny Confucianism at large, fearing 43
that it would undercut their self-definition as great Han descendants. In contrast to their 
hesitation to abolish ancient heritage, they offered passionate voice in favor of the liberation of 
women and reform of the oppressive family system, conceptually separating this aspect of 
modernization and their longing for national roots. But in these areas of social reform, Japanese 
activists, and even the colonial government, were a step ahead of their Chinese reformists.  
The most notable characteristic of the vision of these young Taiwanese intellectuals was 
their rejection of a Social Darwinian competitive world. Their diasporic identity crisis, split 
between their embrace of the historical heritage of a Great China, and an urge for modern 
reforms that often justified Japanese dominance, drove them to value their very in-between-ness. 
“Taiwan’s new youth are equipped with the unique character and capacity to become the 
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middleman for realizing Japan-China friendship,” Zhou Taoyuan argued in the third issue of 
Taiwan qingnian. He deplored the neglect of Taiwanese youth by these two nations, questioning 
whether “it is because the government authorities are afraid of too much potential” of Taiwanese 
youth, or because “Taiwanese youth have not sought development abroad owing to a lack of 
discipline and energy.”  The ideal of perpetual world peace that circulated globally after World 44
War I was not mere utopian rhetoric for Taiwanese youth. Their self-worth rested in the 
cooperation between nations, particularly between Japan and China, not in the severe 
competition assumed in the Social Darwinian world. The editors saw “justice, humanity, 
freedom, and peace” coming to characterize the new era, and called for the Taiwanese youth to 
realize this ideal.  This stood in stark contrast with the goal of survival of the fittest embraced 45
by their Korean counterparts.  
The attachment of Taiwanese youth to mainland China was reflected in their criticism 
toward “the old,” which was significantly milder than that of Korean, Chinese, and Japanese 
youth of the same period or even the Taiwanese “youth circles” prevalent earlier. The articles 
published in Taiwan qingnian and Taiwan minbao called for youth’s self-awareness, defining 
them as the most important agent of social reform. But they rarely expressed antagonism against 
older generations. The “youthful” characteristics praised by activists in Japan and Korea may 
have been vague and inconsistent, but Taiwanese youth’s respect for “the old” constituted a 
significant obstacle to demarcating their age category, however eagerly they embraced of the 
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word qingnian (youth).  
Japan as a colonial oppressor was the only clear “Other” for Taiwanese youth. Instead of 
opposing “the old,” they worked against “conservative” forces, which referred to the oppression 
of the colonial government and the Taiwanese elite who curried favor with it.  Goyō shinshi 46
(government-hired gentlemen) were their nemesis. The confrontation centered on two policy 
areas: equal access to education for Taiwanese and Japanese students and the establishment of a 
Taiwanese parliament, modeled after Irish home rule. Adding legitimacy to their anti-colonial 
identity construction was the crackdowns conducted by the GGT. Once branches of the Cultural 
Association began spreading around 1924, reports on violence, arrests, and oppression by the 
GGT filled the pages of Taiwan minbao. These reports and experiences, in turn, nurtured a 
common identity as Taiwanese youth. 
At the same time, Japan was an obvious modernizing model. The leaders of the Meiji 
Restoration appeared as heroic in their eyes as they did to Korean youth. “Look at the era of the 
Meiji Restoration. Itō, Ōkubo, Saigō, Itagaki, Niijima were the steadfast among the youth,” Wu 
Keji argued and contrasted them to those “lacking patriotism and group spirit” in the new 
Republic of China.  Beyond the Meiji Restoration, establishing constitutional politics and 47
winning the Russo-Japanese War “all depended on youthful enthusiasm and struggle,”  another 48
author claimed in 1924. The Japanese seinendan drew the attention of Taiwanese youth in the 
same way that it had O Sang-gŭn in Korea. Xu Qingxiang published an article entitled, 
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“Encouraging Local Seinendan,” which expressed his admiration at the wide network and 
activities of the seinendan in Japan. Their volunteer labor during the construction of the Meiji 
Shrine particularly impressed him. “Dear wise youth, please look at how actively youth in every 
city, town, and village [in Japan] work and how earnestly society gives guidance and support to 
them,” he begged the reader. Xu did not even modify the state-centric organization of the 
seinendan in advocating it in Taiwan: the members should be “elementary school graduates,” and 
the head of each seinendan should be “the village head or school principal whenever possible.” 
This was the first time Taiwanese elite youth discussed the importance of enhancing local culture 
and enlightenment. In other words, attention to the countryside was generated through the 
discussion of the seinendan.   49
Accompanying the rising popularity of the Taiwan Cultural Association, youth groups 
spread in Taiwan over the course of the 1920s. The association, however, had difficulty in 
counting the exact number of the affiliated youth groups. Many local groups of the “youth 
circles” established in the previous decade were endorsed by colonial officials, and many local 
groups still had dual characteristics in their composition. Chen Wen Sung details the activities of 
Yanfeng youth group in Caotun, Taizhong, which was called the most “solid” youth group by the 
Cultural Association. Even in the case of the Yanfeng youth group, the Japanese village head 
Atsumi Kanzō endorsed it and gave speeches in their ceremonies until it officially became a 
branch of the Taiwan Popular Party in 1927.  It embraced a Chinese revolutionary spirit as 50
expressed in its statement of purpose in 1924, quoting the first half of Chen Duxiu’s Call to 
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Youth. The core elite members, having studied in Taipei and Tokyo, erected a Yanfeng youth 
group building right in front of the village office. This captured the dual characteristics of the 
youth group—the simultaneous association and confrontation with colonial authorities.  51
The leaders of the Taiwan Cultural Association tried to differentiate their youth groups 
from the previous GGT-led ones in various ways. Since both waved the banner of modernization
—abolition of old customs of funerals, marriage, family hierarchies and so on—they had to 
advertise that the Cultural Association truly represented the Taiwanese population. Taiwan 
minbao put up the slogan, “the only organ of public opinion of the Taiwanese,” before its name. 
By 1926, “study group” [dushuhui] became a popular name for youth groups, mirroring many 
“study groups” formed in mainland China.  They claimed that most of the “youth 52
groups” [qingnianhui] worked for colonial officials, but study groups were independent and 
would “conduct real measures to respond to society’s needs.”  These appeals reflected the 53
difficulty in obtaining recognition among people and legitimacy against colonial authorities. As 
in Korea, the central body of the Association stood clearly against the colonial authorities, but 
the local branches often remained ambivalent in political orientation and more subject to politics 
among local leaders. 
Socialist Youth Groups and the Question of Age  54
Both in Korea and Taiwan, colonial officials, anti-colonial leaders, local elites, and youth 
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all had a stake in shaping youth groups to meet their needs. It is easy to imagine that competition 
took place not only between colonial and anti-colonial forces. Complication of youth 
mobilization came from various factors, but the split in the anti-colonial camp at the national 
level contributed to the messy picture. Socialist youth, in particular, asserted a position separate 
from the enlightenment movement and self-strengthening programs advocated by nationalist 
youth leaders.  
In Taiwan, symbolic of this split was the change in leadership of the Taiwan Cultural 
Association in 1927. In the early 1920s, a number of Taiwanese students, including Lian 
Wenxing and Jiang Weishui, came into contact with Japanese socialist figures like Yamakawa 
Hitoshi and Sakai Toshihiko. Others came to devote themselves to communism while studying in 
China. A founder of the Chinese Communist Party, Chen Duxiu met a Taiwanese student Xu 
Naichang in Shanghai and helped him travel to Moscow as a Chinese citizen, for example.  55
“Every year since the establishment of the Cultural Association, influences from the Chinese 
Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, Comintern activities, and anarchism and 
communism in Japan steadily grew in the enlightenment activities conducted by the Cultural 
Association,” the colonial police recorded.   After an internal power struggle among Lian 56
Wenxiang, Jiang Weishui, and Cai Peihuo in 1927, Lian came to represent the Cultural 
Association and established communism as its goal. Jiang, Cai, and other previous leaders who 
did not embrace class struggle left the Association and formed the Taiwan Popular Party.  The 57
previous leaders denounced the leftist forces for their inflexible political orientation, referring 
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again to the Meiji Restoration: “[In the Meiji Restoration,] merchants and masterless samurai 
allied with the nobles,” they argued, “these facts [of alliances] provide a good lesson for 
Taiwan’s liberation activists to learn from.”   58
In Korea, the split in the elite circles affected the national association of youth groups 
even earlier than in Taiwan. Frustration mounted because youth activism remained stagnant at 
the local levels. In March 1921, Tonga ilbo's editorial discussed that “observing the current status 
of each youth group, we see almost no activities or development, hearing (1) the difficulties in 
maintaining the group owing to the trouble in collecting membership fees and (2) the lack of 
projects and activities.”  The national association also lost steam in the second year. Yi Kang, in 59
retrospect, noted: 
In order to write down activities between the first anniversary [of the Korea Youth 
Group Association] and the third general meeting in April 1922, I tried hard to dig up the 
material I have, and asked my friends who were committee members, but how pitiful, I 
did not find anything worth noting. If I have to write something, it would only be an 
increase in member youth groups and the four issues of the journal Asŏng... I cannot 
help but feel sad at how stagnant the youth movement in Korea was during this time.   60!
The harshest criticism came from the socialist youth who collaborated with nationalist 
leaders in establishing the Korea Youth Group Association. From the very beginning, they fought 
what they considered the “bourgeois” forces led by the Tonga ilbo group. Accusing them of 
corruption and lack of activism, the socialist youth attempted to oust their founding leaders, O 
Sang-gŭn, Kim Myŏng-sik, and Chang Tŏk-su at their third regular meeting in April 1922. Once 
this no-confidence motion was voted down, the central Seoul Youth Group, now led by Kim Sa-
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guk, and those pursuing class struggle quit the Korea Youth Group Association altogether. They 
newly sponsored the All Korea Youth Party Convention (Chŏn Chosŏn ch'ŏngnyŏndang taehoe) 
with 74 youth groups in March 1923. This drastically changed the climate of youth politics. The 
remaining Korea Youth Group Association tried to address the increasingly heated issues of 
peasants and workers, but they could not stem the socialist tide created by the Seoul Youth 
Group. In February 1924, the association decided to re-join the Seoul Youth Group and together 
formed the Korea Youth General Alliance [Chosŏn ch'ŏngnyŏn ch'ongdongmaeng].  This time 61
the leadership of the Seoul Youth Group, as well as the main goal of class struggle, became clear 
to everyone. 
 Korean youth, in comparison to their Taiwanese counterparts, had already shown a 
strong generational identity and antagonism toward “the old.” When the socialist youth groups 
gained momentum, they pushed the concerns about age to another level by introducing a new 
question—what is the age limit that defines “youth”? In Japan, the politics of age that unfolded 
in the “autonomy movement” was a development from the army’s intervention in setting the age 
limit of the seinendan. Youth in places like Shimoina county generated the new consciousness 
about the age and demanded that those over 25 years of age not intervene. In Korea, the question 
of age came from a greater distance. It reflected a debate developing among international 
Communist leaders about whether youth should be in leadership positions as the vanguard of 
social revolution, or be subordinate to the Communist Party. When the theory of “youth as 
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vanguard” subsided and the Party set the clear age limit for Komsomol membership at 16 - 23 
years of age, leftist youth groups in Korea rushed to set age limits as well.  The Korea Youth 62
General Alliance also introduced an age limit of 30, later changing it to 27.  63
The strict age limit did not strengthen the power of youth leadership, however. From the 
beginning, the Communist Party in the Soviet Union had set the age limit in order to contain the 
power of youth. Leftist leaders in Seoul used it as a tool of power struggle in seeking recognition 
from international communist authorities. In some occasions, they attacked the Seoul Youth 
Group as promoting vanguard-like youth groups that assumed too much leadership in all sectors, 
including workers, peasants, and women, against the decision of the Communist International.  64
At other times, they criticized the Seoul Youth Group for not being progressive or young enough. 
Pak Hyŏng-byŏng, a 30-year-old leader of the Korea Youth General Alliance, was condemned as 
“the old president” by other committee members.  In short, when socialist leaders imported the 65
question of age from the outside world, the leadership subjected themselves to the volatile 
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climate of global youth discourse at the same time. 
At the local county level, the strict age limit served the goal of leftist youth better than it 
did for the central leadership. In the county capitals, conflicts between these youth and traditional 
elites were erupting everywhere. The socialist youth raised the question of age—youth group 
members ought to be young—as the first measure of “progressive reform” [hyŏksin]. Since youth 
groups were collaborative forums that linked the world of local officials, the traditional upper-
class, and the newly educated, many groups allowed membership up to 40 years old, and even 
people older than that had a say in their activities.  Leftist youth saw this as a source of the 66
problems and deployed the age argument to remove interventions from unwelcome forces. 
Around 1925, one youth group after another adopted a new age limit, mostly up to 30 years old, 
and replaced the original committee members.  Through such progressive reforms, they 67
attempted to shift the priority of their activities. In Chaenyŏng, for example, landed elites 
preferred investing resources in industry-stimulating projects whereas the socialist youth wanted 
to operate night study groups for illiterate peasants and women. Illiteracy was still a serious 
problem in rural life and the biggest obstacle to mass mobilization.  Although the question of 68
age was a double-edged sword for leadership circles in Seoul, setting the age limit allowed the 
country-level leftist youth to distinguish themselves from the older, more powerful traditional 
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upper class that did not share the goal of mobilizing the wider masses. 
The Agrarian View of Nationalist and Socialist Youth  
In Korea’s intense youth politics, local youth groups were valued not only as branches of 
their movements. At the turn of the 1930s, the countryside began to carry ideological importance 
in an effort to preserve national purity. Nationalist activists often celebrated the “national 
authenticity” represented by “rural youth, ” developing a similar position to the agrarian-
nationalist ideals advocated by leaders in Japan. A student in the 1930s, Young Hook Kang, 
recalls the popular belief among nationalist leaders: 
In those days, we were fond of reading novels such as Yi Kwang-su’s Hŭk, Yi Ki-yŏng’s 
Kohyang and Sim Hun’s Sangnoksu, etc. The major theme of these novels was the 
enlightenment movement in the countryside. The nationalist leaders in these days 
appeared to have believed in the possibility of maintaining our national identity and 
national spirit in the Korean farmers, whose lives had deep roots in Korean soil.  69!
The marriage between agrarian ideals and national roots was seen all over the world. Those who 
sought distinctive nationhood in colonized societies, in particular, found their “untouched” 
countryside the most attractive source of ethnic identity and an antithesis to the industrial power 
of the imperial rulers.   70
Many leftist leaders fought the idealized view of countryside and shed light on the cruelty 
of colonial-capitalist exploitation of Korean peasants. Starting in the late 1920s, left-leaning 
literary authors and critics, such as Yi Sŏng-huan, Kim Do-hyŏn, Pek Chŏl, and Hong Hyo-min, 
repeatedly brought up the importance of involving the countryside in new literature. The debate 
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developed in several theoretical directions—some assumed the enlightening role of literary 
works in guiding peasants, and others defined peasant literature as part of proletarian literature. 
Facing the lack of literacy, they debated the challenge and mission of intellectual authors and 
fought the romanticized image of the countryside. Yet they shared with nationalist-agrarians the 
assumption that the future of Korean independence rested in the hands of peasant masses and in 
the rural countryside.  71
The growing attention to rural areas stimulated other forces, particularly religious groups, 
to strengthen rural programs. A famous example of new rural activism was the Korea Farmers 
Company [Chosŏn nongminsa] operating under the Chŏndogyo [Heavenly Way] Youth Party, 
which was also a member of the leftist Korea Youth Group General Alliance. They built 
cooperatives and provided night classes in rural villages.  Articles to inspire youth in the 72
countryside appeared in the 1920s in their periodicals, Farmers [Nongmin] and Korean Farmers 
[Chosŏn Nongmin], as well as in Tonga ilbo and other newspapers.  
These publications, although providing a way for intellectuals to convey their messages 
to rural youth, never became a forum for the uneducated agrarian youth themselves, however. “A 
letter sent to rural youth” in Kaebyŏk, another journal published by young Chŏndogyo activists 
explained that “I am not writing this letter in a desolate field or a boring rural village in which all 
you find is collapsing old houses like where the reader might live… The city I currently live in is 
the capital of Korea, and the center of modern culture in Korea.” After showing an understanding 
of the hardship of life in rural villages and excitement of urban centers, it argued, “cities flourish 
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and develop by exploiting rural villages... [Becoming city people] means becoming an 
exploitative class... If you still want [to come to the city], I would like to rather discuss whether 
turning from an exploited class to an exploiting class really means the improvement of 
personality.”  This author assumed the moral superiority of rural life, but reaffirmed that rural 73
populations had no way out of their poverty. 
Many articles on rural education targeted students who would visit their home villages 
over summer vacations. “Experience farming,” “observe the lives of lower-class people,” and 
“try real labor,” was the advice for those students.  The students were also encouraged to fight 74
rural illiteracy by teaching rural youngster the Korean alphabets, but the summers were the 
busiest farming time of the year. Overall, these suggestions were meant to help students achieve 
a better understanding of rural life and develop wholesome personalities, not necessarily serve 
the goal of empowering farm youth. These articles could not conceal the gap between the elite 
activists and the majority of youth in rural villages—uneducated, poor, caught in family farming, 
and left outside the initiative of the youth movement.  
In Taiwan, too, attraction to the countryside grew in the rhetoric of nationalist and leftist 
activism. The post-1927 Cultural Association decided to mention the development of “culture in 
farm villages” as the top priority in their activities.  As in Korea, the most powerful imagination 75
of the countryside among young intellectuals came from literary works. The new proletarian 
literature that described the rural backwardness and the colonial exploitation dominated the scene
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—the most common themes included superstitious old people, opium-addicted youth, corrupt 
policemen, and exploitative landlords.  The nativist literature movement widely shared the 76
perception that the majority of the Taiwanese population were miserable farmers. 
Despite various authors’ goals and efforts, the nativist literature in Taiwan produced more 
confusion than agreement on what constituted Taiwanese national origin. The issue of language 
was particularly complex, raising a number of issues, such as whether vernacular Mandarin was 
appropriate for Taiwanese readers and weather the use of the Holo (today called Taiwanese) 
language would separate Taiwan from mainland China.  These questions never disappeared 77
from the intellectual discourse and, particularly in the 1970s, became central in the second 
nativist literature debate. In addition to the issue of defining Taiwanese ethnic nation, leftist 
authors, like their Korean counterparts, faced a difficulty in filling the gap between their lives as 
intellectuals and the majority of rural farmers. A representative leftist writer in Taiwan, Yang 
Kui, deplored that “[our works] cannot go beyond the circles of literature-loving youth. This 
proves that today’s New Literature and proletarian literature lack mass-ness. They exist merely 
as an ivory tower.”  78
In short, although the concept of “rural youth” became important for both nationalist and 
socialist youth leaders in Korea and Taiwan, it did neither mitigate ideological differences nor 
bridge the gap between national leaders and youth in the countryside. The local youth groups 
#  86
 For more details, see Chen Nanhong, “Ri zhi shi qi nong min xiao shuo zhong di jing ying zhu yi yu nong min 76
xing xiang (1926-1937)” (MA thesis, National Cheng Kung University, 2007); Zhang Huiqi, “Ri zhi shi qi Taiwan 
nong cun xiao shuo yan jiu” (MA thesis, National Chung Cheng University, 2008). 
 See Huang Qichun, “Ri zhi shi qi she hui zhu yi si chao xia zhi xiang tu wen xue lun zheng yu Taiwan hua wen 77
yun dong,” Zhong wai wen xue (February 1995): 56–74. For the most comprehensive account on the first debate on 
nativist literature, see Yokoji, Wen xue de liu li yu hui gui.
 Yang Kui, “Bunpyōshō shinsa iin shoshi ni atau” Bungaku hyōron 3, no.3 (March 1936) in Chen Nanhong, 45.78
mainly spread provincial capitals and towns, but hardly in remote villages. Despite the effort of 
intellectual youth, they did not establish the mutual communicational sphere with youth in the 
countryside, most of whom were illiterate and did not have access even to local youth groups or 
youth journals. Not being able to align with youth in rural villages, students started to blame the 
farmers as immoral and irrational in the 1930s. Young Hoon Kang, the Korean student who had 
embraced nationalist-agrarian ideals earlier, expressed in his memoir: 
As time passed, we had to acknowledge the crude fact that farmers and countryside were 
not a repository of national spirit and conscience as some national leaders had hoped. As 
long as their lives were not threatened and the social order maintained, they seemed 
rather indifferent to the nature of their leadership. In my observation, the Korean farmers 
were so amenable that they had no difficulty in adapting themselves to Japanese rule. 
Thus, I was driven to despair by thoughts of the possibility of losing our national 
identity forever.   79!
Advocacy of Colonial Governments  
The colonial governments in Taiwan and Korea did not remain silent in the face of 
agrarian ideas and youth groups sprouting in their territory. In fact, colonial authorities actively 
participated in shaping youth discourse and agrarianism among urban elites. For the goal of 
formulating the image of “rural youth” as pillars of modern society, anti-colonial forces and 
colonial officials were in an unintended collaborative relationship, and their political rivalry 
accelerated rural youth mobilization. The rural youth programs of colonial bureaucracies, with 
greater institutional resources, stepped into the gap between anti-colonial intellectuals and rural 
population. 
The experiences of the Japanese seinendan naturally determined the directions of youth-
centered agrarian ideals advocated by colonial officials. In October 1926, the Government-
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General of Taiwan established a bureau of education [bunkyō-kyoku], a new office dedicated to 
the education and moral suasion of Taiwanese youth—“social education,” a recent trend in 
Japan, was named the central task of the bureau.  The new Vice Governor-General, Gotō Fumio, 80
designed many of the bureau’s programs. In Japan, Gotō was known as a top leader of seinendan 
associations. Holding an executive position in the national seinendan bureaucracy, he 
emphasized the importance of centralizing youth education.  The years 1926 and 1927 saw 81
many government surveys and studies on local youth groups, women’s groups, and other 
community organizations that encouraged agricultural and neighborhood cooperation.  Gotō 82
also increased the number of local officials specializing in educational affairs, invited Japanese 
seinendan leaders like Tazawa Yoshiharu to Taiwan, and suppressed activities of the Taiwan 
Cultural Association and Taiwan minbao.   83
Together with the bureau, the Taiwan Education Association, as well as various moral 
suasion [kyōka] groups and shūyōdan (Moral Training) groups that spread at provincial and 
county-levels, played a large role in promoting the emphasis on “rural youth.” They published 
teaching materials that highlighted the power of youth and the countryside, importing the ideas 
publicized by seinendan leaders in Tokyo. “If nature is our god, those who are embraced, cared 
by, and given the most benefits from that god are people in rural villages,” a common saying of 
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Japanese agrarianism was often repeated in “youth readings” distributed by these offices.  The 84
colonial effort to standardize agrarian youth groups steadily progressed over the course of the 
1920s and 30s. In 1930, when kyōka (moral suasion) reached its peak importance in the 
governance of Taiwan, the GGT officially issued an act to centralize youth groups throughout the 
island, which ushered a new phase in village politics.   85
In Korea, the clear continuity from the March First Movement to local youth groups 
alarmed colonial officials who were concerned about their political intents. Almost 
simultaneously with Japan, the colonial government in Korea planned workshops and programs 
of “social education,” targeting local youth group members in the early 1920s.  In 1922, for 86
instance, when the Ministry of Education conducted a survey on “the situation of social 
education centering on schools” in thirteen prefectures in Japan, the GGK collected the same 
surveys from local offices in Korea.  Many programs it offered emphasized a sense of 87
community spirit to distract youth from political opposition. In South Chŏlla province, officials 
invited 46 youth group leaders to a five-day “Youth Moral Training Lectures” [seinen shūyō 
kōenkai] in November 1921, offering lectures on “the Basic Principles of the Cultural Rule,” 
“Current Affairs of Youth Groups in Japan,” “Finances in Rural Villages,” and “Responsibilities 
of Local Youth,” and showing motion pictures on the local improvement activities in the 
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province.  The GGK also selected about 30 youth group leaders from each province and paid for 88
their trips to visit model youth groups in Japan. The officials reported with satisfaction that many 
of the participants were impressed by the passionate lecturers and achievements of the Japanese 
seinendan.   89
The emphasis on agrarianism intensified when the GGK promoted a program called 
“model graduate guidance” in the late 1920s and the early 1930s. Each elementary school chose 
“training-worthy” graduates from farming families and made them the visible symbol of “rural 
youth.”  Throughout the 1930s, when the colonial measures to counter rural poverty developed 90
during the depression, the GGK further integrated “model rural youth” into agricultural 
cooperatives and kyōka campaigns. As we will see in later chapters, these programs elevated the 
discourse and power of “rural youth” in similar ways the seinendan movement did in Japan in 
the 1910s and 20s. 
Conclusion 
“Rural youth” became a powerful social construct in colonial Taiwan and Korea by the 
late 1920s. Colonial intellectual youth attempted to create a rural basis for their own nation-
building by aligning with youth in the countryside. Japan’s seinendan network was a model to 
emulate for these leaders. In generating the youth and agrarianist discourses, however, they 
found themselves subject to an intense interplay of transnational influences. Japan, China, the 
Soviet Union, and the Western powers inspired them with political ideologies and provided them 
#  90
 Zenra-nando naimu-bu, Seinenkai shidō hōshin, 5-6.88
 Ibid., 5-11. Chōsen sōtokufu naimu-kyoku shakai-ka. Chōsen shakai jigyō yōran (Seoul: Chōsen sōtokufu, 1923), 89
184-185.
 See Tomita Akiko, “Nōson shinkō undōka no chūken jinbutsu no yōsei,” Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū 18 90
(March 1981): 148-173 and Chapter 7 of this dissertation.
with institutional support. These transnational forces in turn produced splits and confrontations 
among anti-colonial elites in Taipei and Seoul. Unlike in the Japanese seinendan, which grew by 
absorbing conflicting interests in defining the role of “rural youth,” the similar goal of creating 
the ideal “rural youth” did not help anti-colonial leaders overcome their differences in vision. 
The biggest challenge for the anti-colonial youth activism was the gap between highly 
educated youth and illiterate rural farmers. Students increasingly felt frustrations towards farm 
youth, while farm youth remained neglected in youth politics in Taipei and Seoul. Agrarian youth 
lived in more intricate webs of social relations than the elites imagined. Their envy of and grudge 
against urban elites constituted one of the motivations for agrarian youth to support colonial 
programs. This gap made it easier for Japanese officials and teachers to operate in the colonial 
countryside. With their institutional resources and experience in seinendan mobilization, colonial 







Chapter 3:  
The “Rural Youth Industry” in Shida Village, Miyagi (1900s-1920s) 
!
At the turn of the twentieth century, Japanese national leaders viewed Japan through 
multiple lenses. Japan was a recently centralized nation-state lagging behind the Western powers, 
a new empire in East Asia, and a potential liberator of non-White colonized peoples. Focusing on 
a small village in northern Japan, Shida in Miyagi prefecture shows how politics was even more 
multi-layered. Japan’s imperial expansion, its state policy boosting rice production, and Miyagi’s 
position as a regional leader in the often marginalized northeastern prefectures (Tōhoku region) 
generated a mix of hope, pride, self-designation, and feelings of both superiority and inferiority 
in the minds of local leaders. State officials and intellectuals discussed “rural villages” as if all 
had shared the same experience and status. But the self-images of rural residents, even in the 
same region, varied depending on the location and industry of the village, class, generations, 
gender, and many other elements.   1
Influenced by national policies and discourses but operating within specific local settings, 
the village youth associations [seinendan] in Shida went through major changes between the 
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1900s and 1920s. Their transformation primarily mirrored the changing role and status of local 
landlords. The early youth groups in Shida operated under the strong initiatives of landed leaders 
who attempted to modernize labor relations and agricultural methods. But after World War I, 
with the rising importance of young men for national mobilization, the youth groups gained more 
leverage against the established authorities. The example of an elite rural youth, Katō Einojō, and 
his private youth group called the 4-H club, embodied the simultaneously conservative and 
rebellious characteristics that defined the groups led by privileged youth.  
Parallel to the development of Katō’s group was the emergence of what I call the “Rural 
Youth Industry” for average farm youth. Youth training centers, built by the army in 1926, 
created new employment opportunities for agrarian youth and turned the “model rural youth” 
into a possible career. Overlapping with the expansive discursive space of the seinendan 
network, these job opportunities transformed seinendan members from perpetual farmers to 
success-oriented career seekers. With this mechanism of social mobility, young men in the 
countryside could confront the older generations and landlord-centered village system from a 
very different standpoint in the 1920s from before. 
The purpose of presenting the seinendan history of a village in Japan before colonial 
villages is to show, even in Japan, that young men in the countryside adopted and internalized the 
rhetoric of Japanese nationalism not because they were attracted and convinced by the Emperor-
centered ideology, but because it helped them overcome their marginalized positions and to 
assert moral authority over intellectuals, urban youth, and older generations. Nation-building 
through rural youth mobilization depended on the simultaneous development of the regional 
identity as “rural” and the generational identity as “youth.” The Rural Youth Industry shows how 
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their pragmatic and emotional incentives were intertwined with the spread of Japanese agrarian 
nationalism. 
Shida Village, Miyagi, and Tōhoku in Modern Japan 
Although remote rural villages evoke an image of old, conservative forces resistant to 
change, they were as much the products of modern governance as were the cities. Shida village 
came to life as a community only after modern centralized rule reached the countryside. In the 
local government system structured in 1888-9, the Miyagi prefectural government amalgamated 
thirteen hamlets between and adjacent to two small rivers, Shibui River in the north and Tada 
River in the south, creating the new administrative village of Shida. It was located at the 
northeast edge of Shida county, 28 miles (45 km) north of prefectural capital, Sendai. From 
1889, the village head, village administrative office, and the electoral village assembly governed 
Shida until it was absorbed into Furukawa city in 1950.  2
Shida was often labeled a typical “pure farm village.” Geographically, the village was 
mostly flat with good access to water and transportation thanks to the Tada River. Its population 
grew from 505 households and 4,428 residents in 1888 to 1,145 households and 7,710 residents 
in 1950.  More than 80% of the villagers engaged in rice production. As of 1950, rice paddies 3
stretched over 70% of the total land (with 7% of its fields planted in vegetables).  The northern 4
half of Miyagi prefecture (called Senhoku) was, and still is, one of the major rice producing 
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centers in Japan. But even relative to other areas of the prefecture, Shida village’s industry and 
landscape were markedly rice-centered. 
Nearly all the major historical changes in Shida village were shaped by efforts to 
maximize rice production. The region had been producing rice as a main export product to Edo 
(current Tokyo) even before the beginning of the Meiji period in 1868, but that did not mean that 
it was destined to become a large production center in the modern era. It was only after the Meiji 
state, with the 1873 land tax law, began to collect taxes from uncultivated land that land-owners 
became keen to use every square measure of land.  Miyagi-brand rice became “a pronoun for 5
coarse and bad rice,” the staple food for lower-class urban populations during the Meiji period.  6
This was partly because natural disasters, particularly cold weather and floods, often affected the 
harvest. Shida village experienced famine frequently—1869, 1875, 1876, 1879, 1886 1888, 
1889, 1890, 1902, 1905, 1910, 1913, and 1914.  The low quality of rice was also due to the lack 7
of good drying techniques, which caused rice quality to deteriorate rapidly in transport.  Owing 8
to these problems, Nitobe Inazō, a prominent agricultural economist, argued that the northern 
part of Japan was not suitable for cultivating rice.  Yet new agricultural policies demanded that 9
northern prefectures concentrate on rice production from the 1890s.  The process of overcoming 10
these obstacles to support the goal of fukoku kyōhei (“enrich the country, strengthen the 
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military”) lay at the heart of landlord-tenant relationships, the expansion of (agricultural) 
education, and the spread of youth training institutions in this area.  
Political leaders in the Tōhoku region often harbored a feeling of inferiority as the nation 
marched toward modernization. The establishment of the Meiji state in 1868 and rapid nation- 
and empire-building only highlighted the misery of the region. Tōhoku was on the wrong side 
during the Boshin War, a civil war in which new forces aiming to dismantle the Tokugawa 
shogunate and build an Emperor-centered polity defeated the opposition in 1868-9. Tōhoku (in 
an alliance called Ōu reppan rengō) fought what would become the national army, led by the 
“Seinan (southwest)” forces of the Satsuma and Chōshū domains.  Even in recent popular 11
tellings of the Meiji Restoration, Tōhoku represents the conservative, ignorant, and stubborn 
forces that did not appreciate the efforts of the founding fathers of the Meiji state. After the 
defeat, the domains of the region were dissolved and virtually colonized by the new centralized 
state. Many among the samurai-bureaucrat class had no choice but migrate to Hokkaidō as 
agricultural settlers. Those more fortunate became land-holding farmers at home, and Shida and 
its surrounding villages had a number of these former-samurai landholders. “Despite the fact that 
those who were called ‘rebels’ in the Seinan War [1877] now receive preferential treatment, the 
‘rebels’ in the Tōhoku war had not had their names cleared even today… Nothing is more telling 
than this single fact,” Sugawara Michiyoshi, a politician from Sendai, deplored as late as 1933.  12
The memory of the Boshin War and Tōhoku’s low status in Meiji politics haunted Tōhoku 
intellectuals for decades. 
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Even the celebratory year of Japan’s victory against Russia, 1905, was a time of 
devastation for the Tōhoku region, making local intellectuals resentful of the new empire. It was 
struck by a series of unusual weather patterns—a warm winter, cold spring, snowfall in May, 
followed by harsh summer heat, continuous rain, and early frost in September. This severely 
damaged the crops and caused famine in the region. Shida county exported 46,200 koku of rice 
outside the region in previous years, but in 1905, it only produced 8,790 koku, not enough to feed 
the county’s residents even for a few months.  Hangai Seiju, an intellectual from Fukushima, the 13
main source of “rebels” in the Boshin War, expressed his anger at the abandonment of the region 
in his 1906 book, Tōhoku of the Future. He and other commentators argued that Tōhoku should 
become the industrial center of the nation, and the southern prefectures should focus on 
agricultural productions, taking advantage of their geographical condition. Hangai was most 
upset by the direction of expansion of the Japanese empire. “Rather than the exploration of 
Hokkaidō, the management of Taiwan, or intervention into Korea, the recovery of Tōhoku should 
be the first priority,” he argued. He viewed the expansion of the empire in terms of a competition 
between southwestern prefectures, particularly Osaka, and northeastern ones, including Tokyo: 
We see our territory expanding towards the southwest… Would not this cause the 
national forces of Japan also to develop southward, and at the same time, the power of 
Japanese society to be transferred to the south, and the economic center to be also 
monopolized by the south?… These trends until today produced events that increased 
the power of Osaka. In other words, Taiwan joining our territorial map, Korea becoming 
our protectorate, and Manchuria entering our sphere of influence, all of these were 
nothing but changes that enhanced Osaka’s power… Tokyo should do everything to 
expand its power and maintain its political status. This is not the policy for Tokyo alone, 
but also Tokyo’s responsibility for the nation.  14!
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Resentment against the southwest-centric development was not the only reaction of 
Tōhoku people. They also reflected on their own faults and embraced many of the backward 
images attached to them. “Laziness” was the feature most commonly pointed out, even by Hara 
Takashi, the future prime minister first elected to office in Miyagi.  The Miyagi Educators 15
Journal often discussed the problematic characteristics of Tōhoku people. One teacher listed 25 
of them: lacking time consciousness, ignorance of the sacredness of physical labor, lacking a 
spirit of cooperation, poor in public morals, finding little value in trust, having wasteful customs, 
lacking the spirit of self-rule, and so on.  These features resembled many descriptions by 16
Japanese colonizers of the people of Korea and Taiwan.  
Miyagi residents developed a dual self-image, positioning themselves at the center and 
periphery of politics at the same time. Miyagi, of the six prefectures in Tōhoku, did not recognize 
itself solely as a marginalized periphery. Its people often expressed great pride in Miyagi as the 
cultural and historical center of Tōhoku. The Mutsu Sendai domain had been the third largest in 
the country during the Tokugawa period, and its founder, Date Masamune, was a legendary 
military hero of the late sixteenth century. “This prefecture has been a place renowned for its 
education,” so did an official in the Ministry of Education praise Miyagi’s special status in 
Japanese history. The centrality of Miyagi in Tōhoku was self-evident in his view that “to the 
extent that when we hear Tōhoku, we think Sendai, and when we hear Sendai, we think 
Tōhoku.”  In the name of Date Masamune, they were also proud of the reputation of the Sendai 17
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division as one of the strongest in the army. This recognition of Miyagi as the center of Tōhoku 
created an identity gap between it and the rest of Tōhoku. In a way, the duality of marginalization 
and centrality in Miyagi resembled what farm youth were experiencing in Meiji: a simultaneous 
embrace of rural backwardness and a progressive role as pillars of village reform. With these 
mixed feelings, both Miyagi’s leaders and agrarian youth attempted to break out their 
geographical constraints and place themselves in a larger framework of imperial Japan. “Miyagi 
prefecture should not remain in the position of ‘Tōhoku’s Miyagi prefecture,’” another author in 
Miyagi Educators Journal argued, “[it is,] indeed, ‘a Miyagi prefecture of the Greater Japanese 
Empire.’”  18
The Elementary School Youth Group Under Landlord-led Reforms 
The year 1905 was a key moment for farm youth in Miyagi and around the country. The 
simultaneous occurrence of the Russo-Japanese War and a large-scale famine brought a notable 
change in the villages of Tōhoku. The Miyagi prefectural government issued an act to promote 
youth groups in 1906 in the hope of supporting the military and restoring rural economies.  19
Inspired by Yamamoto Takinosuke’s call for revitalizing rural youth groups, advocates of youth 
groups exalted the leadership of youth and the autonomy of youth groups. In reality, young 
generations in villages gained neither. Rather, they were integrated into the new landlord-led 
reforms. 
The modernization of the military and a major war triggered a surge of new youth groups 
in the countryside of the first decade of the twentieth century. Miyagi witnessed an expansion of 
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various youth organizations —(elementary) school graduate groups, youth clubs, and night study 
groups—as the Russo-Japanese War unfolded. Youth gatherings and night study groups had 
existed even before the war, but in the prefectural report written in 1905, the officials noted that 
the nature of these youth groups had shifted. Wartime youth groups sent off the conscripted 
soldiers and welcomed the returnees, provided manual labor to the families who lost men in the 
military, helped the illiterate families exchange letters with their fathers and sons in the 
battlefield, and organized collective funerals for the war dead. These youth groups had already 
been preparing the members for the conscription exam, but becoming successful conscripts now 
moved to the forefront of their goals.  The increasing attention to conscription derived from the 20
war victory, which raised popular confidence in Japan’s military power. The establishment of 
local army reservist associations in 1906 consolidated the presence of the army in local affairs as 
well.  At the same time, newspapers regularly reported “unpatriotic” incidents and “those with 21
sunken spirits” in the military.  Many youth deliberately evaded conscription—officials counted 22
that 89 young men in Shida county’s registry somehow disappeared.  During battle operations, 23
soldiers rebelled against their superiors, generals “shamelessly” surrendered when their 
subordinates were being killed, and officers committed suicide.  The news reports on these 24
incidents concluded that the government needed soldiers of better quality.  
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Behind the repeated calls for reliable soldiers was a larger need for strong farm youth 
who could restore rural economies. The Local Improvement Movement was thus launched by the 
Home Ministry immediately after the Russo-Japanese War. Throughout the country, the 
movement relied heavily on initiatives of elementary schoolteachers. The “Shida elementary 
school youth group” in Shida village was one of many examples of how teachers implemented 
the Local Improvement Movement by guiding young farmers. The principal Mikami Hajime re-
organized a graduates’ study group into this new “youth group” in 1905 specifically to nurture 
“the spirit of hard work and thrift.” During the famines, Mikami worried, “the ownership of [the 
rice fields] flowed out of village hands every year, and outside ownership reached almost more 
than thirty percent [of the total farms].” This was caused by “the weak spirit of hard work and the 
lack of knowledge of agricultural reform.” With Mikami as the head of the youth group, 
schoolteachers as directors, and local notables as accountants, the youth group adopted the moral 
teachings of the Hōtokukai (Society of Repaying Virtue) and educated 54 graduates of the 
elementary school in that year.  25
Agriculture and academic studies were two pillars of their activities. The members 
cultivated 40,000 m2 of rice paddies and 10,000 m2 of vegetable fields to create their collective 
property. After the first year, they deposited 50 yen of profits for future use. The participants also 
created a pool of money for night classes to buy books, paper, ink, and oil lamps by selling straw 
products that they made together over 20 days of group gatherings. Night classes were offered 
between October 15 and December 24, when farming was off-season. The youth were divided 
into three levels and studied reading, composition, shūyō (moral training, self-cultivation), 
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abacus arithmetic, and agriculture. For those who would soon take the conscription exam, the 
teachers offered two months of intensive sessions to study Japanese, math, and the “handbook 
for new conscripts.”   26
Award ceremonies were important occasions for boosting awareness of the kyōka (moral 
suasion) campaign. In Shida, Kadowaki Chōshirō became an exemplary awardee in 1907. A 
twenty-year-old farmer at the time of the award, Kadowaki had lost his parents when he was nine 
and could not even afford to finish the upper-level years of elementary school. When his 
grandfather fell ill as a migrant worker in Iwate, Kadowaki traveled to bring him home and take 
care of him. “Studying hard, farming diligently, and contributing a lot to youth group activities,” 
Kadowaki became a model of the agrarian campaign.  The Shida elementary school youth group 27
as a whole was honored by the Miyagi Governor in 1909 for contributing to the improvement of 
education and customs.   28
Village notables exercised significant influence in the initiative of the elementary school. 
The village administration, consisting of well-off landed families, built and managed the school 
as an engine of modernization.  Schools produced national subjects even in remote villages— 29
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most importantly, they taught the standardized Japanese language.  The physical presence of the 30
Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890, usually enshrined in a designated place in school, 
symbolized the direct connection between the school and the national authenticity embodied by 
the Emperor. Established as an attachment to the elementary school, the youth group also 
shouldered the modernization effort of village notables. 
In a way, the youth group was more immediate an interest to the landed notables than the 
elementary school was because the youth group was a useful tool for them in transitioning from 
traditional to modern landlordship.  The 1870s goal to “enrich the country, strengthen the 31
military” created the need for abundant rice that cheap labor could afford.  To respond to this 32
national need, the landlords enforced agricultural innovation while reducing their financial 
burden. The youth group disguised their forceful measures of reform and provided free labor. In 
the name of “financial independence through cooperative cultivation,” the youth group re-
cultivated abandoned land and became a collective tenant for the village administrative office.  33
The creation of “common land,” a widely seen phenomenon between the 1880s and the 1910s, 
began in the land reform intended to rescue poverty-stricken tenant farmers by providing jobs.  34
The tenants created new rice fields that became the public property of hamlets. Soon the village 
administration office centralized the hamlet-owned fields and rented them to tenants with written 
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contracts. The profits created, usually deposited in the village credit union, went into public 
investments, such as education and infrastructure. This successfully transferred the 
responsibilities previously fulfilled by the landlords in a private capacity to the village 
administration while guaranteeing continued dominance of the landlords.  The youth groups in 35
Shida were a microcosm of this transition. Encouraged to create and cultivate the “common 
land” and to deposit the profits in the credit union, they helped to reduce the burden of the 
growing landlords.  In fact, the achievement of youth groups was assessed by the size of land 36
they cultivated and the amount of deposits they made in the initial decade. Shida county’s 1912 
summary of county affairs showed only the area of land, membership, deposits of each youth 
group, saying nothing about their night classes or conscription success rate.  37
The youth group also assisted the landlords in introducing new agricultural methods. 
Landlords formed a local branch of the national Agricultural Association [nōkai] to promote new 
technologies, such as new varieties of rice and organic fertilizer. “Kame no o” became the most 
popular breed in Tōhoku since it grew fast, resisted the cold, and could tolerate a large amount of 
fertilizer. But adopting new kinds of rice and changing the familiar methods of cultivation often 
met resistance from farmers. For them, trying a new method was a life-or-death gamble. To 
enforce agricultural reforms, the Agricultural Association in Miyagi depended on police coercion 
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and penalties. The use of coercion at sword point, called “saber agricultural governance,” made 
clear that landlords exercised all sorts of power to promote the agricultural reforms.  To align 38
with this effort, the Shida elementary school youth group used a part of their fields for 
experimental agriculture to test new seeds and fertilizer.  In contrast to raw coercion, the youth 39
group lent a positive and progressive image to the adoption of new agricultural methods.  
In short, in the eyes of modern landlords, the Shida elementary school youth group 
represented the model tenant farmer. They were supposed to acquire the “virtue of hard work” 
through collective cultivation of common land and an “innovative spirit” from new agricultural 
methods. The part played by youth groups in landlord-led reforms never surfaced in the 
discourse on rural youth training. Activists who promoted local youth groups only emphasized 
the educational effect of disciplining youth. Tomeoka Kōsuke, a founder of a famous farming 
school, argued in the Miyagi Education Journal that youth groups were useful in providing 
continuing education, implanting the concept of time, and providing leisure to rural youth, but 
failed to discuss the youth’s relationship to the local landlords.  When the nation faced both the 40
external pressures of a world of imperial powers and the internal need to restore rural economies, 
activists and government officials tacitly or openly encouraged the landlords’ commitment to 
modernizing agriculture. Their use of youth groups for this purpose was commonly accepted, if 
not publicly endorsed. 
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Transforming Hamlet Youth Associations  
In 1905, the year of the establishment of the Shida elementary school youth group, the 
village administrative office organized another youth group, the “Shida village youth group.” In 
contrast to Mikami’s group, which gathered select youth, the village youth group absorbed 
traditional all-in youth associations of the hamlets. Their activities overlapped with the 
elementary school youth group, including night classes and common land cultivation.  The 41
elementary school youth group had a more modern face, symbolizing the new administrative 
village unit, whereas the village youth group preserved continuities from the disestablished but 
traditional hamlets. 
During the Local Improvement Movement, the advocates of youth groups emphasized the 
novelty of the youth groups that emerged in the post-Russo-Japanese War era. The break from 
the previous youth groups was important to them because what they often had in mind was the 
student groups prevalent in urban areas during the 1890s. These groups were inspired by 
Tokutomi Sohō’s call for youth as an engine of the modern nation. They imitated Tokutomi’s The 
Nation’s Friend and published essays, stories, and poems in their journals. They held lectures and 
public speeches to spread enlightenment thought. In Miyagi, the Fudōdō village youth group and 
the Hoppo youth group exemplified this trend of the 1890s. Both were exclusive to elite youth—
the former consisted of sons of upper-class families, and the latter required two internal 
references to join the group.  These youth groups in Miyagi attested that Tokutomi’s influence 42
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reached Miyagi’s remote areas, but also that this movement was strictly confined to elite 
educated youth.  
The pre-Meiji form of youth associations, too, was a concern to new youth group 
advocates. Yet, these associations were more deeply integrated in local society and did not 
disappear. Ethnographer Takeuchi Toshimi argued that the youth groups led by Meiji village 
offices were modeled after traditions in the Southwest region and did not fit the reality of 
Tōhoku: The Southwest village youth groups emphasized horizontal ties whereas Tōhoku’s 
village communities were organized more hierarchically.  Fukutake Tadashi agrees that 43
Tōhoku’s hamlet organizations evolved around the vertical hierarchy with the hamlet landlord 
(the main family “honke”) as the top and its branch tenant families beneath it, resembling a kind 
of clan-based community.  These branch tenant farmers governed themselves through multiple 44
guild associations [keiyaku kō]. A local historian Gotō Ichizō, in his fieldwork on various forms 
of guild associations, argued that they were “the supreme decision-making institution of each 
hamlet.” Their agreements were the iron law of mutual support in every aspect of community life 
—marriage, funeral, irrigation, harvesting, education, festivals, and so on—and being excluded 
from them meant ostracism from the community.  Age and gender associations in the hamlets 45
were organized to support this keiyaku kō-based governance. The age ranges and names of these 
groups varied from hamlet to hamlet. Many male youth associations had the old names of 
wakashū gumi and kuwasuki kō and included those between 15 of age and mid-30s, or even early 
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40s. The initiation to the hamlet youth association was a significant moment in a man’s life. It 
meant that he had become a productive member of hamlet society, gained access to hamlet 
property, and was allowed to marry.  In some hamlets, it meant that he would eventually 46
represent his household in the guild association because only the eldest son of each household 
joined the traditional youth associations. 
Meiji officials banned these traditional youth associations in 1877 by calling them 
obsolete and violent. They considered them inappropriate partly because they preserved old 
customs, such as pre-marital sexual conduct and costly funerals, which Meiji social activists 
sought to reform. It was also because these traditional youth groups were, indeed, the main 
physical resource of the hamlet. They took charge of seasonal festivals, hamlet patrols, and fire 
control. Meiji officials considered that their degree of autonomy sometimes went too far—
engaging in political campaigns, ousting officials, forcing others to provide them with alcohol 
and meals, and so on. “It is of concern if the [new] youth group holds too much power, because 
youth associations of the past exercised too much power and there were many examples of their 
causing problems,” Tomeoka argued.  In its effort to control the means of violence, the Meiji 47
state could not allow local youth groups to maintain much power and autonomy. 
Establishing the village youth group in 1905 reflected the admission of Shida village 
officials that these traditional hamlet youth associations still existed and still played an 
indispensable role in the village. Even though the new village office appeared to have taken over 
the administrative function from previous hamlets, the hamlets often maintained their basic 
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function as organic units of governance, and guild associations continued to regulate villagers’ 
everyday lives.  The hamlet youth associations, even after the ban by the Meiji government, 48
continued their gatherings under new names, such as “agricultural society” or “fire fighting 
group.”  The new village youth group absorbed these hamlet youth groups as its branches. As a 49
result, the age range of village youth group members in Miyagi’s 1909 survey was notably 
broader (15-40 years of age) than government officials in Tokyo expected (14-20).  It also led to 50
a rapid expansion of its membership on paper. Within five years of its establishment, the Shida 
village youth group had 635 members. Takeuchi argued that, because of the heavy dependence 
on traditional hamlet youth associations, “activities of the new [village-level] youth group lacked 
originality and inevitably became inactive.”   51
Despite these observations, the emergence of village-level youth groups signified 
important changes in rural societies. One change was a further step toward a male-dominant 
social system. The military conscription had already raised the value of young male bodies,  and 52
the effort by the Meiji state to establish new codes of law also institutionalized patriarchy. The 
Meiji Civil Code (1896), for example, made the first son of the main family as the sole legitimate 
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heir. Before this, inheritance had no gender specificity in many parts of Miyagi.  The village-53
level youth group was part of this trend that enhanced the position of men. Unlike the hamlet age 
groups that tightly organized both male and female residents, the activities of new youth groups 
targeted mainly males.   54
Another change affected the familial-labor relationship in the hamlet community. For 
centuries, the landlord family—the “main family” or honke—did not just rent out rice fields to 
nearby farmers, but formed the core of an organic community with a blurred distinction between 
family and non-family members.  A number of young tenants in Tōhoku region started their 55
farming life as apprentices of the honke, and their coming-of-age and future holding of land were 
determined through their relationship with the main family.  During the landlord-led reforms, 56
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the dominance of the honke institution continued. But the new labor relation based on written 
contracts ended the traditional life cycle of many tenants, and the new youth groups replaced 
apprenticeship during the transitional period. In other words, while the village office collectively 
represented the new landlord class and regulated tenant farmers through written contracts, youth 
education also ceased to center around the familial-labor relationship, and became a public 
enterprise under the supervision of village administration and the elementary school. 
The Influence of World War I 
The nature of village-level youth groups shifted again when male youth became 
politically and militarily important. During the course of the 1910s and 1920s, the younger 
generation around the country joined in political rallies and demonstrations in line with various 
ideologies. In the meantime, Japan participated in World War I as a British ally and fought 
German troops in China. Witnessing the new scale of mass mobilization in Europe, the military’s 
eagerness to intervene into people’s everyday lives expanded greatly during the War. 
The centralization of seinendan and the increased influence of the military went hand in 
hand. Receiving orders from government ministries in 1905, 1915, and 1918, local governments 
standardized and centralized the network of youth groups. In 1910, the new Shida elementary 
school principal centralized the youth groups and reinvigorated their stagnant activities.  The 57
Shida village youth group was officially named Shida village seinendan in 1916.  The 58
centralization of the network continued from the village level to the county and prefectural 
levels. In May 1911, Shida county had a youth association convention for the first time. More 
#  111
 Shida sonshi hensan iinkai, Shida sonshi, 266, 302-303.57
 Ibid., 267.58
than two thousand young men from one town and nine villages of the county gathered in 
Furukawa town middle school. The county head Iwabuchi Toshio gave an opening speech and 
read the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education. The main purpose of the federation was to 
“promote unification and communication between each seinendan in the county” through 
common projects, awards, lectures, sports events, and various learning and disciplining activities. 
The attending army officer gave an hour-long talk, entitled “On Military Education,” and 
discussed the “physique, mentality, obedience” and other qualities that were “demanded in the 
youth groups from the military’s point of view.” After talks by the officials, three seinendan 
members gave five-minute speeches. One of them, Sugawara Rikizō, was a 14-year-old farmer 
from Shida village, and talked about the Boshin Imperial Rescript of 1908, which preached 
Emperor-centered nationalism and the spirit of hard work. It was reported that the officials gave 
him a special prize because “his speaking attitude, intonation, and pronunciation was 
impressively clear and fluent, and the way he moved the audience of more than two thousand 
people proved his superb performance.”   59
One sign of the army’s influence was renewed attention to sports events. In November 
1916, the Miyagi prefecture seinendan was launched, spreading a network over 222 village and 
town youth groups and involving more than 35,000 members. Its main activity was large-scale 
sports events. Its inauguration on November 12 accompanied a sports festival, in which 5,000 
youth who had won their local competitions participated.  Sports events of elementary schools 60
and youth groups had been the most popular entertainment in rural villages since early Meiji. 
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These prefecture-level competitions, as well as many county-level ones, excited both youth and 
audiences and enhanced the popularity of the seinendan.  61
Military conscription also gained a new spotlight. After the war, national policy and 
ideology increased the pressure on the seinendan to produce healthy soldiers. At conscription 
exam sites, the examinees with a sexually transmitted disease, astigmatic eyes, or just poor 
health, were treated as disgraces to their village. If they could not read a passage from an 
elementary school textbook, the examiner blamed their seinendan group by asking them, “did 
you go to night classes?” and “which teacher was in charge?”  62
Even among well-off landlords, military experience became a new source of prestige. 
Many landlords enhanced their social status through their experiences as officers in the military 
in addition to their commitment to agricultural reform. In Shida village, Kadowaki Yoshio 
embodied a marriage of the two. He was born into a wealthy family in 1872, joined the military 
in 1894, and was promoted to the private first class in the military police. He fought in Taiwan, 
seizing the aborigine-owned land. He traveled extensively during the Russo-Japanese War. On 
his return, Kadowaki established the army reservist group in Shida village in 1910 and took 
charge of veteran affairs for the next 30 years. He served as the village head between 1912 and 
1917. He took position of the Shida village representative of the Agricultural Association in 
1906, and was one of the strongest forces promoting agricultural reforms during the Local 
Improvement Movement.  Kadowaki represented the “modern” in many ways in the eyes of the 63
villagers—he had received higher education, had seen foreign places, had been decorated as a 
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military officer, and had promoted new agricultural techniques. Kadowaki preached the agrarian 
ethos to young farmers. Itō Rikichi, known as a model farmer who turned from an impoverished 
tenant to a land-owning farmer, admired and quoted Kadowaki’s teachings: “Although people 
tend to call those who seriously engage in agriculture and produce a lot ‘model 
farmers’ [tokunōka], this is a shallow definition… Model farmers have to be determined by their 
wide vision and deep thought. In other words, only those who succeeded in comprehensive 
management of agricultural business and can be models for farmers both in personality and 
social [responsibility] should be called tokunōka.”  64
The Rise of Rural Youth in the 1920s: An Example of Katō Einojō 
By the 1920s, the seinendan institutions had experienced multiple rounds of mobilization 
and centralization by the army and other state ministries. The increasing attention to rural youth 
education and the established importance of agrarian-military ethos appear to have regulated the 
lives of seinendan members, or so village leaders, army officers, and state officials intended. But 
youth did not blindly succumb to this top-down mobilization. On the contrary, many young 
people pursued activities beyond the scope of official control. They took advantage of the 
national seinendan network and the improving status of youth in village affairs. For them, youth 
group activities provided a window to the national and global spaces beyond their hamlets and 
villages.  
Sons of relatively wealthy families could use their new leverage as “rural youth” more 
readily than average farm youth. Katō Einojō in Aratanome hamlet, Shida village, is a good 
example. Born in 1904, Katō was the first son of the second largest landlord family in the 
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village, holding more than 40 ha in 1928.  In 1926, he formed a youth group with a few more 65
than a dozen neighborhood youths between the ages of 15 and 26, including his family 
apprentices and young women. Katō always wanted to study in Tokyo and “fly unto the larger 
world,” according to his son. Because Katō Einojō’s father expected him to take over as the head 
of family, he was not allowed to pursue college education in Tokyo as his two younger brothers 
did, but was sent instead to an agricultural school in Sendai after graduating from the upper-level 
of the local elementary school. His father, Katō Hisanosuke, was a leader in agricultural 
innovation in the region and an admired local notable. Rejecting Hisanosuke’s hope that Einojō 
follow in his footsteps, Einojō ran away from home and enrolled in the Tokyo School of Foreign 
Languages, living with his sister, who was married to an aircraft engineer. After a few years, 
Katō Hisanosuke came to Tokyo and forced Einojō to go back to Miyagi. Katō Einojō remained 
bitter about his father’s act throughout his life. Back in Shida, his young rebelliousness had no 
outlets other than establishing a new youth group. At the same time, Katō’s knowledge of art, 
literature, foreign affairs, and agriculture attracted the young people in Aratanome. He even 
knew how to use Western cutlery and play golf. In addition to Katō’s charisma, he provided a 
free space for the neighborhood youth to hang out. His parents resided separately in nearby 
Nakaniida hamlet, where they started a new rice threshing and carrying company. The Katō 
family’s original house in Aratanome, with its spacious garden, became a perfect place for the 
neighborhood youth to gather and enjoy sports.    66
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The most intriguing aspect of Katō’s youth group was its name, “the Aratanome 4-H 
club.” When Katō discussed with his friends the question of what to name their gatherings, he 
remembered that his teacher in the upper-level elementary school, Takahashi Gunji, once 
mentioned the American 4-H club, which put a strong emphasis on youth training through rural 
life. Takahashi was a young intellectual who had just graduated from normal school. Katō 
deliberately avoided using the common names, seinenkai or seinendan. For him, the initiative of 
youth themselves, not its affiliation to the government, characterized the group. He also felt 
alienated from the official purpose of seinendan training because his short stature had prevented 
him from passing the conscription exam. The “4-H club” expressed his connection to the outside 
world and his liberation from the rules of a landlord family and hamlet. It also symbolized the 
cultural leadership of a non-military figure with agrarian ideals. The members held evening 
gatherings more than 60 times within the first 14 months. Katō gave lectures on scientific 
developments, international affairs, architecture in Tokyo, Japanese economic policies, and social 
issues. He assigned two members to give a speech at every gathering. For many members, this 
was their first experience of speaking in front of an audience. After sharing knowledge and 
practicing public speeches, they played cards and listened to music on Katō’s gramophone, a rare 
possession in those days.  
After five years of these activities, Katō wanted to start a new group project of publishing 
a journal. He picked the title, Omoto (Rhodea), an evergreen plant that represented eternal youth. 
At one gathering, Einojō suggested that the members write essays together and watched them 
struggling with paper and pen. “I feel sorry hearing them sighing deeply in front of the 
distributed paper,” he wrote in his own essay, “but it is ‘spare the rod and spoil the child.’ 
#  116
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Group members wrote poems and essays about their work, families, gardens, and daily lives. 
One member who spelled his name Naoji in Roman characters wrote about the 4-H club. 
“Writing an essay is not easy… The leader said, ‘try writing anything that comes to your mind as 
it is’… what on earth should I write about? … Since the inauguration of the club, the knowledge 
of the members improved a lot. We take turns to give speeches, and now we have come to write 
essays for a journal. It feels delightful, as if we had become big scholars or something.”  68
Katō Einojō’s lack of interest in the Shida village seinendan did not mean that the 4-H 
club was antagonistic to the hamlet and village order. In Omoto, he expressed strong agrarianist 
ideals and respect for those who performed military service in the same way the seinendan did. 
One of the group’s first activities was to save money through collective labor, such as selling 
eggs. The government had been campaigning to promote savings around the country, and Katō 
believed that labor and savings projects would allow youth to learn self-discipline as well as help 
the national economy. The organization of the 4-H club followed the standard format of 
government-led seinendan despite its more voluntary nature. The members agreed on formal 
regulations and rules, elected executive members with limited tenure, and held three kinds of 
meetings (regular, convened, and executive). They also worked closely with the patrolling group 
of Aratanome hamlet. The patrolling group consisted of the heads of households in Aratanome, 
who traditionally supervised the pre-Meiji youth group and hamlet affairs in general.  Katō’s 69
leadership position replicated the teacher’s role in the village seinendan. Although the 4-H club 
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was no doubt fun and approachable for the members, their relationship with Katō was 
undeniably hierarchical. As such, the 4-H club in Aratanome was a new phenomenon that 
occurred outside official purview, but it combined many features of the old hamlet youth group 
and new seinendan. 
The 4-H club showed how youth from relatively well-off families incorporated the global 
and national discourse of “rural youth” and attempted to design their own group. In its local 
context, it mirrored the changing position of landlord classes. After the series of Meiji famines, 
agricultural production steadily increased during the 1920s and expanded the fortunes of the 
middling farmers who cultivated between one and five ha of rice paddies either as land-owning 
farmers or relatively well-off tenants. Unlike in the Meiji era, agricultural advancement relied 
less on the initiative of landlords, and more on public research centers and government 
investment in larger-scale irrigation and land reforms. The Agricultural Association, originally 
the league of landlords, turned into an institution that promoted new agricultural techniques to 
support these middling farmers. It was not a coincidence that Katō Hisanosuke, facing this 
changing status of his family, felt compelled to start a new rice distribution business. 
Furthermore, starting from the mid-1920s, tenant farmers organized large-scale disputes all over 
the country to secure the rights of tenancy. Many of them won permanent cultivation rights, 
which dramatically limited the power of landlords, and virtually ended the tight control of 
landlords over village affairs.  In the late 1920s, witnessing the collapse of the organic hamlet 70
communities that evolved around the landlord’s household, the village office emphasized the old 
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slogan of “united village” [zenson itchi] in an attempt to alleviate class confrontation in the 
village.   71
Katō Einojō had a stake in this changing environment. Holding a grudge against the older 
landlord system that forced him to abandon his dream in the city, he might have felt that he was 
taking part in the changes associated with the new rural dynamism. The strong emphasis on 
youthfulness of the 4-H club provided him with a new community that replaced the old landlord-
tenant hierarchy that had previously dominated hamlet affairs. Perhaps he felt proud of creating 
new ties with villagers when his father had a harder time maintaining the old ones. Yet, at the 
same time, Katō Einojō’s leadership in the 4-H club relied on urban experiences that were 
available only to the sons of landlord families. Regardless of Katō’s intentions, the club helped 
the village administration mitigate confrontation between the classes and secure the overall status 
of the landlords.  
The 4-H club’s detachment from class confrontation stands out in light of involvement of 
many rural youth in tenant disputes in the 1920s. Since these conflicts often affected entire 
village (hamlet) populations, many seinendan groups and their members had no choice but to 
participate. In Toyosato village in Miyagi, for example, the seinendan leader played an active 
part in bringing the tenants’ demands to the village assembly in 1927.  In some cases, rural 72
youth became leftist activists. Inomata Yūjirō, once famous as a model farmer who won a youth 
speech contest in the early 1910s in a village in Miyagi, turned to socialist activities in the 1920s. 
Inspired by activists’ calls for a peasant uprising, he started a tenant union in his home village. 
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He was arrested and tortured repeatedly during the police crackdown on Communist Party 
members in 1928.  The Shida region was relatively slow in joining these movements, but by 73
1930, even Shida village, where Katō Einojō lived, had two major disputes with more to follow 
in the subsequent years.  Before the tenant disputes spread, the region was already a site of 74
contentious politics. Various political parties rallied in adjacent Furukawa town in the 1920s.  75
Furukawa was home to the nationally famous liberal thinker, Yoshino Sakuzō. The same town 
elected Akamatsu Katsumaro, a Socialist Party leader, to the House of Representatives in 1928.  76
It is hard to imagine that Katō Einojō accidentally missed these lively political movements in 
neighboring Furukawa. He seemed to have deliberately maintained his youth group as a circle of 
neighborhood young people and avoided getting involved in “class struggle” of any kind. 
Despite his avoidance of leftist activism, Katō’s 4-H club was a product of his own 
rebelliousness. Because of the intense confrontation between the government and leftist activists, 
political polarization appeared to define youth activism in the 1920s and early 30s.  The youth 77
groups of the two confronting camps fought proxy battles over access to the masses. But even 
more noteworthy was the variety of motivations and the strong presence of localized agendas on 
both sides. Economic and labor relationships constituted only one of the factors that drove youth 
to leftist politics. They were motivated by generational conflicts, anti-urbanism, family tensions, 
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and other conflicts in hamlet society when they chose to join a youth group of one political hue 
or the other.  A surprising consequence for political leaders was to see former model youth 78
participating in tenant disputes, even as many rebellious youth ended up in conservative 
positions. The unpredictable nature of youth had already surprised the officials during the rice 
riots in 1918, sparked by the skyrocketing price of rice. Top government officials like Tanaka 
Giichi and Tazawa Yoshiharu expected the seinendan and army reservist groups to help the 
government maintain the social order during the chaos. Yet more than 10% of the 8,000 arrests 
turned out to be of members of these groups.  In contrast, Katō Einojō’s 4-H club seems to have 79
been conformist, or at least not leaning to the left. Nonetheless, he was rebelling against his own 
environment, except that his rebellion took the form of the deployment of his modern knowledge 
and the creation of a strong generational community, rather than engagement in political 
demonstrations. 
The “Rural Youth Industry” 
Stories of Katō Einojō and many individual youths establishing and engaging in private 
youth groups are testament to the expansive space of activities for young men in the countryside 
in the 1920s. For average farm youth who did not have family wealth or status like Katō’s, it was 
the formation of what I call the “Rural Youth Industry” through the expansion of youth training 
institutions in 1926 that altered their social leverage and allowed them to challenge the 
established authorities.  
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Youth training centers, established in 1926 and turned into youth schools in 1935, were 
not the only schools that took charge of training working youth. Since the beginning of the Local 
Improvement Movement, educators in the countryside made every effort to establish a 
supplementary vocational school in every elementary school. In Miyagi, a total of 210 vocational 
schools had been built by 1926.  In Shida, the village head, Kadowaki Yoshio, decided to set up 80
a supplementary agricultural school in 1915.  In these schools, elementary schoolteachers 81
continued to give a few hours of instruction a week to their school graduates to maintain their 
academic level and improve their agricultural skills. By the 1920s, the village had the upper-level 
elementary program, the supplementary vocational (agricultural) school, and the youth groups to 
supervise farming village youth.   82
These facilities faced increasing difficulty in keeping young people in the villages. Japan 
of the 1920s experienced a widening gap between urban consumer culture and rural life, fanning 
the “city fever” among rural youth as was the case with Katō Einojō. The regional newspaper 
Kahoku shinpō repeatedly pointed out the need to halt youth’s urban migration. “Local 
authorities and local governments need to respond with appropriate measures to the youth who 
move to cities as a result of the lack of educational facilities,” it reported in 1922.  Its editorial 83
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claimed that, although the local seinendan had been doing a wonderful job providing civic 
education and vocational training, “local youth do not feel satisfied and still leave farms for the 
city to seek happiness.”  84
The army and its Minister, Ugaki Kazushige, finding their concerns deeply intertwined 
with rural problems, advocated establishing the youth training center to improve the quality of 
future rural conscripts.  Students were given the “youth handbook” [seinen techō], in imitation 85
of the military handbook [guntai techō], to carry around rules and slogans and to record their 
activities.  Miyagi prefecture quickly established 244 centers in July and August 1926, which 86
included one in Shida village.  87
How did such expansion of military’s intervention in the village affect the life of young 
men in the countryside? The biggest difference it made was not in the content of education—the 
marriage between military and agrarian ideals was not new. More significant was the fact that 
hundreds of rural youth found employment as temporary instructors in the newly established 
youth training centers. Supplementary vocational schools already had a chronic problem in 
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finding appropriate teachers. Because of financial constraints, elementary schoolteachers were 
responsible for vocational classes, but those who had gone to normal schools had very little 
experience in agriculture. “Looking at the reality of agricultural education at the elementary 
school, [teachers] just follow pages of the agricultural textbook as if it was a reading class, let 
50-60 students cultivate only 100m2 of practice farms in their wooden sandals…, or make them 
clean the campus or water system to kill time,” an advocate of vocational education in Miyagi 
complained in 1925.  In the new centers, teachers had to give military-like physical training as 88
well. Moreover, students in youth training centers (and in youth schools, built after 1935) were 
working-age farmers who were not easy for regular schoolteachers to teach. One instructor 
described the difficulty in his memoir: 
The backgrounds of the students in youth schools are significantly different [from those 
of elementary school children or middle school students], so the difficulty of teaching 
and training at school is by no means comparable. In youth schools, just making them 
attend on schedule takes so much effort… In addition, it is troublesome that many who 
come to school are not motivated, either. A good number of them come here to have fun. 
It is frustrating because they are not interested in the subject at all and consider the day 
as their holiday. When extreme, they enter the clean classrooms with their shoes and 
sandals on, smoke although they are too young for that, eat snacks at the store in front of 
the school, change clothes and go see motion pictures in the middle of the class… 
Female teachers hate the students as if they were worms, and even male teachers try to 
escape them.  89!
To solve the problem of finding teachers, villages hired those who experienced both 
farming and conscription as part-time instructors. Each youth training center usually had about 
three or four of these in addition to five or six regular schoolteachers. This means that, in Miyagi, 
more than 750 army reservist members trained younger generations. They also switched 
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instructors every few years. Outside Miyagi, the ratio of reservist instructors was 10% higher, 
creating even more jobs.  In national statistics, more than 40% of youth school instructors 90
consisted of those without formal qualification as teachers.  91
A few elements in this recruitment affected youth. Most significantly, the required resume 
writing brought farm youth the first opportunity to apply a narrative of career development to 
their own lives. The newly hired instructors filed their resumes at the schools, and the schools 
reported all of them to the prefecture. Hundreds of these youth, who would otherwise remain 
nameless even in local histories, suddenly appeared as individuals with self-narrated career 
records in Miyagi’s prefectural archives. Their resumes were simple. They were born around the 
time of the Russo-Japanese War and graduated from upper-level of the elementary school. Some 
attended the supplementary vocational school for another year or two. Most engaged in family 
farming after that. Within a few years, schools started hiring them. All of them had conscript 
experience, and some listed more detailed advances and awards they received during their 
military service. However simple, through compiling these resumes, farm youth began to find 
meaning in these experiences and to view themselves as career-seeking professionals.  
Another element was financial reward. Their promised salaries varied between 20 and 60 
yen for 50-100 hours of physical training instruction a year.  Their hourly rate was equivalent to 92
full-time substitute male teachers in Miyagi’s elementary schools.  Although it was small in 93
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comparison to urban jobs and was often delayed, this salary was significantly higher than relief 
work provided by the government in the rural villages of the depression.  Accompanying the 94
monetary compensation was social recognition as school instructors. Schoolteachers were often 
the only intellectuals known to farming youth. In order to become full-time teachers, they needed 
a degree from competitive programs in either a middle school or a normal school.  With an 95
expansion of youth training centers, farm youth without teacher training were recruited and 
suddenly gained an opportunity to be called a teacher [sensei]. 
By the mid-1930s, the series of youth education institutions—the seinendan, 
supplementary vocational schools, youth training centers, and later youth schools—created the 
occupational space that I call the “Rural Youth Industry,” where farm youth were both the 
consumers and providers of youth training.  The Rural Youth Industry overlapped with a 96
growing discursive space of seinendan newsletters, circulating at the village, prefectural, and 
national levels. As new instructors and newsletter writers, they celebrated the superiority of 
“rural youth” and re-interpreted “risshin shusse” (“rising in the world”) as rural-based careers. In 
the Rural Youth Industry, farm youth transformed themselves from perpetual farmers to success-
seeking rural youth who shared a common identity with their peers in other rural areas. After 
teaching experience in the youth training center, many continued to up the career ladder, 
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becoming full-time teachers in elementary schools, technical advisors in agricultural research 
centers, and seinendan leaders.  97
In effect, the establishment of youth training centers—typical disciplining institutions 
from state officials’ point of view—challenged the previous rural hierarchy by empowering 
average farm youth. People’s occupations used to be determined by the family wealth and status, 
but the Rural Youth Industry gave both means and confidence to farm youth to alter their 
position. This was a very different kind of self-empowerment from that sought by the son of a 
landlord, Katō Einojō, or the “autonomy of youth” envisioned by leftist activists. 
The careerization of “rural youth” propelled the youth to embrace agrarianism, anti-
urban, and even anti-intellectual feelings. For example, Mori Shigeshi, a youth group member in 
Edano village, Igu county (southern Miyagi), demanded a pension for farmers equivalent to that 
for retired government officials in his hand-written essay. “Our empire is an agricultural nation 
as we all learned in the elementary school… It is a contradiction in logic and ignorance of 
humanity that farmers, the foundation of nation-building… are left without any pension.”  His 98
claim deliberately juxtaposed rural careers and the urban academic success that culminated in 
positions of state officials. Nearly all of the journals compiled by seinendan members in these 
years called for rural youth’s awareness of their grave responsibility to restore the countryside. 
Satō Kesao, another member in the Edano seinendan, was convinced that “today, the city-
centered material civilization has already declined, and the time has come for the revival of rural-
centered spiritual culture.” In his view, leftist activists were urban products. “Has any of the left-
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leaning thinkers detested these days come from hardworking rural villages? If there is, he is just 
instigated [by others]. In any period, such thoughts are generated from a corner of the materially 
and spiritually impoverished city.”  Satō’s passionate essay revealed that the state was not 99
simply controlling the mindset of the youth, but rather youth could incorporate the prose of the 
state to assert their moral authority against the urban, the educated, and the old. This mutual co-
optation flourished in the Rural Youth Industry. 
The Rural Youth Industry was a male-dominant space, but young women were not totally 
left out of the rise of “rural youth.” Young women’s groups developed in a smaller scale than the 
seinendan. Some villages established study groups for female elementary school graduates also 
around 1905, but without much continuation from the traditional hamlet associations.  After 100
World War I, activists and teachers considered that young women should obtain shūyō (moral 
training) and the spirit of hard work so that they would become hardworking wives and healthy 
mothers.  In 1917, a national network of young women’s groups, called shojokai (maidens’ 101
groups) were established, and they were transformed into Greater Japan Women’s Youth Group 
Federation [Dai Nihon joshi seinendan rengō] in 1927.  The founder of the shojokai network, 102
Amano Fujio, argued that the shojokai were the mother of the seinendan, and “if ‘youth’ [seinen] 
are the element of national energy, ‘young women’ [shojo] are the source of that energy.”  In 103
the 1920s, at least in Miyagi, many young women participated in the discursive space of rural 
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youth through seinendan newsletters. Like their male counterparts, young women were hired by 
supplementary vocational schools and youth schools where girls obtained skills in sericulture, 
household accounting, sewing, cooking, and other home sciences. They faced a different set of 
social pressure from male counterparts. Because schooling was less common among female 
farmers, education outside the realm of formal schooling had a more significant impact in their 
pursuit of a rural modernity. 
Conclusion 
The seinendan movement in Shida village in Miyagi shows that, despite the rhetoric in 
mobilization, the embrace of Japanese agrarian nationalism was not necessarily the main driving 
force of mobilization but rather a result of youth’s aspiration for social mobility. At the initial 
stage, youth groups served local landlords. They allowed landlords to enhance power and 
prestige as rural modernizers. In the 1920s, as seen in Katō Einojō’s 4-H club and the village 
seinendan, youth took over the role of rural modernizers, weakening the presence of the older 
landlords. In the 1920s, with the help of peaking youth activism and the discursive rise of “rural 
youth,” village youth developed a sense of moral superiority vis-à-vis urban youth and older 
generations. From their point of view, rural youth mobilization was a chance to break the social 
hierarchy. Agrarian nationalism boosted their morale and inspired them to confront urban 
centrism and the establishment in the family and village. Regardless of what national leaders 
envisioned achieving through youth training centers, the youth consumed the power of the state 
in their immediate contexts and used the rhetoric of agrarian nationalism to their own benefit. 
I used the term “Rural Youth Industry” to identify the mechanism in which these youth 
turned national mobilization into social opportunities. Although the seinendan symbolized 
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“modern youth” and “rural modernity” from the time it became a national movement in 1905, it 
was not until the 1920s that average agrarian youth found a solid ground from which they could 
pursue career-oriented goals. The job positions created by the establishment of youth training 
centers not only changed their financial opportunities, but elevated their sense of self-worth. 
They shared an identity as “rural youth” in the communication sphere that expanded through the 
centralization of the seinendan network. The nationalization of agrarian youth was a continuous 
process since the Meiji period, and it accelerated in the 1920s and 30s when the youth formed the 
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Chapter 4:  
The Rise and Demise of Rural Youth in Shida, Miyagi (1930s-1945) 
!
The “Rural Youth Industry,” developed after 1926 as an occupational and discursive 
sphere where young farmers sought career paths as “rural youth,” did not grow only in 
counterpoise to urban dominance of Japanese society. It also faced worsening rural conditions 
during the depression of the early 1930s and the need for agricultural expansion to support 
Japan’s war efforts later in the decade. Young farmers in the Rural Youth Industry were to 
shoulder the responsibility to boost social morale and help the rural economy to recover. In one 
sense, this hardship enhanced the importance of rural youth in national policy and discourse in a 
similar way that the Local Improvement Movement had in the 1900s and 1910s. Young men 
were central in the governmental Rural Revitalization Campaign, launched in 1932 to tackle 
rural depression and facilitate wartime mass mobilization. At the same time, the expanding 
imperial frontiers in Manchuria elevated the image of rural youth as imperial forces.  
Despite the enhanced image of rural youth, the routes to achieving personal success in 
their home villages disappeared at the height of wartime mobilization. The majority had to leave 
their villages as industrial workers, soldiers, and colonial migrants, and few returned before 
1945. The ever-expanding youth training institutions no longer provided an autonomous space 
for the youth, either. In other words, although mobilization continued, the Rural Youth Industry
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—the mechanism that transformed mobilization into mobility—collapsed. This marked the start 
of an era of fascist mobilization, or expansion of the state’s direct control over individuals. Katō 
Einojō’s involvement in wartime mobilization, no longer as a rebellious youth but as an 
established local notable, shows that the celebration of “youth” and “farmers” over the preceding 
decades seamlessly transitioned to fascist mobilization. 
“Rural Youth” in the Great Depression and War 
Japan was already in the economic crisis before the global economic depression began in 
1929. Rice prices fell most years in the 1920s, and banks and businesses collapsed in 1927. The 
Great Depression brought another blow to the market, making the value of agricultural products 
plummet almost by half in the two years between 1929 and 1931. During the 1920s, a large 
number of people moved from the countryside to urban centers, widening the gap between city 
and countryside.  Unemployment in the depression forced many urban migrants to return to their 1
home villages, creating the problem of excess population in the countryside.  The frustration 2
born of rural poverty led to an upsurge of tenant disputes. It even led to a coup attempt on May 
15, 1932 by young military officers also drew national attention to the rural predicament. One of 
the arrested officers testified that a reason for their action “was to help the families of the soldiers 
from Tōhoku. A peasant uprising was sure to occur if that state of affairs was allowed to 
continue.”  3
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In 1932 and 34, the Tōhoku region was hit by unusually cold weather, which caused two 
devastatingly poor harvests. The scale of devastation of these famines was reported widely as a 
national tragedy. Photos of starving babies and exhausted mothers and stories of thousands of 
schoolchildren getting vision impaired by malnutrition were carried in regional and national 
newspapers on a daily basis for months.  In Aomori prefecture alone, more than 2,400 girls were 4
reportedly “sold” to sex industries or factories by their starving families in 1933.  Shida county 5
of Miyagi experienced massive rainfall in the summer 1932, which worsened the already severe 
damage to crop yields, leading to chronic food shortages.  In 1934, Shida again faced a 6
combination of cold weather and water damage. Particularly hard hit was Kashimadai hamlet, 
where 65% of the farming land produced absolutely nothing, causing the farmers to “stand on the 
[border]line of starvation,” reported Kahoku shinpō.  This led to another surge of tenancy 7
conflicts in Shida in the early 1930s.  Since the price of rice plunged during the depression, 8
landlords demanded that tenants compensate for the deteriorating quality of rice by providing a 
larger amount. Kahoku shinpō reported that this caused the farmers a “blood-sucking pain”  and, 9
after the Mass Party’s involvement, Shida region reportedly became “the hottest region of 
peasant disputes in the prefecture.”   10
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Tōhoku received overwhelming sympathy, but this seemed to be another confirmation of 
the region’s inferior status within the empire. In the early 1930s, heavy industry dictated the 
Japanese labor market and widened the gap between the countryside and cities.  “[T]he famine 11
[of 1934],” historian Kerry Smith argues, “was in many ways a reminder of just how wide the 
gap had become between the modern, developed sector and the countryside.”  Urban 12
intellectuals considered that more modernization—rational and effective farming—was the only 
remedy for Tōhoku’s plight. Agencies, such as the Home Ministry and the semi-governmental 
Imperial Agricultural Association, conducted a variety of research on the causes, situations, and 
solutions to rescue Tōhoku. Some of them characterized the tradition of Tōhoku agriculture as 
the source of the problem, pointing out “simple management,” “primitive land use,” “backward 
use of labor,” and “inferior agricultural productivity.”   13
The Rural Revitalization Campaign was launched nationally in 1932 as a product of local 
initiatives and compromise among policymakers. Agrarian activists, the army, and the Ministry 
of Agriculture were more sympathetic to the dire rural situation and requested the cabinet to 
provide expansive budget to help farmers through public relief work. In fact, it was thanks to the 
campaigns and petitions by agrarianists that the press made “the village problem” national news 
in 1932.  But Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo refused to allocate large resources to the 14
rural problem, cutting the budget for emergency relief from 366 million yen in 1933 to 235 
million yen in the following year. Instead, the “self-revitalization” [jiriki kōsei] campaign, which 
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originated in local advocacy of the Hyōgo Prefecture Agricultural Association, received 
enthusiastic support from Takahashi and other policymakers. It exalted the familiar Hōtoku 
philosophy of moral uplift, which emphasized individuals’ responsibility in maintaining sound 
management of rural households and village society. The campaign, designated by state officials 
as the “Farm, Mountain, and Fishing Village Economic Revitalization Campaign,” was to cost 
the government only a minimum and bring about a maximum result.   15
In response to this campaign, local leaders in each village and hamlet promoted the spirit 
of self-help and pushed the limit of productivity through labor- and fertilizer-intensive 
agriculture. Shida village’s participation in the movement also emphasized “self-reliance” and 
sought to overcome the massive debt of villagers without help of the government. As a measure 
of self-reliance, the village head Katō Hisanosuke, father of Katō Einojō of the 4-H club, 
established a cooperative, “two-eight society,” in 1934. He encouraged the villagers to commit 
three hours every night to domestic industries while farming off-season between fall and spring, 
save 20% of the profit, and use 80% to pay taxes. Involving almost all the households of the 
village, the two-eight society also tried to reform everyday customs and cut spending for 
weddings, funerals, and other ceremonies.   16
The young generation took many responsibilities in and outside the Rural Revitalization 
Campaign. This expanded the burden on rural youth to work harder.  In addition to their labor, 17
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seinendan members provided villagers with morale-lifting entertainment.  In Shida’s 18
neighboring Ōnuki village, they managed to bring popular motion pictures for evening 
screenings. Even though they could not afford to hire a narrator [benshi], villagers watched new 
samurai films in an outdoor theater set up by the seinendan. Youth presented amateur plays, 
music, and vaudeville performances at seasonal festivals.  The sports festivals organized and 19
performed by the seinendan continued to be one of the biggest social events in rural villages, and 
nearly all residents came to see and participate in the games. Ōnuki village youth used humor to 
turn even the government slogan of “self-reliance” into the name of a sport game.   20
The category of “rural youth” continued to symbolize the bright and hopeful future. 
Seinendan activities in each hamlet and the news of the conscripts from the village fighting for 
the recently established puppet state in northeast China, Manchukuo, were often the only 
encouraging news to help the villagers briefly forget the reality of the rural conditions.  In 21
newspapers, photos of young men in the uniforms of the military, seinendan, or youth training 
center, represented the modern force in the countryside, making a visual contrast to the reports 
on the unemployed and starving population. Youth speech contests, usually called “yūben 
(eloquence) competitions” were widely reported, often attaching photos of a young man on the 
podium in front of equally young audience. In the 1929 Miyagi prefecture-level competition, the 
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speeches “A Roar of a Young Man” and “Rescue a Small Rural Village” received the first and 
second prizes.  Other newspaper reports praised rural youth for helping the villagers complete 22
tax payments,  rescuing neighbors from a fire,  diligently attending youth training centers and 23 24
youth schools,  and conducting shūyō (self-cultivation, moral training) roundtable discussions.  25 26
Such reports enhanced the symbolic status of rural youth. 
War Mobilization 
In the 1930s, when the imperial government repeatedly emphasized a grave national 
crisis and a time of emergency, the Rural Revitalization Campaign and war mobilization virtually 
merged into one. Together they brought about a torrent of programs, slogans, and regulations that 
overwhelmed the rural population. In fact, war was intrinsic to the success of the rural campaign. 
Scenes of soldiers returning to rural villages, for example, reminded the villagers that the rural 
life was part of a bigger imperial effort. Villages organized parades and ceremonies, in which 
soldiers’ injuries and reunions with their families became a spectacle for public consumption. 
Kahoku shinpō reported “the ecstatic welcoming” in every village and town. The reports usually 
did not discuss where they fought and what they did, but focused on their honorable returns (and 
non-returns) instead.   27
#  139
 “Kenka yūben taikai,” Kahoku shinpō, August 13, 1929, 4.22
 “Ichi-seinen no funtō doryoku de mohan nōzeiku ga umareru,” Kahoku shinpō, April 24, 1930, 4.23
 “Heishi nana-mei no otegara,” Kahoku shinpō, April 24, 1930, 4.24
 For example, “Yūryō seikunsei,” Kahoku shinpō, May 5, 1930, 6.25
 For example, “Shūyō zadankai,” Kahoku shinpō, September 9, 1930, 6.26
 “Namida aratani kokyō e: eirei wa eikyū ni nemuru,”Kahoku shinpō, March 8, 1932, 4. “Suihai o kawashita 27
Dōkyō no yūshi,” Kahoku shinpō, February, 2, 1933, 7. “Gaisen yūshi o mukaete miyo kakuchi no kyōkiburi,” 
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The army consciously linked rural villages and battlefronts to reinforce the image of the 
“hamlet soldier.” After the Manchurian Incident in 1931, in which Japanese military initiated an 
assault in China and established Manchukuo the following year, farm youth received more daily 
military drills. The annual army inspection of students of youth training centers in each village 
became another village spectacle.  Hundreds and thousands of young men, mainly students of 28
youth training centers or youth schools, conducted large-scale combat games with real 
weapons.  Schoolchildren observed these practices, participating in the excitement about the 29
war and the prospect of becoming soldiers.  Women in the village took part in these practices as 30
nurses.  Once conscripted, enlisted men were organized according to their home regions to 31
maintain cohesion of the unit. Soldiers were encouraged to write to the training officers and 
seinendan members back home.  Through these measures, soldiers achieved respect in rural 32
society, and the villagers eagerly awaited news of the soldiers at the front. 
Army conscription, a hinge of the deep connection between the military and rural 
societies, began to bear the seriousness of wartime as the decade progressed. In 1936, two young 
men in Shida county submitted blood-signed applications. Examinees shaved their heads at the 
conscription exam site to demonstrate their determination. The newspaper described the year’s 
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inspection as “reflecting the time of urgency.”  This was not triggered only by wartime 33
propaganda and social pressure. As an official policy, the army gave the veterans an advantage in 
finding jobs in the midst of severe unemployment. The army itself took initiatives to allot jobs to 
them, and the government encouraged their employers to re-hire them.  Owing to its 34
achievement in the national-imperial expansion and its role in providing employment, the 
presence of the army inevitably increased in the impoverished countryside.  
Localization and Centralization 
As the “hamlet soldiers” and “village Japan” were being constructed simultaneously 
through the tie between rural villages and the army, youth training institutions underwent further 
centralization. In the late 1920s, the national network of seinendan empowered average farm 
youth and allowed them to imagine rural modernity. At the same time, dynamics in local villages 
were where rural youth built social capital and enhanced their status. The seinendan and other 
youth training institutions operated under the tension between the centralizing (or nationalizing) 
and decentralizing (localizing) forces. During wartime mobilization, however, the former 
overwhelmed the latter. 
In the early 1930s, localities were still important. Local history, folklore, and folk art 
movements were popular across the country.  In educational practices, localization and de-35
centralization were a national trend since the late 1920s. Seinendan groups were often regarded 
as belonging to localities, compared to youth training centers and youth schools. “The essence of 
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youth training centers is clearly the educational facility of the state… All the educational 
methods there are conducted by certain educators based on a set of laws. In comparison, the 
seinendan are completely private groups and are not subject to any legal constraints,” Nagato 
Raizō, a social education official in Miyagi prefecture argued, “the seinendan, viewed from their 
history, emerged with various local characteristics of each village and town, as well as of each 
region.”   36
Yet, despite Nagato’s perception, the localities owed much to nationalizing, centralizing 
forces. The seinendan received as much supervision by the prefectural and national officials as 
the youth training centers. The government ministries had eagerly intervened into seinendan 
activities even before 1924, when the Greater Japan Seinendan Federation was established as a 
national network of the local seinendan. Particularly in the Shōwa period (starting in 1926), 
Emperor Hirohito frequently visited the ceremonies and sports festivals of seinendan members, 
emphasizing the direct connection between rural youth and Imperial state. The national network 
of seinendan became a single body, the Greater Japan Seinendan, in 1939 and expanded to 
integrate groups of younger children [shōnendan] in 1941. Through these national networks, 
localities represented by village seinendan units were studied, compiled, and presented.  The 37
premise of locally-driven and centuries-old seinendan was itself a product of nationalization of 
the seinendan institution. 
One project of the Miyagi seinendan, the establishment of a statue of Date Masamune, 
shows how the emphasis on locality rested on centralizing forces. Miyagi’s social education 
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official Nagato Raizō initiated the movement to construct the Date statue in 1930 in the hope of 
instilling local pride in young people in impoverished rural villages.  The most popular 38
historical hero in Miyagi, Date’s legendary life was known to all Miyagi youth—losing an eye in 
childhood, succeeding the lordship of the Sendai domain at 18, expanding the domain through 
remarkable military feats at the age 23, and leading Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea of 
the 1590s.  To celebrate the 300th anniversary of his death, 50,000 seinendan members raised 39
funds for the statue by laboring at various construction sites and soliciting donations from 
politicians and business leaders, including Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo.  On May 16, 40
1935, a bronze equestrian statue, sculpted by a Miyagi artist Komuro Tōru, traveled from Tokyo 
and arrived in Sendai. The regional newspaper Kahoku shinpō reported the excitement over his 
“homecoming” for many weeks. As much as it manifested local pride, this project was only 
possible because of the national seinendan network, which centrally organized the labor force 
and brought the statue of the hero from metropolitan Tokyo. 
The emphasis on local characteristics in education originally started as liberal activism by 
schoolteachers, challenging standardization in the late 1920s. In Tōhoku, teachers in Akita 
launched a movement to teach local languages, histories, and characteristics in the journal Hoppō 
kyōiku (Northern Education) in 1930. They argued that they reflected “the trend of educational 
de-centralization” and aimed at “abandoning conceptual discussion and abstract theories and 
exploring the right path in concrete realities.”  Miyagi Education Journal also published many 41
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articles that argued that one’s love for a native place [kyōdoai] should be the basis of education. 
A teacher in Igu county argued, “The start of education must center on the native place.”  42
Elementary schools put up slogans, such as “understand one’s native place, love one’s native 
place, and develop one’s native place,” and hung paintings of Date Masamune.  Authors in the 43
journal started to embrace a new perspective on the Tōhoku dialect, which had been a target of 
“correction” in the early part of the century. Asserting that even “the Tokyō language is another 
dialect,” another teacher stressed the importance of regional dialects and argued that “it is not 
standard Japanese that vividly expresses the emotional lives of local people, but the language of 
the native place, or in other words, the dialect.”  The appreciation of the Tōhoku dialect 44
continued in the late 1930s, with some applying a new adjective, “beautiful,” to “Tōhoku 
language.”   45
Agrarian values concealed the potential conflict between the liberal-localizing movement 
and standardizing central forces. Every non-urban region claimed its value based on its 
commitment to agriculture and fishery production, the moral quality of villagers, and the 
presence of strong and healthy young men. Shida county was no exception. Kahoku shinpō’s 
specialized local report in 1936 featured Shida county “in the throne of Agricultural Miyagi.” It 
emphasized that Furukawa city, famous for tenant disputes and political contestations between 
socialists and the government, overcame its earlier difficulties and united for the revitalization of 
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Tōhoku.  The phrase “pillars of youth” [chūken seinen] appeared in the middle of the page, 46
stressing the high morale of young men and reservists.  By emphasizing these typical agrarian 47
elements, local leaders appeared supportive of nationalizing and de-centralizing forces at the 
same time. 
Thus “rural youth” symbolized two things in the 1930s: local pride to village leaders and 
the target of reform to urban educators. A research team measured the levels of intelligence of 
young people in an academic test in 1938, claiming that the intelligence of rural youth was 
significantly lower than that of city youth. In Shirai village, Chiba prefecture, a case study of the 
study team stated, “81% of male and 78% of female youth have lower-than-average 
intelligence.”  The national leaders of seinendan, viewing rural youth as uneducated bumpkins, 48
did not hide their attitude toward them even at a later date. They lamented about the change in 
the official journal, Seinen, as becoming “an earthy and fun-seeking journal with phonetic marks 
on kanji … that finally stimulated rural seinendan members to read.”   49
Perhaps sensing the urbanites’ condescension toward rural youth cloaked in the praise of 
localities, Miyagi educators emphasized the usefulness of local culture to the nation as a whole. 
“Native place is the nation [kokka],” one schoolteacher emphasized, “superior Miyagi people, 
from the national point of view, are superior Japanese people.”  Among many theorists quoted 50
by these Miyagi teachers, particularly popular was German geographer Karl Ritter’s claim that a 
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native land has everything necessary to study the entire earth.  In measuring the importance of 51
Tōhoku in the nation, some had recourse to the rivalry between the east and the west, which 
Hangai Seiju had argued in 1906 when he warned against the westward imperial expansion. “We 
must not make Tōhoku into Kansai-style (Osaka, Kyoto)” because “Tōhoku is, and has to 
remain, the root of Japan,” argued Itō Hyōgo, a schoolteacher in Miyagi.  Proud of his origin in 52
Fukushima, the president of the Tokyo Science Museum claimed in 1938 that “the culture is 
shifting from Seinan (southwest) to Tōhoku (northeast).”  53
These claims by Tōhoku leaders paradoxically revealed the difficulty in countering rapid 
standardization in educational methods. Since the establishment of youth training centers in 
1926, through the transition to youth schools in 1935, and deep into the war mobilization of the 
1940s, these schools were designed to provide uniform, nationalizing education.  As teachers, 54
many youth in these schools faced the mounting pressure to apply standardized methods, which 
quickly diminished their ability to attract younger generations. Each school struggled to raise the 
attendance rate in these schools. Village administrators had to lure the students in and even 
manipulate the numbers. “The primary importance is to raise the attendance rate, and training 
itself is the secondary importance,” argued a schoolmaster in Iwadeyama, Miyagi, in 1934. They 
attained near perfect attendance by reducing the frequency of training from four times to twice a 
month and by visiting each household to remind the families in advance.  Among students, 55
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young farmers were still exemplary. Teachers had a harder time recruiting youth in other 
industries—“The attendance of youth in commercial business is nearly zero,” Kahoku shinpō 
reported in 1935.  As the war progressed, the army demanded greater standardization of training 56
in youth schools. Kahoku shinpō reported in February 1941: 
In order to respond to the current international situation, complete the goal of “all 
citizens are soldiers,” and overcome the difficulty of the times, the Sendai army 
division’s headquarters decided to focus its energy on youth military drill. As a guiding 
principle in youth schools, it will correct the students’ thought and behavior that varied 
according to region-specific conditions by adopting the set principle based on 
encouragement of the Japanese spirit and imperial rescripts. It will introduce to youth 
schools [a custom of] strict salute, which the Sendai division has been implementing as 
of primary importance in education and training in order to maintain order. At the same 
time, in military drills, it will hold prefecture-wide group practices, which have been 
previously held individually in cities and counties.  57!
On the same page of Kahoku shinpō, the Sendai division boasted about Miyagi’s highest 
enrollment rate of youth schools among Tōhoku prefectures— 99% of 43,320 eligible youth 
reportedly entered youth schools.  Village officials had to keep up with the unrealistically high 58
expectation to the extent that the numbers on paper ceased to mean anything. Shida village 
recorded the largest number of youth school students, 304 (and 65 graduates) in 1941, but lost 
track of the size of enrollment in 1942.  At the time of full-scale war mobilization, even the 59
nominal entrance of young male population to youth schools seems to have become too 
bothersome to compile. The energy of village officials was re-directed from training to the 
constant allocation of manpower to military, agricultural, and heavy industries.  
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By 1943, the centralizing forces completely overwhelmed the localizing ones. Even the 
“model farm villages,” which used to represent the beauty of the locale at least in theory, were 
now leveled with the word, “standard” [hyōjun]. Three hundred “standard farm villages” were 
established throughout Japan to “perform appropriate agricultural management and nurture 
farming families that conduct firm and long-term agriculture in response to the demands of the 
nation.”  The government gave subsidies to these select villages to encourage the 60
standardization of other villages. Local characteristics that were once praised as the basis of 
“national culture” disappeared from this new program and, overall, from the wartime planned 
economy in the early 1940s. 
National Ethos through Bodily Practice and Everyday Experience 
In the localization movement of education, “home village education” [kyōdo kyōiku] had 
been the flagship of agrarian education. It had won currency as a desirable way of educating 
rural populations because it not only provided vocational and agricultural techniques, but also 
taught agrarian morality. “By using the home village’s historical and social materials, the home-
village education aims to give children a deep impression, build upon their experiences, and 
establish the foundations of human character,” a teacher of Shida elementary school argued in 
1932.  But when the force of nationalization overwhelmed rural education in the 1930s, the 61
emphasis on nurturing “character” was transformed into a focus on bodily acquisition of 
nationalistic spirit. As a result, “home village education,” originally intended to shift attention 
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and resources to develop local identity, was transformed into a method of inculcating nationalism 
through everyday life. 
Eliminating the boundary between formal training time and daily life was a decisive 
departure from previous kyōka (moral suasion) campaigns toward fascist education. 
Schoolteachers and seinendan leaders had always aimed at influencing lifestyles of children and 
youth, but mere “influence” was no longer enough for the nation in “wartime emergency.” To 
merge home and nation, “integration of training and everyday life” [kunren no seikatsuka, 
seikatsu no kurenka] became a new teaching philosophy in Funaoka youth training center in 
Shibata county, Miyagi, in 1935. Army officers of the Sendai Division applauded its “forward-
thinking” training and paid a visit to view the center’s activities, mainly “military-style” 
agricultural practices. They also visited the students’ homes to study how their changed behavior 
at home affected their family members.   62
The so-called China Incident of 1937, which marked the initiation of total war against 
China, intensified the trend of integration of military training and everyday life. Kahoku shinpō 
printed in large fonts that the situation of all-out war was an “Unprecedented National Crisis,” 
which made “Youth’s Mission Critical.”  The Shida county seinendan held a convention with its 63
2,000 members, just like thousands of other seinendan groups around the empire, to pronounce 
the state of emergency and make an oath to commit to the war effort.  “All of the activities of 64
youth in Shirai village have to be filled with national significance and penetrated by the spirit of 
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devotion to the state,” argued the 1938 study on rural youth education.  It emphasized that 65
seinendan should focus on “collective practice of daily life” [shūdanteki seikatsu jissen] as a 
means for intensive moral training.   66
In order to implement “collective practice of daily life,” many youth training institutions 
turned themselves into dojo (a training facility for martial arts), where individuals spent days 
together and received strict supervision of every aspect of their daily routine. Dojo facilities, 
where “living together” was central, spread around the country.  In December 1938, Katō 67
Hisanosuke made a large donation to build a dojo in the local Hachiman shrine yard in the hope 
of “producing youth with iron bodies and iron spirits.” It served multiple purposes as a center of 
youth’s moral training: it was a facility for group exercises of village male and female youth, a 
venue for lectures and speeches, a dojo for martial arts, and a memorial hall of the China 
Incident that displayed photos of the village’s heroic war dead.  As the prospect of war became 68
bleaker, elementary schools were also turned into dojos that emphasized bodily acquisition of 
nationalistic spirit over learning. “The 180-degree change of education!!,” a schoolteacher in 
Sendai advocated in 1942. “It is extremely outdated if you regard only intellectual instruction as 
the value of schools.” Against the criticism “that school beats bells and drums, having too much 
of religious flavor,” he stressed that the “training of all aspects of children’s lives” required 
integration of training and everyday life. Many youth schools adopted the dojo-style training as 
well. A teacher at a youth school in Kurihara county reported in November 1943 that its mission 
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was to “make youth aware of the meanings of their work and their mission at their workplaces 
and complete their mission, through every possible means, with burning loyalty in response to 
imperial benevolence.” Their training ranged from radio listening comprehension and military 
marches to monetary savings and lectures on imperial agrarianism.  In the 1940s, the original 69
emphasis on the “local” in home village education was replaced by stress on the young “body” 
that knew no separation between private and national spheres.  
Rural Imperialism  
When both localizing and centralizing forces defined their goal as establishing a strong 
nation [kokka], the word nation meant the empire. The presence of the empire was inflated in 
young farmers’ everyday lives not only through wartime educational methods. The expanding 
imperial frontiers in northern China, like the battlefronts, were closely linked to Japanese rural 
villages. Japan’s imperial expansion was informed by agrarian ideals from the beginning, but the 
imperial control over Manchuria in the 1930s magnified the discourse of an agriculture-centered 
imperialism. Schoolteachers argued that the seinendan in the 1930s differed from those in Meiji 
times: “Today’s Japan shows a superlative presence as a champion of East Asia and world leader, 
so the seinendan in the Japanese countryside should not remain in the era of wakarenchū (hamlet 
youth associations), seinenkai (youth groups in Meiji), shojokai (young women’s groups in the 
1910s) as in the thought of early or mid-Meiji.”  They envisioned the seinendan to transform 70
themselves as the scale of imperialism expanded in the late 1930s.  
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In fact, the empire in the 1930s affected the everyday lives of rural Japanese in a new 
way because of government migration programs to Manchuria. The territory in northeastern 
China, Manchuria was called “the new paradise” and was presented as a panacea for the 
widespread rural problems in the 1930s. Villagers had faced a shortage of arable land especially 
when the rural population expanded during the depression.  To ease the population pressure, an 71
agrarian activist Katō Kanji, with support by the Kwangtung Army (the Japanese army stationed 
in northeastern China) commanders Ishihara Kanji and Tōmiya Kaneo, advocated and launched 
the Manchuria colonization program in 1932.  The program provided Japanese farmers with 72
army drills and agricultural training in the Uchihara training center in Ibaraki prefecture and then 
relocated them as armed agricultural colonizers. After sending 423 farmers from the Tōhoku 
region and Nagano prefecture to Manchuria in the first year,  the central government planned to 73
send millions of farmers in the next ten years. The media, including the popular magazine Ie no 
hikari (The Light of the Family), introduced success stories of emigrants in one issue after 
another, popularizing Manchuria as a destination.  Between 1932 and 1936, the Miyagi 74
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prefectural government sent 12,419 emigrants in the official record, a fifth largest group in the 
country.  75
In reality, Miyagi officials, although they frantically recruited volunteers, had no concrete 
evidence that Manchuria was the solution to rural poverty. Kimura Tadashi, a Miyagi official, did 
not conceal his lack of confidence in a 1931 speech: “I know nothing about Manchuria. I have 
been told only that Manchuria has limitless land and limitless resources. And there is always an 
insistence that Manchuria is Japan’s life-line; that we must protect the rights and interests earned 
in the battles of 1904-5. It is a very abstract thing.”  Nonetheless, the mobilization was 76
accelerated every year. The prefectural government set up a “Miyagi village” in Manchuria, 
consisting of a few settlers from each village so that emigrants had more than immediate kinship 
to rely on. Some villages promoted migration more enthusiastically than others and created their 
“branch villages” in Manchuria. Nangō village, also called the “best migration village of Japan,” 
was the first in the country to plan to establish a branch village.  Nangō’s move fanned Miyagi’s 77
“migration fever,” and encouraged other villages like Ōnuki to hold lectures, motion-picture 
showings, and hamlet meetings to emulate Nangō’s collective colonization on the continent.   78
Since the target population of emigration consisted of young male farmers, the seinendan 
played a central role in mobilization. The seinendan were the most reliable organization to 
prepare model migrants from the viewpoint of the government and the Kwangtung Army. 
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Japanese bureaucrats, particularly those in the South Manchurian Railway Company, were 
concerned about a large number of unemployed youth going to Manchuria with a dream of easy 
money. The magazine Ie no hikari warned that there were an increasing number of waitresses 
from cafes and bars, as well as prostitutes, in Manchuria.  To encourage the migration of farm 79
youth for agricultural colonization, all levels of government offices worked with the 
corresponding levels of seinendan associations. At the national level, the Japan Youth Hall in 
Tokyo hosted a large celebration for the departure of the migrants from 1932.  In 1937, the 80
Greater Japan Seinendan Federation established a “colonization department” to facilitate 
overseas migration and submitted to the cabinet a policy recommendation to establish the Young 
Volunteer Corps for the Development of Manchuria-Mongolia [Manmō kaitaku seishōnen 
giyūgun, or the Volunteer Corps]. The seinendan leaders used every venue to promote the 
Volunteer Corps, such as convening prefectural representatives to discuss the guidelines of 
recruitment and advertising the Volunteer Corps in the official seinendan journal Seinen (Youth), 
the Japan Youth Newspaper, and the popular series the Youth Card, and so on. As a result, more 
than 20,000 young men joined the Volunteer Corps and relocated themselves to Manchuria in 
1938.  81
The prefectural level of seinendan associations had already been taking youth to the 
frontier of the empire. Since 1925, the Miyagi seinendan had been organizing study trips to 
Manchuria and Korea. These trips supposedly provided an opportunity to “transcend national 
borders, reflect upon the state of our empire, feel the customs of the continent, correct our 
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perceptions of Manchuria and Korea, mourn at the battle sites, and see the activities of 
compatriots.”  After the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the 206 former participants of these study 82
trips formed the Miyagi Youth Manchuria-Korea Group to show their firm support to those “who 
risk their lives defending the lifeline of the Yamato race,” and initiated a variety of publications, 
lectures, and study groups.  Miyagi seinen (Miyagi Youth), the official Miyagi seinendan 83
newsletter, was the main forum for their activities. In fact, the Miyagi seinen and the Miyagi 
Education Journal constantly reported “impressions” of Manchuria, Korea, and occasionally 
Taiwan by teachers and youth who visited these places. Their experiences of riding the trains 
with passengers of different ethnicities, passing through dangerous zones where the Japanese 
were often attacked by bandits, and walking among the neon signs, bars, and jazz music in Jilin 
depicted the adventurous atmosphere of their trips from Korea to Manchuria. At the same time, 
this unfamiliar space filled with flashy hyper-modern symbols did not feel completely foreign to 
these visitors owing to the presence of Miyagi settlers there.  The study trip participants often 84
obtained help from Miyagi business owners for accommodation, meals, and tour guides. Reports 
on the agricultural settlement in Manchuria similarly employed a combination of the unfamiliar 
and familiar. “We use the machines of Western nations for agricultural tools, which are 
unimaginable in Japan,” wrote a settler from Miyagi in the fourth migration program.  By 85
having Miyagi’s co-locals introduce their experience, the “unseen scale” of agriculture appeared 
more graspable to the young readers. Scholar Hyung Ok Park has argued that the settlement of 
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Korean farmers in the Kando region of Manchuria functioned as cells in the “osmotic” expansion 
of the capitalist-empire.  Miyagi’s emigrants to Manchuria created a similar process of 86
“osmosis” in that these migrants transformed not only the boundary of the empire, but also that 
of Miyagi’s rural villages.  
At the village level, fraternal bonds that grew among seinendan members served to bring 
the larger imperial state closer to village everyday life. Many young people who emigrated to the 
colonies continued to submit their essays to their home village’s seinendan newsletters. Some 
newsletters allowed overseas contributors to use their authority to give a “real account” of the 
empire. Especially in the 1920s, when migration was not such a prevalent phenomenon, 
seinendan members living in an “outer territory [gaichi],” as the colonies were called, were a 
rare source of first-hand accounts. In the Akita city seinendan newsletters, for example, Satō 
Yūtarō, a member living in northern Korea, shared his opinion. Cautioning the reader against the 
mistaken image of Koreans, Satō described the “real” Koreans as “loyal and humane,” although 
“some have the slyness of the loser of a war.” His chauvinism came out when he concluded that 
“it was sufficient for those in the past to just be the conqueror [seifukusha], but we have an 
additional duty now: the assimilation of the conquered [hiseifukusha].”  As living in outer 87
territories became more common a phenomenon over time, and seinendan newsletters reflected 
that trend. Kanno Sukeo, a settler in Taiwan, submitted his essays to the seinendan newsletter of 
his home village, Edano in Igu county around 1935. Kanno gave no sign of being a settler other 
than the word “Taiwan” in front of his name. His essay deplored that people with high morality 
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often fell into poverty. It downplayed the unique environment of living in Taiwan by sharing a 
universal concern of rural youth.  Essays like this flattened various experiences in the empire 88
and shrunk them into one narrative of struggling rural youth. Through these exchanges and 
personal ties that grew among them, the expansive empire became a familiar, graspable world to 
village seinendan members.  
Japan’s conquest of Manchuria gave rural villages pioneer status not only in the national 
discourse but also in the imperial framework. Young generations in the countryside, in particular, 
nurtured a deeper sense of agrarian imperialism. They came to believe that their responsibilities 
extended from their hamlets and villages, beyond the Japanese archipelago, reaching the frontier 
land of northern China and Manchuria. They were told to “love their native place” because “the 
earnest love for their native place… is the mother of the development of the continent.”  They 89
were also told to “raise self-awareness” as imperial settlers in the continent and abstain from 
alcohol, violence, and arrogant behavior in order to cultivate admiration for Japan among 
Chinese (and Korean) locals.  All aspects of their lives, even their wedding, were mobilized to 90
advertise imperial settlement. Nangō village chose brides for thirteen migrant volunteers and 
conducted a group wedding in February 1937. The wedding ceremony at the Nangō shrine was 
to “further propel the accomplishment of the village goal,” which was “emigration to 
Manchuria.” The brides wore monpe work trousers and “absolutely no make-up,” to symbolize 
the spirit of Manchurian migration.  Thus, village seinendan members found themselves in the 91
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midst of the emigration campaign, both as mobilizing forces and as mobilized subjects. Teenage 
boys were recruited to join the Volunteer Corps to go to Manchuria. Female seinendan members 
received training as “brides of the continent,” attending lectures on childbearing and nutrition 
science as well as volunteering at construction sites.  The Japanese seinendan, which used to 92
operate separately from their counterparts in the colonies, started in the late 1930s to regularly 
cross the ocean and meet other youth in and outside Manchuria. 
In addition to their ties to Manchuria, the seinendan symbolized the imperial power 
through their connection with the Hitler Youth. Fascist movements in Europe had already 
captured attention of young and old, as well as ideological right and left in Japan in the 1920s 
and 30s.  Both the national seinendan magazine Seinen (Youth, previous Teikoku seinen, 93
Imperial Youth) and village seinendan newsletters saw Mussolini and Hitler as superior leaders. 
In September 1938, the seinendan and the Hitler Youth exchanged visits to tour around each 
other’s empire.  Twelve members of the Hitler Youth, headed by Reinhold Schulze, were 94
welcomed enthusiastically by Japanese crowds everywhere they went during their three-month 
travel in the Japanese empire. Their brief stop at Sendai on September 11 became a regional 
spectacle. Kahoku shinpō published photos of German youth in the famous Jugend uniform: 
“The five hours the Hitler Jugend spent in Sendai, the city of forests, was filled with 
[expressions] of Japanese-German friendship by all 220,000 residents. Enthusiasm for the youth 
of our ally followed and boiled hot. Sendai was plunged into a whirlpool of breathtaking 
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excitement for five hours.”  The Shida village newsletter reported the news: “The Jugend sang 95
the German national anthem to the Sendai seinendan musical band, and then [the seinendan] 
sang Kimi ga yo (the Japanese national anthem) in return.” After a number of speeches, “to 
introduce the local arts, the city seinendan performed a sword dance, the young women’s 
seinendan sang Sansa shigure, and it finished with a children’s performance. The Jugend sang 
the Nazi party song, the Jugend song, and so forth. In a harmonious atmosphere with a stream of 
solemn feeling, we gave three shouts of banzai (“long live”) for Germany, and Mr. Schulze led 
three shouts of banzai for the Greater Japanese Empire.”  The appearance of the Hitler Youth 96
impressed the public and raised its confidence in seinendan associations in representing a global 
power on a par with Germany. These exchanges symbolized a new vision of internationalism, 
and were reported even in remote villages like Shida. After Japan walked out of the League of 
Nations and isolated itself from other Western powers in 1933, the exchanges between the 
seinendan and the Hitler Youth may have conveyed the public Japan’s tie with Europe’s new 
rising power. 
Individuals in Fascist Mobilization 
How did village youth react to these forces of agrarian, imperial, and military 
mobilization? This becomes a difficult question to answer because of the merging of private and 
national spheres in wartime mobilization. Local contexts and personal motivations were deeply 
submerged under nationalistic slogans. Everyone was occupied producing agricultural and 
industrial goods, participating in military drills, attending neighborhood meetings, and 
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compensating for the loss of critical manpower to military conscription. During this time, the 
local social sphere quickly disappeared, and the links between individuals and the state became 
more direct and organized hierarchically.  
It appears that the generation that lived through the rise of “rural youth” in the 1920s 
made the transition to wartime rural imperialism and militarism without a major rupture. The 
personal records of Katō Einojō, the landlord’s son of Shida, indicate no major shift but only an 
acceleration of his belief in the power of rural youth. Having become a semi-public figure by the 
late 1930s, Katō’s life revolved around active participation in war mobilization. His full embrace 
of wartime rhetoric reveals not only what messages reached his village, but also how individuals 
of his generation, class, and gender consumed fascism with a degree of enthusiasm. 
Katō Einojō, already 33 years of age when Japan launched all-out war in 1937, took 
Japan’s “state of emergency” seriously as a “pillar” of Aratanome hamlet, Shida village. Because 
he failed the conscription exam in the 1920s owing to his height, he remained in the village in 
the 1940s even as the war intensified and most of the youth had enlisted. He served in many 
official positions related to agricultural administration, education, and hamlet governance. After 
completing a lecture course on “the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” in June 1941 and 
another on “Leadership in the Time of Crisis and Self-Awareness of National Subjects” in 
October 1942, he became the head of village sōnendan (adult associations) in 1943.   97
Katō had already acquired skill and reputation as a hamlet leader through his experience 
of leading his 4-H club. Once he took charge of hamlet affairs, he frequently wrote and 
circulated hamlet newsletters to report donation quotas, surveys to be conducted, rules of the new 
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national health insurance, venues and quantities of rationing of goods, and detailed plans for 
agricultural coops.  These writings reveal his enthusiasm for playing a leadership role that was 98
already apparent in his earlier youth group activities. The rebelliousness that had characterized 
his youth group, however, was replaced by new confidence as a figure of authority. Kahoku 
shinpō reported his leadership in promoting the war effort in 1943: Katō gathered heads of 
households to explain the grave national food shortage. He promised to contribute 20% of his 
own rice holdings to the hamlet’s donation quota, begging others to cooperate with him. He also 
argued that “it is a shame for farmers” to receive rice rations. Under Katō’s initiative, Aratanome 
residents made a collective oath that they would resort to other foods in case of rice shortage in 
their households.   99
Slogans on “youth” and “farmers” continued to attract Katō’s attention. Omoto, the 
private youth group journal he edited in 1931, had already featured the feelings of proud, young 
farmers and their determination to work hard in “a farmer’s poem” and “a letter to the enlisted 
soldier.” The focus on youth and hard work smoothly merged into the rhetoric of total 
mobilization and intensified over time. He was surrounded by the rhetoric of fighting “rural 
youth.” Declared in the cover of the meeting minute of Shida Country Imperial Rule Assistance 
Association in May 1941, “Youth is the heat and oil for the flame of our leaders!”  The “oath of 100
food production increase” by the Shida village sōnendan was printed in handouts: 
Today food is also a weapon. 
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We know that one grain of rice and barley, or one chunk of potato, is equivalent to one 
airplane and one flying bullet that determines victory or defeat in the war. !
We are farmers. 
Facing the severe war situation and entering the harvest season, now is autumn when we 
farmers must all stand up. We shall do our best to reach the production goal, firmly 
determined to complete the hamlet’s assigned obligation of agricultural donation. !
Farms are our final battleground. 
Regarding them as our fighting field, we rely on and help each other to overcome the 
hardship. We make an oath to the world that we shall absolutely achieve food production 
increase for the sake of victory.  101!
He regularly pasted articles in scrapbooks that elevated the importance of farmers, 
including one from Yomiuri Hōchi shinbun written by a leading economist Tominaga Yoshio. It 
stressed the significant role played by the 50 million farming population in Japan, Taiwan, and 
Korea, and demanded them to sacrifice more, particularly in giving up their own food 
consumption to “even out the levels of hunger of all national subjects.” Katō underlined these 
points in red pencil.  He also made a number of handwritten notes on Hōtokukai lectures, 102
perhaps in preparation for his own lectures to give to hamlet residents.  
The enthusiasm of local leaders like Katō, repeated in almost all hamlets and villages 
around the country, characterized the Japanese wartime mobilization as fascist.  Even without a 103
charismatic leader or a popular fascist party, the Japanese government enjoyed unprecedentedly 
wide popular participation and support. Like Katō, their enthusiasm owed a great degree to the 
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appeal of agrarianism and youthfulness that had built up over the decades preceding the total 
war.  104
In addition to the rhetoric of youth and agrarianism, another element characterized village 
mobilization in the 1930s and 40s: individual competitions. Fascist mobilization depended on a 
congregation of competitions among individuals at the local level. The quotas of rice donation 
and savings assigned to Aratanome hamlet by Shida village was further broken down to quotas 
for individual households. Compared to the quota system in force during the Russo-Japanese 
War, which used neighborhoods as units, the quotas during WWII appear to have been more 
individualized even though “neighborhood associations (tonari gumi)” were formed to watch 
each other.  Katō made clean tables and charts to visualize the achievement of each household 105
every year. The collected results were then used to make a hamlet-to-hamlet comparison. As a 
hamlet leader, Katō Einojō took pride in completing, and even outpacing, his own quota. This 
competition increased pressure at every level, and, as a result, maintained a high morale among 
the people. The mobilization in the 1930s and 40s might appear to have reinforced the traditional 
function of hamlet community control that had developed over centuries, but modern 
collectivism was in fact based on individual responsibility, made possible by meticulous, 
standardized surveys and monitoring methods used only in modern times. 
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While the fascist state emphasized the virtue of collectivism, people rationalized their 
collaboration with the state in the name of the empowerment of individuals. In a way, this was an 
expansion of the dynamic seen in the Rural Youth Industry, except that now the state attempted 
to eliminate the sphere outside its influence altogether. Agrarian youth had formed the Rural 
Youth Industry by seeking rural modernity and personal success. They deployed the rhetoric of 
the state and used the global trend of youth activism to their benefits. In the 1940s, when any 
voice that challenged the goal of the state met with immediate harsh punishment, such freedom 
of co-optation was gone. But at the same time, the individuality of all people was supposed to 
blossom through the state. Those whose voice had been submerged earlier, such as children and 
unmarried farmwomen, in particular, could establish a new status in the new symbiosis. A 
children’s magazine, Weekly Junior Nation [Shūkan shōkokumin], argued that children were even 
more responsible than adults for carrying out the war and shouldering the future of the empire. 
Children who grew up during wartime later wrote that they felt “happiness and pride” in 
believing the rhetoric and becoming a “perfect imperial subject.”  Young women also viewed 106
themselves as having new leverage. Ōnuki village’s female seinendan members established a 
“non-marriage alliance,” pledging that they would not marry men who did not attend military 
drills in youth training centers, saying “without military drills, they are not ‘men’!” They 
attempted to confront the dominance of masculinity by turning their marriage decision into a 
chance to judge their male counterparts.   107
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In this way, the escalating wartime mobilization challenged established social statuses, 
including the status accorded to healthy young men. The last years of the war destabilized 
another longstanding social hierarchy—that of the urban and the rural. Food supplies were in 
critical shortage and urban areas were targeted by daily air raids.  Urban populations rushed to 108
find family connections in rural villages so they could flee the cities. The government began 
arranging evacuation of urban children in June 1944, and by September 1944, Shida county 
accepted 714 schoolchildren (the total of 792 including teachers and staff) mostly from Tokyo.  109
Scholars have argued that the nation-wide phenomenon of evacuation [sokai] overturned the 
ressentiment against the cities among the rural population. Many urban residents suffered in the 
sudden displacement and formed bitter memories of their sokai experience.  Katō Einojō 110
experienced the shift in the urban-rural relationship personally. Two months before Japan’s 
surrender, Katō agreed to host twenty students of Tōhoku Imperial University in Sendai, as well 
as a professor of law, Nakagawa Zennosuke, in a community center attached to the Aratanome 
shrine.  They put up a sign, “The Aratanome branch of the Law and Literature Department of 111
Tōhoku Imperial University.” Katō’s records do not say whether he felt any sense of superiority 
over the displaced urbanites, only about his belief in the increasing responsibility of rural 
villages. But under the extraordinary circumstances of wartime, Katō Einojō’s failed dream of 
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seeking higher education in a city seemed to be now all reversed as the refugees of the university 
sought help from him in his home village of Shida.   
The Demise of the Rural Youth Industry 
The social hierarchies in rural areas were being re-defined especially because the “pillars 
of youth” had left and never returned, leading to the demise of the Rural Youth Industry. Despite 
the alarm about population pressure in the 1930s, the agricultural population sharply declined in 
the late 1930s and early 1940s. In addition to the continuing governmental efforts to send 
farmers to Manchuria, conscription and war-related heavy industry absorbed rural youth during 
the final years of war. Nangō village, which eagerly promoted emigration to Manchuria, saw a 
rapid shrinkage of the tenant population to the extent that landlords suffered shortages in the 
workforce required to cultivate their land in 1941 and 1942.  The diminishing numbers of 112
agrarian youth is shown in simple demographic statistics. In 1930, the dominant demographic 
group in the agricultural sector was young men between 15 and 20 years of age. This was 
particularly true in Tōhoku, where these teenagers were presumably responsible for the 
“overpopulation” to be eased through migration.  In comparison, a 1948 study of Shida village 113
pointed out that “the size of male population in their 20s and 30s dropped precipitously” and 
argued that “this speaks vividly of the demographic change during wartime.”  114
The loss of manpower in Shida village mainly came from military service and death on 
battlefields. Between 1944 and 1945, the number of registered deaths almost doubled from 125 
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to 220 (causes unspecified).  A village history of 1950 lists 240 soldiers who died in 115
Manchuria, Pacific islands, Okinawa, and other places between 1937-1946—approximately 8 % 
of all the male residents. Others presumably came home injured. The number conveys the gravity 
of wartime loss, especially when compared to the twenty soldiers who died during the sixty years 
of the Meiji and Taishō periods combined.  Katō Einojō’s hamlet newsletters tell Aratanome’s 116
struggle to deal with declining manpower as well as with the death of its young soldiers. It often 
reported news of Shida village’s group funerals held in the elementary school, requesting that 
hamlet residents raise a mourning flag.  He also asked every remaining male resident between 117
21 and 50 years of age to attend the inauguration of the Patriotic Labor Corps in September 
1943, organized to compensate for the loss of the workforce.  In 1944, the village organized 118
several “Military Assistance Emphasis Weeks.” Schoolteachers and village officials, including 
Katō, visited the families of the conscripts to hear and record the details of their circumstances.  
With very few young men remaining in rural villages, older men and women moved to 
the forefront of village management. The sōnendan (adult associations), consisting of those who 
had passed the conscription age of twenty, took over the role of seinendan and provided 
volunteer labor and leadership in agriculture.  Katō Einojō, although he had earlier refused to 119
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join the village seinendan, exercised his leadership through positions in the Shida village 
sōnendan and as a manager of Shida county sōnendan after May 1943. Young women played an 
increasingly larger role as a labor force. When women of 17 and 18 years of age formed a 
“young ladies’ corps” [otome butai] to go to villages in Fukushima to boost their silk production 
in 1939, the newspaper featured a large photo of young women lining up at Furukawa station.  120
Within a few years, female labor mobilization became the norm in Japan as elsewhere and 
“reinforcement corps” [engun] for agricultural production became a synonym for young 
women’s labor units.  Young women formed the teishintai (female volunteer corps) and took 121
the place of the masculine seinendan in the final stage of the war.  It is no coincidence that 122
women wrote most of the memoirs that recounted the suffering of everyday lives on the home 
front—facing serious shortages of food and basic materials, working in fields and factories in 
abysmal conditions, teaching students war slogans, panicking in air raids, and finding burnt 
bodies of their children in the shelters.     123
Conclusion 
The Japanese countryside underwent an age of youth mobilization that stretched from the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1905 to the peak of the Asia-Pacific War in the early 1940s. Owing to the 
head start in establishing youth training institutions, Japanese young men in rural villages began 
to find opportunities for upward mobility earlier than their colonial counterparts. In the 1930s, 
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seinendan members tied the battlefront and empire to everyday experiences in villages, uplifting 
social morale and production for the fighting empire—the empire relied on the “pillars of youth.” 
The idealization of powerful rural youth continued in national policy and discourse until the end 
of the war. Yet, as farm youth left their home villages from the late 1930s, they emptied the Rural 
Youth Industry of its protagonists. When young men were disappearing, the relationship of 
mutual co-optation—previously established between the state and farm youth—was extended to 
the entire population. As the state demanded the full participation and commitment of every 
citizen, it opened up an opportunity for underrepresented social groups to escape the confines of 
social hierarchies by utilizing the rhetoric of the state. At the same time, intensive mobilization 
disallowed the private arena—where people had formed desires for rural modernity and created 
incentives to subvert social hierarchies—to remain outside the purview of the state. In short, 
village youth had radicalized the ideology of nationalism by pursuing social opportunities, which 
in turn destroyed the mechanism of social mobility during wartime. 
!
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[Shida Village Age and Sex Demographic Groups in 1948]  !













Chapter 5:  
Youth in a Mountain Village—Beipu in Xinzhu, Taiwan (1890s-1930s) 
!
Seeing the movement to establish and centralize the seinendan in Japan, Japanese 
colonial bureaucrats and educators felt impelled to introduce similar institutions as a means to 
nationalize—or assimilate—local population in Taiwan. The colonial setting, of course, made the 
task more difficult. In Taiwan, basic infrastructure to implement assimilation policies—
elementary schools, moral suasion [kyōka] groups, and youth groups—spread rapidly even in 
remote villages in comparison with Korea. But this did not readily lead to the formation of what I 
call the “Rural Youth Industry,” a mechanism where youth turned mobilization into mobility, 
until the mid-1930s.  
Taiwan’s unique social conditions explain this gap. Because Chinese migrants had arrived 
in Taiwan and colonized coastal towns and remote mountainous villages at different times over 
the centuries, when Japan colonized Taiwan in 1895, the colonizers faced a great variety of social 
dynamics made by class and racial relationships. The coastal provincial capital of Xinzhu 
province, Xinzhu city, resembled a town in mainland China long stratified by social classes. In 
these provincial cities, anti-colonial intellectual youth established local youth groups and tried to 
reach the rural population from there in the 1920s.  
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In contrast, a newly conquered mountain village in the same province, Beipu, had not 
established a stable social order by the late nineteenth century. The village life revolved around 
the racial tensions between the Chinese Hakka and the indigenous Saisiyat. After 1895, Hakka 
leaders used the presence of the Japanese to secure their control over the mountains. In these 
villages, where mountains were the source of wealth and adventure, and youthful leadership was 
the norm in previous armed conquests, the idea of “rural youth” did not have a neglected and 
marginalized image vis-à-vis “urban youth.” This diversity in social conditions at the initial stage 
of colonial rule produced difficulties in implementing uniform programs across the island. 
Despite these differences in social dynamics, the development of youth groups in Xinzhu 
province followed a broad pattern seen in Miyagi, Japan. The local youth groups first served 
local elites to solidify their status in the changing political and social environments. These elites 
monopolized the role of modernizers through youth groups. But the national movements to 
create the ideal “rural youth” eventually challenged their dominance. In Xinzhu, this was 
initiated in the early 1930s not by average agrarian youth themselves, but by Japanese educators. 
New seinendan activities attracted a wide range of youth, but without creating job opportunities, 
their activities alone did not create a Rural Youth Industry for average youth in the countryside. 
Nonetheless, rural youth mobilization up to the mid-1930s fostered hardwork-ism, frugality, and 
the identity as model rural youth—traits of ideal Japanese subjects. Once career opportunities 
became available to average farmers through wartime youth training, the spread of the seinendan 
and the high literacy rate allowed the rapid formation of a version of the Rural Youth Industry, 
which subsequently nurtured Japanese nationalism among youth in the Taiwanese countryside. 
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Youth in Xinzhu City and Beipu at the Turn of the Twentieth Century 
When Japanese colonial rule started, colonizers faced different social hierarchies in 
different parts of Taiwan. In Xinzhu city on the northwest coast of Taiwan, the main social 
dynamic was created by class divisions. The Chinese settlement in this area had started in the late 
seventeenth century. By the late nineteenth century, the wealth generated from trade, the mastery 
of Chinese classics, and the privilege of passing the Qing civil servant examination defined the 
upper class—in other words, their social status depended on the Qing source of prestige. After 
Japan took over Taiwan in 1895, the Government-General of Taiwan (GGT) sought to find a way 
to replace the authority of Qing civil service and the Confucius education with new institutions. 
Along with elementary schools, the early youth groups in Xinzhu city were one of the 
institutions that enhanced the upper-class status of the wealthy and the educated. 
Japanese elementary and language schools were the first institutions built by the colonial 
government to provide a new source of status and privilege. Schools spread relatively quickly, 
and by 1904, the popularity of modern schools had almost reached that of shufang (private 
Chinese schools run by local literati).  However, schools did not immediately function as a status 1
signifier. In 1903, a Japanese elementary school teacher in Xinzhu city, Hayashi Genzaburō, 
observed that the new school system had disrupted the previous avenues of social mobility in a 
way that Japanese officials did not expect. Elite families never discarded the idea that the 
Chinese classics was the most authentic body of knowledge, so they sent their sons to shufang 
rather than the Japanese school.  Only after the elite children grew up and realized the need of 2
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Japanese language education did they enter the elementary school. As a consequence, students 
above 15 years of age constituted more than 44% of the total of 255 students in his school, and 
they were increasing in number every year. But because the supply of elementary schools was far 
smaller than the demand, Japanese introduced a stricter age limit for admission. Hayashi raised 
his concern about what would happen to the elite youth who were willing to study in school but 
were deprived of the opportunity. In his eyes, many had already lost discipline and hope, falling 
into a nihilistic and hedonistic lifestyle. Hayashi considered that “it is the fault of the Japanese 
that they strayed from the right path,” because previously when the Qing-style elite course was 
still in place for urban residents, they did not have any time for drinking, playing, or wasting 
money. Japanese destroyed the life cycle for middle- and upper-class elites without providing 
many alternative routes.  3
Instead of elementary school diplomas, the phrase “youth circles” defined the new 
privileged class of the transitional period. The “youth circles” of Xinzhu began appearing in the 
government bilingual newspaper Taiwan nichinichi shinpō (P. Taiwan riri xinbao, E. Taiwan 
Daily News) in 1906. The phrase referred to a new generation that acquired both Chinese- and 
Japanese-style education unlike the majority of youth who went astray. They constituted a 
specific class, without an affiliation to a certain institution but with similar educational 
backgrounds and business (or academic) relationship with both Japan and China.  But some of 4
them did gather and organize youth groups in Xinzhu city. A number of “motivated youth” set up 
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a youth group to “pursue learning and advocate civilization” in a temple in Xinzhu city in 1911. 
They gathered every Sunday to “exchange knowledge,” particularly of Confucian scholarship, 
and to learn Japanese, Chinese, and mathematics.  5
While “youth” symbolized the new class emerging under Japanese rule in Xinzhu city, in 
a small mountain village, Beipu, the Japanese presence impacted racial and ethnic relationships 
more than class divisions. Beipu is located only 10 miles southeast from Xinzhu city, but had 
developed community dynamics and social values separately from coastal areas.  The dynamics 6
in Beipu had revolved around racial tensions between Chinese Hakka residents and the Saisiyat 
aboriginal groups living in the neighboring mountains. The Hakka colonizers, the Jiang family, 
conquered the area for agricultural settlement only a half century before Japanese rule.  Hakka 7
migrants arrived in Taiwan much later than the Chinese Holo (or Minnan) people from the Fujian 
region, whose presence drove the newer Hakka migrants inland to form “belt-like residential 
areas at the foot of mountains, comprised of self-defensive hamlets, between the Fujianese Holo 
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in the open land and the aborigines in the mountains.”  Jiang Xiuluan and his armed men seized 8
Beipu and established the land-development company, Jinguangfu, in the 1830s.  Jinguangfu 9
operated like a small government independent of Qing China—deploying anti-aboriginal patrols, 
building irrigation systems, facilitating land cultivation, keeping track of tenancy, and collecting 
rents. During this process, many aboriginal men waged bloody battles against the Chinese 
colonizers, and were forced deeper into the mountains.  10
Because of the racial tensions, Beipu leaders relatively quickly submitted to the Japanese 
colonizers in 1895. When Japan acquired Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Jiang 
Shaozu, a 20-year-old great-grandson of the family founder, gathered hundreds of armed men to 
resist the Japanese army.  But after his heroic death, Beipu villagers found the presence of 11
Japanese police force useful to maintain security against the Saisiyats. The number of Japanese 
settlers was small — even in the 1930s, the village only saw around 10 to12 Japanese households 
with 50 to 60 residents in total.  Despite the small number of Japanese residents, the Jiang 12
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family promptly incorporated Japanese-style administration and worked closely with the GGT.  13
In 1896, they re-organized their patrol headquarters into colonial police stations, and invited the 
Japanese to set up an administrative office in Beipu. In 1899, the Xinzhu police set up the civil-
defense system [baojia] under the directive of Gotō Shinpei, the head of civil affairs in the 
GGT.   Local elites and colonial officials set up a Japanese language school in the village temple 14
Citiangong as early as May 1898, renamed as Hoppo kōgakkō (Beipu elementary school) five 
months later.  To construct a new school building, the Jiang family and other local elites 15
contributed a considerable amount of money.   16
The racial and ethnic relationship and social hierarchy were closely linked in villages like 
Beipu. The Japanese helped the Jiang family consolidate the wealth and status they had achieved 
through battles against aboriginal groups. In one way, racial and ethnic tensions increased 
complexity after the Japanese intervened. In 1907, Saisiyiat tribesmen and Chinese rebels 
attacked Beipu and killed 57 Japanese residents including schoolchildren (the “Beipu 
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Incident”).  The inter-ethnic mistrust heightened among the Saisiyiat, the Japanese, and the 17
Hakka after the police executed no less than hundred Hakka residents for their alleged 
involvement in the uprising. At the same time, the incident demonstrated the predominance of 
the Japanese armed power. The Japanese police quickly quelled uprisings and restored the order
—subduing the rebel forces in less than a day and re-establishing the aboriginal border patrols in 
four days.  The Jiang family and Japanese village authorities used the anniversaries of the Beipu 18
Incident to emphasize the security offered by colonial village administration.  
The Japanese intervened in the hierarchy and tensions between different Chinese 
descendent groups, too. Dai Guohui, a Taiwanese Hakka who grew up in Zhongli, Xinzhu 
province and became a historian in Japan later, argues that pre-Japanese rule Taiwanese society 
was characterized as a “frontier equivalent to the wild West” and “grudges and hostilities 
between [Holo and Hakka] people that had grown in the frontier history flowed at the bottom of 
Taiwanese society” during colonial rule.  The Japanese used a blanket label of “Han Chinese” 19
that undistinguished Chinese groups, consequently allowing Hakka people to seek new 
opportunities in Holo-dominant communities.  20
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In villages like Beipu, where Japanese colonial rule did not destabilize the social class 
system but instead consolidated it, the term “youth” did not carry a new meaning. In these 
villages, because of the recent history of armed settlement, both the “rural” and “age” had 
different connotations from those in Miyagi, Korea, or even Xinzhu city. Young men had fought 
to found and protect the village, relying heavily on kinship ties. Because they had sought 
adventure and wealth in the mountains, there was no mass migration of village youth to the 
cities, and Beipu’s young leaders had already enjoyed power and status.  The Japanese 21
ideologues of “rural youth” at the turn of the twentieth century faced an unfamiliar dynamic in 
Taiwan—they were unable to stimulate village youth to grow a grudge against urban youth and a 
desire for “risshin shusse” (“rising in the world”) by forming agrarian youth groups.  
The difference in social dynamics—particularly the status of “youth”—between Xinzhu 
city and Beipu impacted the responses to the colonial attempt to establish youth groups. In 1915, 
when Japan issued the first decree to establish a national federation of the seinendan, the Xinzhu 
colonial Governor Mimura Sanpei planned to create a similar network in the province. To 
celebrate the twentieth anniversary of Japan’s rule over Taiwan, Mimura first established the 
Xinzhu youth group [J. Shinchiku seinenkai, P. Xinzhu qingnianhui]. By expanding the network 
across the province, he aimed to “organize youth groups that include 3,000 elementary school 
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graduates, public servants, graduates of shufang, and 3,000 dropouts of elementary schools in 
order to improve youthful morals and to have them practice the Japanese language.”   22
In Xinzhu city, this attempt appeared to achieve initial success before it faltered. The 
Xinzhu youth group started providing night study sessions, mainly offering Japanese language 
education. Taiwan nichinichi shinpō described the popularity of the sessions: “since its 
establishment, the membership increased everyday… The first session had 40 people. The 
second session had 156, out of which 60 have absolutely no previous knowledge in Japanese.”  23
After a few months, however, these groups ceased to function.  In the 1910s, elite Taiwanese 24
continued to view youth groups as a status-producing institution. Mimura’s attempt to establish 
an inclusive network, integrating thousands of dropouts of elementary schools, did not agree 
with the aspirations of  “youth circles.” Elite youth in Xinzhu city still sought exclusive groups 
as late as September 1919, when they discussed a resumption of the Xinzhu youth group. They 
decided to begin anew with “the gentleman group” and another group that consisted only of 
middle school graduates and above.  Given that Xinzhu province did not have even a single 25
middle school until 1922, the members were a wealthy class, educated in Taipei or Japan. 
In Beipu, Governor Mimura’s initiative failed for a different reason: the idea of youth 
groups did not attract local population even as a status symbol. The villagers did not oppose the 
advocacy of Mimura. They established the first Beipu youth group as one of the earliest in 
Taiwanese rural villages. The celebration of Japanese rule accompanied another campaign—cut 
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off the Qing-style queue of all students in the Beipu elementary school.  Despite these efforts to 26
facilitate the colonial campaign, the youth group only existed in name and disappeared quickly.  27
Elite Youth Groups in the 1920s 
In the 1920s, the Taiwan Cultural Association, the first island-wide organization that 
advocated self-determination of Taiwanese people, began organizing local youth groups in 
provincial cities. Youth in Xinzhu city received considerable influence from their activities, 
joining the battles between colonial and anti-colonial forces by switching their affiliation. Yet a 
closer look at the reports on them shows that status-marking remained the central function of 
these youth groups. In this period, the site of local youth mobilization began shifting from 
provincial cities to the rural countryside. Under “Cultural Rule” of the 1920s, colonial authorities 
spread new assimilation programs in remote villages. A new generation of local leaders, 
including the Jiang family in Beipu, assumed the role of “rural modernizers” by carrying out 
these programs. 
In 1921, a Taiwanese elementary school teacher, Zhang Shigu, and four other men in 
Xinzhu city, established a new youth group (again, named Xinzhu youth group).  Initially, 28
Zhang’s group showed a strong pro-Japanese character, saying that it would “promote a 
community spirit, exchange knowledge, and study Japanese.”  It gained official support from 29
Japanese school principals and local officials and continued to provide lectures on modern social 
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life, such as “Tax Duties” and “Hygiene for Children.”  In 1925, which the police authorities 30
remembered as “the crazy time of public speeches by the Taiwan Cultural Association,” the 
Xinzhu youth group scrapped its ties with the colonial authorities and joined a branch of the 
Cultural Association.  While reforming the youth group, they also started a “Xinzhu study 31
group.”  Taiwan minbao, a newspaper published by the Cultural Association, advertised study 32
groups as progressive self-rule groups in comparison to the other youth groups associated with 
pro-colonial figures.  Both the Xinzhu youth group and study group declared their support for 33
the Cultural Association, leading to some arrests and even violence during their lecture events.  34
In reality, regardless of their political affiliation, both the Xinzhu youth group and study 
group still functioned as elite youth clubs. The Xinzhu youth group did not change its activities
—reform of the old customs of funerals, for example, which was also a goal of the Japanese 
assimilation campaign.  Taiwan minbao warned of the continuing ties between leaders of the 35
Xinzhu youth group and colonial authorities—“part of the leading members with ambitious 
minds actively visit the pro-colonial figures and help them criticize the youth group.”  Once 36
these youth achieved their goal of networking through the youth group, “they all turned 
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inactive.”  Taiwan minbao also reported that the Xinzhu study group turned into a party after 37
meeting four or five times. “The organizer uses various excuses to turn a simple dinner into a 
drinking party in order to show his hospitality,” one member criticized, “this happened mostly 
without the members noticing, but it changed an occasion for academic studies into one for 
evaluating food.”  Despite effort to restore these groups, they continued to suffer from the “lack 38
of passion among the executive leaders” and “one or two conceited members,” and ended up 
being dissolved soon afterwards.   39
To give another blow to the Cultural Association, a few dozens of the same members 
formed a brand new Shinchiku seinendan in 1929, this time with support of Japanese officials, 
school principals, and local elites. When the Shinchiku seinendan turned to the colonial 
authorities, it claimed that they were getting rid of old powers and making a “purely young” 
organization composed of those between 17 and 25 years old.  Now “youthfulness” was being 40
aligned with colonial authorities, after a short period during which the Cultural Association had 
emphasized youthfulness as a force against the colonial establishment. 
To counter anti-colonial movements—particularly the movement to establish the 
Taiwanese parliament starting in 1919, the GGT promoted “moral suasion” [kyōka] campaigns in 
the 1920s and 30s. The term kyōka had been widely used in Japan for ideological education to 
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spread Emperor-centered nationalism, the spirit of hard work, frugality, and modern living 
customs. In the Taiwanese context, kyōka campaigns meant assimilation programs with a 
similarly strong emphasis on the reform of daily customs. In the 1920s and 30s, all 
administrative levels had an institution that supervised kyōka programs; at the national level, the 
Association of Social Work was established in 1920 and the Taiwan Kyōka Association in 1933; 
Dōkōkai at Xinzhu provincial level, and Jinshinkai at Zhudong county and village levels 
established in 1929.  
Beipu of the 1920s seems to have embraced the assimilation programs promoted by these 
colonial institutions. For the Jiang family, colonial programs allowed them to claim their role as 
local modernizers, influence villagers’ everyday lives, and monopolize government funding. In 
1919, the Jiang family established an industrial credit union under the supervision of the village 
administrative office.  They led various kyōka programs by forming a reform association, 41
Zhenduohui, in 1924.  It introduced a money offering box in the central temple, Citiangong, for 42
example, so that people would not “spend money wastefully” buying paper offerings to deities 
and spirits that were burned during prayers.  A village branch of Jinshinkai also came to Beipu 43
in 1929. In the village chronicle written in 1934, Jinshinkai provided a long list of “points of 
improvement of daily life.” Starting from suggestions on clothing (“do not buy new clothes or 
garments frequently”) and marriage (“use your own home or a religious facility for weddings and 
#  186
 Shimabukuro, Hoppo kyōdoshi, 82.41
 It also offered “youth library,” etc. Taiwan sōtokufu naimu-kyoku, Zentō seinenkai sonota shakai kyōka teki 42
dantai (Taipei: Taiwan sōtokufu, 1925), 7.
 “Beipu Citiangong sai qian xiang,” (Han wen) Taiwan ri ri xin bao, March 30, 1927, 4. The Xinzhu youth group 43
also advocated to renew the customs surrounding religious festivals, trying to end the use of pillories and the 
burning of paper offerings as well. “Xinzhu Zhusheng juhui,” (Han wen) Taiwan ri ri xin bao, May 31, 1925, 2
avoid restaurants”), the 76 points covered customs regarding funerals, parties, celebrations, gifts, 
invitations of guests, meals, houses, public manners, and so on.  44
These kyōka programs not only allowed the Jiang family to extend their dominance. They 
also created a new consciousness of “modern youth” among a new generation. Like Katō Einojō, 
the son of a landlord in Miyagi who grew up in a series of kyōka campaigns after the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-5, the new generation emerged in the elite circle of Beipu. Jiang Ruichang, 
a symbol of the Japanese-rule generation—one of the first Taiwanese teachers in the Beipu 
elementary school who graduated from the elite teachers’ program—became the village head in 
1920. The Beipu youth group, with 60 members, was newly founded on October 5, 1923 as a 
response to the initiative of Vice Governor-General Gotō Fumio. Their leaders symbolized the 
new generation that grew up under Japanese rule: Peng Qingqin, a young public translator, Liu 
Muzai, a secretary to the Beipu village head, and Jiang Axin, a young business leader of the 
Jiang family who graduated from Meiji University in Tokyo.  The youth group worked closely 45
with both the dominant Jiang and colonial authorities—they played “the industrial union song” at 
the ceremony to celebrate the completion of a new building of the Beipu credit union in 1930.  46
The Beipu youth group operated as another kyōka institution under the supervision of 
Jinshinkai, but their role was not limited to reforming old customs. By joining the colonial 
initiative of youth groups, the Beipu youth group connected the village to the larger world. They 
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practiced sports and formed a musical band—activities popular as symbols of “modern youth” 
across the empire.   The colonial bureau of education [bunkyō-kyoku] promoted interactions 47
among youth groups across Taiwan. As a part of the effort, Xinzhu province organized large-
scale joint sports festivals, gathering 4,000 schoolchildren, youth group members, and 
schoolteachers.  News of other parts of the empire reached Beipu through the youth group. In 48
1927, the Beipu youth group raised donations for the victims of the earthquake in Kyoto by 
organizing a charity concert.  Through these activities, youth group members symbolized the 49
new force of the village and the empire. 
In the 1920s, although activities and political orientations appeared different, the youth 
groups in both Xinzhu city and Beipu developed hand in hand with the discourse on the rise of 
youth. In both places, the positions of “modern youth” were monopolized by upper-class elites. 
Although this was a continuation from elite “youth circles” in Xinzhu city, in Beipu, this meant 
the rise of a new generation that grew up not in the volatile racial and ethnic relationships, but in 
more solidified social class system. In the social conditions of the 1920s, generations began to 
form important identity boundaries even in Beipu. 
Turn to Elementary School Graduates in the 1930s 
As the youth groups spread in the course of the 1920s, Japanese educators started to 
apply the methods of the Japanese seinendan to Taiwanese youth groups, with a hope of 
achieving more success than Governor Mimura’s earlier attempt. Their involvement reflected the 
influential position they occupied in Taiwanese rural villages by the 1930s. As local residents, 
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they analyzed Taiwanese rural society with confidence, criticized colonial policies, and 
condemned local elites for leading hardworking village youth astray by importing urban culture. 
The vocabulary they used in their essays and their assumptions about Taiwanese rural youth 
shows how eagerly they applied the Japanese experience of seinendan mobilization. 
The year 1930 marked a new phase in the development of youth groups in Taiwan. 
Colonial policies on youth education had developed incrementally during the 1920s. But the 
1930 decree to standardize the names (into “seinendan”) and establish common rules, including 
stricter age limits, reflected the urgency of mass mobilization after the onset of the depression. 
The Beipu youth group, now the Beipu seinendan, incorporated the new standard, adopting 
stricter age limits (15-25), reducing the number of its members to 40, and attaching itself to the 
local elementary school in 1931. They also had new rules, where the main purpose was to 
nurture them as “loyal members of the nation.”  Like Xinzhu city’s Shinchiku seinendan, the 50
previous Beipu youth group was first dissolved and then re-organized as a new group. They 
made a uniform probably at this stage, also imitating the Shinchiku seinendan, which sported 
new uniforms and a new flag at the inauguration ceremony.  51
Despite the growth in the number of youth groups, this standardization led to a dramatic 
shrinkage in the total number of participants, shifting from around 50 groups with 7,000 to 9,000 
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members in 1925-6 to nearly 100 groups but with only 2,000 members in 1934.  The overall 52
number of participants declined by 42% between 1930 and 1931 alone.  The scholar Miyazaki 53
Seiko argues that the shrinkage was intentional and aimed at suppressing anti-Japanese youth 
activities — or in the language of Japanese colonial authorities, activities of “bad youth.”    54
Japanese educators in the countryside of Xinzhu province did not, however, regard 
cutting the size of youth groups as a means of social control. They felt a need for institutional 
reform because the youth groups in Taiwan had been so unsuccessful in developing into 
motivated, active associations for average farm youth. Miyajima Yutaka, an elementary school 
principal in Guanxi village, initiated his discussion “The Reality of Rural Youth Groups in This 
Island” in 1932 by stating, “youth groups in local rural villages in Taiwan are extremely inactive. 
Currently, most of them exist in name only, showing no activity or development, and are rather 
useless things.”  Each youth group concluded too broad an area and too many people, and 55
lacked community cohesion; the age range (15-35) was too large; they were not well funded; 
people expected the youth groups to produce results in projects, rather than encouraging “moral 
training” [shūyō].  Other educators seemed to agree with Miyajima’s analysis of why village 56
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youth groups had not flourished. Another educator of Zhudong county, Matsuo Shōji, argued that 
the lack of a visible passion for anarchism, communism, and nihilism among Taiwanese youth 
was more difficult to handle. “The damage of the economic depression is not being felt [in 
Taiwan] as severely as in Japan,” and, consequently, “we do not really see among Taiwanese 
youth group members those, like the ones in Japan, who pretend to be dangerous thinkers by 
talking big and who are infected by trendy ideas.”  In official records, the unemployment rate 57
remained low in the early 1930s, especially in a remote village like Beipu.  But the living 58
conditions of tenant farmers had become an issue, and Taiwan saw a rise in the number of tenant 
disputes in the late 1920s.  Still, it was not “dangerous thoughts” like socialism that the colonial 59
educators feared, but the individualistic tendencies of Taiwanese youth. Matsuo continued, “from 
now on (or already so), if we start to find in youth groups those who do not talk big, recruit 
others, or engage in demonstrations, but just quietly read and contemplate, then they would 
really be threatening as they are extremely difficult to deal with and beyond control of simple-
minded youth group leaders. They would leave the youth groups before we knew it.”   60
The Japanese teachers thought the problem lay in Taiwanese society, not in the goal of 
creating seinendan. Miyajima attributed the inactive nature of youth groups partially to the 
absence of similar kinds of groups in pre-Japanese-rule Taiwanese society, whose history as an 
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immigrant society constitutes “sheer battles with hardship,” and made up of “defensive lives 
constrained within conquered territories.” They had no other means but to operate in “defense-
oriented, independent, and extremely kinship-centric groups.”  He continued by identifying two 61
characteristics in their social relations as the largest obstacles. One was that the youth were 
“under the strict control of their parents,” who did not understand the merit of youth groups. 
Since the parents’ generation did not experience youth groups themselves, they were not at all 
cooperative. The other was that “the youth lack admiration for older leaders [outside their 
families]. It might be a result of their history in which they only sought wealth and power, but 
this is one of the reasons why the youth group leaders have difficulty in directing the 
members.”  While puzzled by their observation that the youth lacked admiration for older 62
figures, these teachers did not consider other explanations such as that youth perhaps already had 
stature in their villages. Neither did they seem to realize that the strong kinship-based ties already 
provided a social organization that was more solid than horizontal youth groups. They were too 
focused on the success of the seinendan network in Japan—no one really questioned why the 
villagers would want a youth group in the first place.  63
These teachers thought they represented a higher ideal of empire than the colonial 
officials, whom they saw as too mired in compromises with powerful Taiwanese elites. They 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the sons of the landlord class, who were the primary 
#  192
 Miyajima, “Hontō nōson seinendan shidō no jissai,” 120.61
 Ibid., 121-123.62
 On discussion of how Beipu’s village society was organized before the Japanese colonial period, see Wu 63
Xueming, “Riben zhi ming tong zhi xia Taiwan xiang cun she hui de bian qian,” Taibei wen xian 107 (March 1994): 
23-67.
members of the youth groups in the 1920s. Miyajima described the landlord youth as the source 
of almost every problem in village youth groups: 
Most of the landlord youth who make a living by renting out farming land to tenant 
farmers never handle a shovel or a plow by themselves, but they proceed into higher 
school even after the middle school. Even those without academic ability or talent go to 
private schools, studying academic theories that have no practical application, and once 
they come back to the villages, they turn arrogant and do not understand agriculture, 
showing little sympathy for the hardship of tenants. They are often affected by urban 
culture, get used to luxurious life, despise rural villages, and do not enjoy associating 
with rural youth. Many second and third sons leave the village as salaried workers, and 
sometimes become village celebrities after improving their social status, but usually they 
are not helpful for the village as a whole. Instead, some harm the spirit of simplicity and 
fortitude by becoming objects of aspiration among village youth in deleterious ways…   64!
Miyajima’s frustration with the wealthy youth convinced him of the need to recruit a different 
type of village youth. 
The ideal recruits for local youth groups, for Miyajima and other Japanese educators in 
Xinzhu, were graduates of elementary schools who helped in family farming on their own or 
rented land. The middle school graduates “are arrogant and disdain their fathers’ occupations,” 
and “their brains alone grew, but they lack practical ability.” In contrast, elementary school 
graduates were generally loyal and trustworthy. They were “in the greatest need of guidance, yet 
most worth guiding.”  Even if they could not afford going to elementary school, the youth who 65
showed admirable character in Japanese language centers should be considered as model youth 
as well.  They preferred those engaging in agriculture, not working as office clerks or in their 66
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own business, saying that “agriculture is an occupation that Taiwanese people look down upon. 
First of all, we need to inspire the pride of farmers.”  67
Emphasizing the discontinuity in 1930 was important for these educators in order to give 
a fresh look to the youth group. Since they were still building the basis of local youth groups that 
had no historical roots, “selecting members requires tremendous attention,” Miyajima argued. 
“First and foremost, we should only weigh the quality of the members, and not be concerned 
about the number… ten or so would be enough. Increasing the number is impractical and would 
not by accompanied by good results. By making it a group of high-quality youth, we need to 
make the label of youth groups valuable to youth and villagers.”  Exclusivity was an important 68
character of elite youth groups in the 1920s. The new goal was to transform the previously elite-
centered youth group into a youth group that was still limited in membership, but not based on 
the social status, but on their commitment to a communal spirit and their qualities as good 
farmers.  
These teachers had in mind the model of Japanese seinendan, which were quickly formed 
because they had a basis in pre-modern youth associations. In Taiwan, they could not create the 
façade of spontaneously formed youth groups and faced a challenge as colonial outsiders: How 
could the youth groups represent the villagers, not the colonizer, when all initiative came from 
Japanese teachers? Hashinabe Kazuyoshi, another school principal in Xinzhu, was afraid that 
personal biases in the selection process would make the youth group appear to represent a 
particular interest group.  These educators themselves had to be wary of the thin line between 69
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their own favoritism and the definition of “model youth” villagers could appreciate. Here again, 
they considered that the absence of “dangerous youth” inspired by socialism made it more 
difficult than easy. In Japan and Korea, many youth group members drew legitimacy of their 
groups by positioning themselves against leftist youth. Without the visible presence of such 
politicized youth, the educators in the countryside of Xinzhu province felt a different kind of 
challenge in identifying local demands and creating an attractive picture of “model rural youth.” 
Their decision to make elementary school education a key standard for member selection 
came out of their confidence in the extent to which Japanese schools transformed Taiwanese 
children. An increasing number of children went at least to elementary school in the course of the 
1920s and 30s. The Beipu elementary school principal recorded that, in the central part of Beipu, 
the schooling rate in 1934 was 77% for male children and 35% for female children. Starting in 
the early 1920s, the school saw 50 to 70 students graduating every year, and by 1934, the Beipu 
elementary school produced 1,195 graduates (1,017 male and 178 female), of which 404 (all 
male) worked in agriculture upon graduating.  A villager who attended the school between 1933 70
and 1939 noted, “almost every boy, regardless of whether they were poor peasants or wealthy 
landlords, could go to school.”  It became a space where Beipu residents had the closest 71
everyday interactions with Japanese people for the first and perhaps only time. Their personal 
connections turned into nostalgic memories later, and many of the graduates remained in contact 
with their Japanese teachers even after they had left Taiwan. The deep roots established by the 
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elementary school in the local community gave the Japanese teachers the best opportunity to 
influence Taiwanese children. 
In the school, Taiwanese pupils internalized a new social order, embracing the authority 
of the teachers and an age hierarchy among students, which the educators in Xinzhu thought was 
lacking in Taiwanese society. The most obvious achievement of elementary school graduates was 
Japanese language ability. The spread of Japanese did not come naturally but had to be enforced 
through various means. Questions of the Japanese language pedagogy generated heated debates 
throughout the five decades of colonial rule. When elite youth groups started to form in the 
1900s, colonial authorities expected them to promote Japanese language classes in the ways that 
village youth groups in Japan promoted “accent-free” standard Japanese pronunciation. But 
elementary schoolteachers were the only people equipped with the skill and willingness to 
provide Japanese language classes in and outside of the school.   72
Various institutions for Japanese language education, and consequently other assimilation 
programs, revolved around the elementary schools and schoolteachers. The school became the 
most reliable institution for seinendan advocates, and the most familiar home of modern learning 
for the youth. The elementary school had already been associated with the earlier Beipu youth 
group. Its members marched in a musical band and distributed pamphlets to encourage children 
in the village to attend the school.  The public learning center [kōmin kōshūjo] for graduates of 73
the elementary school and the Japanese language center [kokugo kōshūjo] for school-age (mostly 
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female) children and youth who did not enroll in the school were set up in the Beipu elementary 
school in 1931 and 1933 respectively.  The centrality of the elementary school in the wide range 74
of educational programs made both Japanese and Taiwanese teachers extremely busy and even 
“exploited,” as village heads observed.  “Everywhere I go, I witness with my own eyes that 75
teachers’ lives today had no time to spare, and personally I cannot help but truly sympathize with 
them,” observed an education official who visited a number of vibrant village youth groups and 
language centers in Xinzhu countryside.   76
Creating Model Rural Youth in the 1930s 
The Xinzhu educators faced the strictest limit in changing the content of seinendan 
activities. They thought that youth needed to engage more in shūyō (moral training, self-
cultivation)—lectures, reading, and character building activities. In their mind, it was only 
through shūyō that rural youth would learn agrarian nationalism and become the “pillars” of 
increasingly important kyōka campaigns. Behind the term shūyō was their effort to detach kyōka 
programs from dominant landlord leaders and increase the status of average farm youth.  
Shūyō was surely not at the top of the agenda for village youth groups that operated under 
landlords’ supervision. Matsuo considered that they engaged in too many volunteer public 
projects instead.  This was partly the fault of the colonial government—because of the absence 77
of a centralized seinendan network and a military conscription exam, the GGT had assessed the 
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group achievement based on the numbers of events, gatherings, and participants.  Matsuo 78
pointed out, “it was a bad idea that the government authorities only considered the results of 
gathering events in awarding the best youth groups.”  When the Shinchiku seinendan was 79
designated a model group in 1932, the committee praised its wide array of activities:  
The first day of every month, they have the day of public interests and an early morning 
study gathering. Every Saturday they have a military drill supervised by an assigned 
officer… They held various events celebrating the Emperor’s visit, a cinema showing 
for citizens, a harmonica band, a singing and dancing party, and a table tennis 
tournament in April. They opened a new youth building and created a group song in 
May, had a record concert and a debate roundtable in June, a music festival and early-
rising events in July, a mobile camping and a baseball team in August.   80!
From Matsuo’s point of view, these events did not necessarily mean successful training of the 
youth. “It is ‘home guidance’ [katei shidō] that should be the criteria for success of the youth 
groups” because the goal of shūyō is to influence their everyday lives.   81
The shift towards shūyō became an important agenda item because the home country was 
embarked on a major kyōka (moral suasion) campaign in the 1930s. The colonial educators 
criticized that dominant landlords monopolized kyōka assimilation programs, as the Jiang family 
did in Beipu. Envisioning that elementary school graduates promote kyōka through youth group 
activities, they advocated “sociable interactions, leisure, and learning” as three core elements 
necessary in their training.  Among the training methods they promoted, night camping and 82
mountain climbing were widely implemented. Beipu’s southern wall, Mt. Wuzhi, was a popular 
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destination of mountain excursions for Xinzhu youth. Even a mountain climbing trip was full of 
opportunities for learning: Switching the youth’s positions frequently according to their strengths 
so that the team would reach the destination as a coherent group without spreading out, learning 
to appreciate the beauty and mystery of nature, and not leaving even a bit of newspaper after 
lunch—as the teachers described it, “climbing in this way would bring about not merely physical 
exercise, but high-quality moral training.”  83
In the transitional period from landlord-led elite groups to those of model farmers, the 
seinendan were widely advertised as a modernizing force by both elites and schoolteachers. The 
seinendan provided spectacles and increased their presence in the early 1930s. It became news 
when 45 members of the Shinchiku seinendan, for example, went on a cycling tour of the 
northern Taiwan from Xinzhu to Taipei, showing off their mastery of bicycle riding in the name 
of strengthening their bodies.  On another occasion, the Xinzhu police deployed a band 84
comprised of seinendan members in front of its automobile parade, distributing 20,000 brochures 
to promote traffic rules.  Seinendan members from various regions demonstrated their mastery 85
of Japanese on the radio show, Kokugo fukyū no yūbe (Evening of the Promotion of National 
Language, 1930-1933), twice a week. They presented a dozen different performances, including 
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Japanese folk songs, marching songs with a Manchurian theme, conversational skits, and essays 
composed by the youth.   86
As a tool of kyōka assimilation campaign, the educators promoted “youth amateur 
plays.”  In them, the youth literally played model rural youth—-they were “artists of soil” in 87
creating vegetables and rice. They helped their younger family members to complete elementary 
school education even in dire poverty. They encouraged their parents to abandon superstitious 
beliefs and trust modern medicine. These plays almost always included a subplot of young 
people opposed to arranged marriages, which traditionally involved a large amount of money 
handed from the bridegroom to the parents of the bride.  By performing these plays, the 88
seinendan not only spread kyōka messages as a modernizing force, but also challenged 
traditional elitist norms in which acting on the stage was frowned upon.  89
Japanese educators attempted to create a communicational space among Taiwanese rural 
youth to foster an identity as “moral rural youth.” The new magazine, Kunpū (Summerly Breeze: 
1932-), presented colonizer’s messages in essays written by Taiwanese rural youth. This created 
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a semblance of the seinendan newsletters that Japanese youth circulated by themselves. Many of 
the essays in Kunpū stimulated the youthful desire to “rise in the world” and argued that success 
was possible for rural residents without higher education. One youth group member, Cai Qingzi, 
asserted that youth should start saving money as soon as possible, saying “saving is difficult at 
the beginning, but the first [principle] of youth is patience. Those who work very hard with no 
distraction would always bloom one day.”  These publications were made available to rural 90
youth, many of whom were literate through school education by the 1930s.  
The Xinzhu seinendan raised its profile most powerfully in the context of a natural 
disaster in the same way that the Japanese seinendan did in rural famines. On April 21, 1935, 
Xinzhu and Taizhong were hit by large-scale earthquakes, which killed more than 3,200 people 
and destroyed more than 38,500 houses and buildings.  623 members from 40 seinendan in 91
Xinzhu province rushed to the severely affected villages in Zhunang and Miaoli counties to 
rescue survivors, dig up bodies, clear rubble, and set up emergency shelters. They provided food, 
distributed medicine, and secured lifelines by helping to re-build roads and bridges with police 
forces.  Newspapers and Kunpū emphasized the sacrifices of these youth who committed 92
themselves to the public rescue mission despite the damage suffered by their own families. These 
youth were also good boosters of the kyōka campaign more broadly. One youth play published in 
Kunpū a year later was staged in a post-earthquake rural village in Xinzhu. The protagonist was a 
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young man who engaged in the rescue mission. In the play, he remained humble about his 
sacrifice, and donated the entire award money given him by the Xinzhu Governor to earthquake 
victims. A typical kyōka touch was added in the end when he decided to marry a girl of the same 
family name, rebelling against the customary taboo of marrying within a clan of the same 
origins.  In this way, in Tōhoku and Xinzhu alike, natural disasters raised the value of masculine 93
power of rural youth. 
Did the rise of “rural youth” and establishment of the seinendan for elementary school 
graduates create social mobility for average young farmers in Taiwan? The seinendan alone did 
not systematically produce job opportunities in the way youth training centers did in the 
countryside of Miyagi. Yet, according to anthropologist Miyazaki Seiko, the seinendan in not-so-
remote provincial towns began providing social mobility to non-elite youth in the early 1930s. In 
the transition from elite-led youth groups to the seinendan of “model rural youth,” the youth 
between these classes found a window of opportunities. In the town of Xinzhuang in Taipei 
province, where Miyazaki conducted oral historical research, the seinendan was membered by 
elementary school graduates, but they generally came from relatively well-off families and few 
engaged in agriculture. Through group gatherings, they established connections with local 
notables and officials. The affiliation with the seinendan allowed them to obtain job 
opportunities in administrative offices that were usually occupied by middle school graduates.  94
Although limited in scale, the seinendan in Taiwan began to produce a mechanism of social 
mobility for less privileged youth in less urban areas by the mid-1930s.   
#  202
 Nakayama Yū, “Hohoemu aozora,” Kunpū 47 (March 1936): 1-13.93
 Miyazaki, Shokuminchiki Taiwan ni okeru seinendan, 173-180.94
Conclusion 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the concept of “youth”—a pronoun of a new 
privileged class educated in Japanese and Chinese in Xinzhu city—did not resonate in the remote 
mountain village of Beipu. Nor did the image of “rural youth” developing in Japan attract elite 
youth or farm youth in Beipu. The difference in the connotation of “youth” and “rural youth” did 
not come from the absence of colonial officials’ effort to mobilize rural youth—it was despite 
Governor Mimura’s initiative in 1915. It derived from the social dynamics of new villages in 
Taiwan, where both “rural” and “youth” were highly valued in the recent past of armed 
conquests against aboriginal groups. Beipu’s example shows how rural youth mobilization did 
not automatically succeed by spreading agrarian ideologies and establishing youth groups. More 
important for seinendan advocates was to grasp local social hierarchies that conditioned desires 
and aspirations of rural population. In the early 1930s, Japanese educators in Xinzhu, although 
with a lens tainted by the model of the Japanese seinendan, analyzed dynamics of Taiwanese 
rural society. They believed that in Taiwan, too, elementary school graduates had a potential to 
become “pillars of youth” of the Japanese empire. 
Without a systematic way of creating job opportunities for average agrarian youth, the 
Taiwanese seinendan in the early 1930s were yet to form a Rural Youth Industry—the 
mechanism that produced a highly nationalistic population in Japan. But a few elements that 
grew during this period made it possible for a version of the Rural Youth Industry to emerge 
soon: the commitment of Japanese teachers, the high rate of literacy among Taiwanese children, 
the improving reputation of the seinendan, and the sphere of communication in the seinendan 
#  203
journal, Kunpū. Based on these elements, colonial advocates of the seinendan could promote 
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Chapter 6:  
Taiwanese Youth in the Nationalizing Empire (1937-1945) 
!
At the beginning of colonial rule, the Japanese faced a number of distinctive social 
conditions in Taiwan. Mountain villages like Beipu, in particular, were characterized by recent 
settlement of Hakka migrants. The armed conquests defined wealth and social status, rendering 
the image of “rural youth” dissimilar to that in Japan or Korea. Yet, once the colonial state 
solidified the dominance of local landlords, rural villages lost social mobility like other parts of 
the empire. In the late 1930s, when the Government-General of Taiwan (GGT) and its local 
offices launched youth training institutions for wartime mobilization, village youth aligned 
themselves with mobilization as a way out of the marginalized status. The overlap of the 
ambitions of Taiwanese youth and the needs of the wartime empire created a Taiwanese version 
of the Rural Youth Industry, where youth turned mobilization into opportunities and, through that 
process, internalized the ideology of Japanese nationalism. 
One feature of youth mobilization in Taiwan is how rapidly it was carried out once it 
started in earnest. Until the mid-1930s, local youth groups were still associated with elite youth 
despite the Japanese teachers’ struggle to transform them into the Japanese-style seinendan of 
model farmers. After 1937, however, the groups quickly became a rural bastion of Japanese 
nationalism. The stories of two figures, Huang Yuanxing and Xu Chongfa, show the various 
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social factors that came together to make this happen—personal bonds in youth training 
institutions, pragmatic benefits of new job opportunities, and the heated rivalry among rural 
youth of different provinces and between rural youth and urban students, for example. Although 
many scholars focus on the emotional process of replacing a Taiwanese identity with a Japanese 
identity, the identity shift was more context-specific, sometimes serving as an instrument in other 
kinds of struggle in the lives of agrarian youth. Their sense of rivalry and desire to overcome 
peripheral positions in the family, in the village, in the province, in Taiwan, and in the empire 
became the driving force behind the intensive Japanization of Taiwanese population. 
The War and the Local Youth Groups 
Although kyōka (moral suasion) had already been a central theme, there was little 
wartime urgency evoked in the training of village youth groups [seinendan] in Taiwan in the 
early 1930s. Even in the government-supported youth magazine Kunpū, there was more 
discussion on how to overcome traditional taboos surrounding marriage than about Japan’s “time 
of emergency” after the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. But the Sino-Japanese War, starting on 
July 7, 1937, triggered Taiwan to prepare for war. A flood of news reports on the fighting in 
China and the homefront efforts in Japan had a major impact on the mood of youth training. The 
demand for elementary school education among Taiwanese population increased rapidly, pushing 
the attendance rate of school-aged children in Xinzhu city from 65% in 1938 and 73% in 1940, 
to 95% in 1942.  Youth, and rural youth in particular, were considered the engine of Taiwan's 1
Japanization efforts. The ultimate goal of the accelerated assimilation campaign was now set to 
produce reliable soldiers—soldiers with guns, plows, and Japanese language skills.  
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With the outbreak of war, the Taiwanese seinendan immediately supported Japan’s cause 
in the war. In Xinzhu province, 350 leaders of youth groups and the Governor gathered in the 
city on September 17, 1937, to pray for the victory of the Japanese military at the Shinchiku 
Shrine, holding a convention to discuss the prospect of its activities to support the war efforts.  2
They concluded that the seinendan needed new strategies of recruitment. It had only been 
targeting those who graduated from the elementary school, did not continue schooling, and were 
willing to join. The Xinzhu educators in the early 1930s presented a good reason to narrow the 
scope of participation to build an organization with highly motivated youth. But now with the 
war effort, the seinendan had to transform themselves into institutions that would organize a 
much larger number of people and train local leadership to Japanize the whole society. 
When the GGT compelled all male youth and all unmarried female youth to join the 
seinendan, its membership exploded. Scholar Miyazaki Seiko explains that the GGT had 
originally planned to establish the mandatory seinen gakkō (youth school) system at the same 
time as Japan did in 1939, but this could not be implemented because Taiwan had not yet fully 
realized a system of mandatory elementary school participation. In order to make up for of the 
absence of youth schools, the GGT enforced the universal participation in village youth groups 
instead. Between 1938 and 1939, the number of youth group members in Taiwan jumped from 
62,906 to 269,906.  The Xinzhu seinendan preceded this island-wide trend. Within a few months 3
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after the beginning of the war, Xinzhu officials already promoted universal participation.  The 4
most dramatic jump occurred between 1936 and 1937—from 4,851 in 1936 to 14,554 in 1937, 
and to 27,638 in 1938.  Xinzhu Governors started using the phrase “thirty thousand youths in the 5
province” (shūka sanman-nin no seinen) as an icon of the strong Japanization movement in the 
province.    6
The new homefront mobilization facilitated the centralization of the seinendan. In June 
1938, for the first time in Taiwan, seinendan institutions created a central body, the Taiwan 
Seinendan Federation, to oversee island-wide activities. In its inauguration, youth declared four 
resolutions: “We will complete the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement. We will volunteer 
for patriotic labor [kinrō hōkoku]. We will establish Japanese-speaking villages and towns. We 
will perfect national defense.”  A month before this, to emphasize the role of millions of youth as 7
an engine for the war effort, Governor-General Kobayashi Seizō had already distributed a 
message in the form of a gramophone record, calling on “all young people in this island, you 
have to know the social status that you have, take charge of things passionately and pure-
heartedly, and be ready, with positive state of mind, to become the salt of the earth.”   8
Local levels underwent a streamlining of various semi-governmental groups. The Xinzhu 
provincial government issued an act to re-organize the seinendan on the third anniversary of the 
beginning of the war in 1940. The communication line from the provincial government to 
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individual youth was designed to match the line of command of kyōka associations, including the 
moral suasion federations [kyōka rengōkai] and hamlet revitalization groups [buraku shinkōkai]. 
The Xinzhu government expected that the seinendan would be part of the Patriotic Imperial 
Subjects [kōmin hōkō] campaign. At the village level, it separated young people into two groups; 
one for those who graduated from the elementary school, and the other for those who did not.  9
The latter had to have two to four years of language education first before joining the seinendan. 
The members gathered regularly in small groups to conduct a set round of training and volunteer 
work. They wore the standardized uniform of the newly centralized seinendan.    10
Together with this institutional centralization, the government placed a strong emphasis 
on localities, coinciding with the dual development of localization and centralization of youth 
training in Japan itself.  Both the GGT and the Xinzhu provincial government demanded that 11
local leaders design concrete plans of volunteer work and Japanization training courses that 
would meet the local conditions. Newspapers and journals applauded local activities, including 
Shinkensetsu (New Construction), the journal of the Patriotic Imperial Subjects Associations 
(PISA: kōmin hōkōkai), often publicized “unique activities” in various villages and towns. 
Reflecting the three years of the Patriotic Imperial Subjects Campaign, the PISA headquarters 
and a group of journalists criticized the spiritual arguments of the campaign: “overall the guiding 
principles are too abstract. Should we not suggest more concrete things in accordance with each 
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locality?” As in Japan, the importance of locality was underlined through the national network of 
PISA. 
The emphasis on locality exacerbated the old dilemma about leadership. If local officials 
initiated the campaign on their own authority, youth would participate but not be interested in the 
prescribed standard activities. It was more desirable for non-official local figures to take charge. 
The problem was that local leaders of the PISA programs were mostly “rich intellectuals who 
enjoy debating ideologies” and “lack passion in practice.”  The discussion, as always, led to the 12
determination to promote the training of village youth who with first-hand knowledge of their 
villages. “Regarding youth training, we should teach how they should lead and improve their 
particular villages in a more concrete way, and show them individual cases, including how other 
villages use which methods and what they achieved... The future of our campaign relies in great 
part on the power of practice of these youth. Youth desire excitement and inspiration. We should 
direct responsible work to them.”  13
The Xinzhu Youth Training Center [The Xinzhu Seinen Shūrenjō] 
The dilemma of leadership was nothing new.  It had been a constant headache for 14
Xinzhu educators, who believed that “an impassioned speech on loyalty and love for the nation 
has to come from the leaders of the same ethnicity,” but local leaders “do not have sufficient 
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Japanese ability or quality to give citizenship training.”  The colonial officials held the first 15
“pillars of youth” training camp in Taipei for one week in February 1935, gathering 60 people 
from all over Taiwan who had finished elementary school, had been active as youth group 
members for more than two years, were male, healthy, strong, and younger than 25 years old.  16
Xinzhu’s first attempt to provide thorough leadership training was an agricultural training center 
that began in July 1935. The provincial government established the facility with 80 acres of land 
near the beach in Qiding and invited agricultural specialists to teach thirty young farmers.   17
Thirty young people a year—this was hardly a desirable scale for leadership training, 
especially after 1937. In August 1938, the Xinzhu officials launched a new youth training center 
[seinen shūrenjō; thereafter “shūrenjō” ] near the beach of Nanliao.  They selected 60 young 18
people from village seinendan groups in the province for thirty-day training.  They scheduled 19
one-month cycles almost back to back, to reach the maximum number of young people. “Even 
the Adolf Hitler School is eight years of education, but Xinzhu province's youth training center is 
going to complete it within 30 days,” they bragged, emphasizing the intensity and effectiveness 
of the training before it even began.  20
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 The very first-term trained 20 young men for 30 days. Women's training for the first few years was 20 days.19
 “Iyoiyo kaishi wo kettei shita Shinchiku shūritsu seinen shūrenjō,” Shinchiku shinpō, August 1, 1938.20
The shūrenjō adopted a dojo-style of training—the popular method in the metropole. The 
youth who either volunteered to join or were selected first went through a physical check-up.  21
The teachers organized the trainees geographically into six-person groups, based on which the 
youth conducted all activities, including eating, cleaning, and sleeping.  Their daily schedule 22
was rigidly designed, and demanded military-like punctuality. They woke up at 6 a.m. to the 
sound of a Japanese drum. Male youths ran to do misogi, a Shinto-style morning prayer in the 
ocean wearing only a fundoshi (loin cloth) as ritual. That became a symbol of Xinzhu's youth 
training center. After morning exercises and a simple breakfast of a bowl of miso porridge, they 
listened to lectures on Japanese imperial history, rural village problems, and moral stories. 
Before or after lunch, they did outdoor activities, practicing martial arts, working at the 
construction site near the Shinchiku Shrine, plowing new land for vegetables, and marching 
through the city and mountains. After an hour or two of evening leisure time, they practiced seiza 
(formal sitting) and listened to a concluding lecture before going to sleep at 9:30 p.m.  A female 23
participant remembers witnessing that “seiza on the hard floor was the hardest for farm youth, 
because their ankles were too stiffened to stretch flat.”  24
The intense socializing experience at the shūrenjō produced strong group bonds 
equivalent to the fraternity that Japanese village seinendan members cultivated over years. 
Painful training was a necessary component to create affective bonds between the trainees and 
the instructors as well as among the trainees themselves. Xinzhu's bi-weekly newsletter on kyōka 
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programs, Dōkō (The Same Light), framed the pain as trust-building experience. In a roundtable 
interview, the twelfth-term graduates gave examples: 
The seiza sitting was the most painful. The first two times, I cried, but when I listened to 
the Governor's 50-minute lecture in seiza, it was surely painful, but I was happy that I 
could finally bear the pain this long. !
I used a pickaxe for the first time during volunteer labor, and I got a lot of calluses. !
Doing misogi in the rain the first few times was very cold and I shivered. !
I left a few pieces of root vegetable at the first meal, but Teacher Yamada told me to eat 
them all, so I ate them with my eyes closed. I thought I could not take it any more.  25!
For the first time in their lives, the youth received intense attention from the Japanese 
instructors. There were three full-time Japanese teachers as well as one or two Taiwanese 
assistants. They lived in the same building, ate the same amount of the same food, and went 
through the same schedule together. In their personal letters, published essays, and roundtable 
interviews in Dōkō, the graduates appear to have developed respect towards the instructors 
through their everyday interactions: 
The teachers even taught us how to scoop rice and hold chopsticks. Their kindness 
surpassed our parents.' !
I do not know how to thank the teachers who I am sure have wives and children and 
were committed so completely to our education. !
I cannot forget that Teacher Kitamura did not move even a bit during an hour-long seiza, 
saying, “it hurts everyone in the same way, but you have to overcome that.” !
I will not forget that, when I had a pimple that was so badly swollen that I did not even 
touch it myself, Teacher Yamada squeezed the puss out for me.   26!
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Young women's training in shūrenjō started in July 1939 with female teachers. They also 
went through rigid training that emphasized physical exercise, although their afternoon activities 
focused on learning skills and manners that represented Japanese culture, including cooking, 
sewing, music, flower arrangement, archery, and dancing.  They were told that an action as 27
simple as washing one’s face was an opportunity to develop Japanese spirituality—a misogi for 
women.  Like their male counterparts, the female trainees also developed close personal 28
relationships with the teachers through living together and tried to meet their expectation. Huang 
Chunwei from Beipu, who participated in the first-term women's training, wrote in her diary (a 
requirement in the training program): 
July 13. Finally the day of going to the shūrenjō that I long waited for... there was a strict 
physical check-up, and two people did not pass. I did not know what to say seeing them 
going home disheartened. But how happy I was when I could enter the shūrenjō!..A 
teacher kindly applied medicine to my head... felt like a mother doing that... July 16...I 
asked Teacher Hoshi to teach us dancing for the women's patriotic song. I did not 
memorize it well when I practiced it just three of us, so I made a mistake and felt 
embarrassed. July 17... We took a bath before our teachers. Since I felt sorry, I decided 
not to go in the water... July 18... I have been following the teachers' words very well so 
far, but I think there are many things I do not notice... I hear some cried when teachers 
scolded them, but isn't that part of our training?  29!
The shūrenjō taught these youths to become leaders back in their villages, and the 
seinendan groups were the first targets they were supposed to influence. Dōkō exaggerated the 
achievements of the graduates in almost every issue. An article entitled, “A Shining Star of the 
Village, a Warrior of the Soil, a Shūrenjō Graduate, Huang Kunxuan,” introduced the model 
young farmer and his father who were dedicated to new agricultural technologies and the 
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Japanese language education in Yangmei.  Another graduate Huang Rongzhe initiated activities 30
that he learned in the shūrenjō in his seinendan in Zhongli—waking up 6 a.m., running to do 
misogi, and doing morning exercises or voluntary cleaning of the streets.  “He became a totally 31
different person,” the principal of an elementary school in Zhudong was reportedly stunned by 
the change in Xu Yaocheng's attitude. “That introverted, passive, and quiet boy was transformed, 
in a short period of time, into such an active and lively young man to the extent that I could not 
recognize him.... If every single seinendan member could go to the training center, how lively 
and worthy the Xinzhu seinendan groups would become!”  32
Even if these graduates intended to play the expected role to invigorate the local 
seinendan as Dōkō advertised, in reality it was not always easy. They expressed their frustrations 
in their letters to the teachers they felt close to. “[We, a couple of shūrenjo graduates,] are 
working hard for the seinendan, but the participation rate is not great. Members are not united, 
and are individualistic and insincere.... Moreover, there are some shūrenjō graduates who have 
such wicked minds that I cannot believe they also went to the shūrenjō.”  Another graduate also 33
wrote, “when I clean up [the school] with the school principal in the morning, other people say 
'she's showing off because she went to the training center' behind my back. I do not do it in order 
to be praised. I felt really lonely.”   34
#  215
 “Buraku no myōjō, tuchi no senshi, shūrenjō sgūryōsei Huang Kunxuan kun wo tou,” Dōkō 185 (December 5, 30
1938): 6.
 “Miyo!! Wakoudo no moyuru tōshi wo!! Shinshin no shūren ni, kokugo buraku no kensetsu ni kekki seru Sekitō 31
seinen bundan,” Dōkō 186 (December 20, 1938): 4.
 Okumura Ryōtarō, “Seinen shūrenjō no shūryōsei wo kataru,” Dōkō 186 (December 20, 1938): 7.32
 A letter from Chen Fengjie (12th term female trainee) to Xu Chongfa, December 11, 1943. (Provided by Xu 33
Chongfa)
 A letter from Liu Chunzi to Xu Chongfa, August 15, year unknown (most likely 1943 or 1944). (Provided by Xu 34
Chongfa)
The graduates were also expected to influence their family members. The most important 
was to encourage their parents to learn Japanese. Dōkō published a message of shūrenjō student:  
Mother, I thank you and aunt for visiting me at the shūrenjō from our far-away home. 
When mother visited me in the office, we talked a little in Taiwanese. I felt really terrible 
at the time. Since I decided that I would never speak Taiwanese during the one-month 
training, I felt embarrassed in front of those outside the room. Mother, please go to the 
Japanese language center and study hard. I want you to be able to speak in Japanese 
anytime with anyone as soon as possible.  35
  
Such articles in Dōkō, fictional or not, pressured the young reader to tell their mothers to 
do the same. It became a goal to obtain a certificate for a “Japanese-speaking household” by 
educating the older people in their families.  According to the gender roles in the Chinese 36
culture and in Taiwanese past, it was a subversion of hierarchy for daughters to have achieved a 
level of learning above their parents. The September 1939 issues of Dōkō featured a series on the 
female trainee Zheng Liangmei, who fell seriously ill and died during the second term of 
women's training. On her deathbed, Dōkō reported, she talked in Japanese to her mother, who 
could not understand the language, and sang the Japanese national anthem Kimi ga yo. Zheng 
Liangmei became a heroine of the shūrenjō, the equivalent of a soldier who honorably died in the 
battlefield.   37
The Taiwan Patriotic Labor Youth Corps 
Huang Yuanxing in Beipu and Xu Chongfa in Guanxi shared their experiences of going 
through the shūrenjō in interviews. Huang Yuanxing was born in Beipu on August 24, 1925, as 
the second son of a farming family, where his elder brother became the main source of family 
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labor after their father died. Although his family owned some land, unlike most of the farmers in 
Beipu who rented land from the Jiang family, he remembered, “we did not have money, and [that 
is why] none of my seven sisters went to school but instead, five of them were adopted by other 
families in exchange for cash.” After graduating from the Beipu elementary school in March 
1939, he continued into the upper-level years.  However, he quit soon afterwards because a son 38
of the Jiang family in the same class was a bully, and Huang had “a personal clash” with him. 
Moreover, his family did not have money for him to continue into middle school anyway, he just 
wanted to help the family in farming. He did well in the village seinendan, which he joined 
immediately after dropping out of school. When he became the branch leader, the leader of the 
village seinendan (the Beipu elementary school principal) selected him to go to the shūrenjō. 
“Everything was determined based on the schoolmaster's recommendation letter,” Huang 
reflected. He endured the painful time in the shūrenjō, where “the training was militaristic and 
strict—they had a very unique training called misogi… There was a teacher called Nemoto 
Kenji, who I did not know was Taiwanese at the time, who was particularly strict. He often 
shouted loudly at us.”  39
Huang Yuanxing found out that Nemoto Kenji had a Chinese name, Xu Chongfa, only 
after the end of Japanese colonial rule. When Huang met Nemoto Kenji at the shūrenjō, Nemoto 
spoke a sophisticated Japanese, exhibited Japanese mannerisms, and gained full trust from the 
other Japanese teachers. Nemoto, or Xu Chongfa, was the third son of a carpenter in Guanxi, and 
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was only three years older than Huang Yuanxing. He was not Hakka, but grew up speaking both 
Hakka and Holo. He had to give up middle-level education because the family could not pay for 
it, but he mail-ordered lectures from Japan and studied the entire curriculum of the middle school 
of Waseda University by himself while working as a carpenter. Even today, he looks upon the 
completion certificate that Waseda University mailed to him, dated April 1, 1939, as a personal 
treasure. He became the branch leader of the local seinendan, and went to the shūrenjō in 1941 
when he was 17. Because of his outstanding grades on academic exams, Xu immediately became 
the representative of the 60 trainees, and gave a speech at the graduation ceremony. 
For both Xu Chongfa and Huang Yuanxing, the next step of youth training, the Taiwan 
Patriotic Labor Youth Corps [Taiwan kingyō hōkoku seinentai, or the Labor Corps], was a major 
launching point for their careers. The GGT started the Labor Corps program in March 1940, 
gathering 200 to 300 men of around 20 years old, to have them engage mainly in construction 
labor work for three months at a time. They went to one of the three sites of Taipei, Hualian, and 
Taizhong, either to construct shrines, or to build a highway between Hualian and Taizhong.  The 40
purpose of the program sounded similar to other kinds of youth training—“through labor 
volunteer life and training, let them physically understand the essence of the Japanese spirit, 
‘selfless patriotic service’ [messhi hōkō], and complete their character as imperial subjects by 
training their minds and bodies.”  41
For government officials in Taiwan, however, the Labor Corps was not merely an 
extension of local youth training. It was the equivalent of military service. “In Korea, they started 
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the volunteer soldier program, and achieved a good result. We should not forget that the result of 
our Patriotic Labor Youth Corps has a special meaning. It is a good opportunity to measure the 
progress of youth in Taiwan.”  Xinzhu officials repeatedly discussed the similarity of the Labor 42
Corps and conscription in Dōkō: 
Unfortunately, there is no duty of military service for youth in Taiwan. The fact that you 
cannot participate in military service means, not only that you cannot directly stand at 
the frontier of national defense during these grave times, but also that you do not have 
an opportunity for the most serious group education where you obtain training in the real 
Japanese soul... The Patriotic Labor Youth Corps initiated by the GGT recently is the 
most appropriate facility for group education.   43!
Youth were exposed to an environment that convinced them that the Labor Corps was the 
equivalent of conscription. The official letter to convene the youths evoked the image of the 
conscription letter of which they had heard.  When they came back from the service, they were 44
called “reservist corps members” [zaigō taiin], imitating the respected title of the military 
reservists [zaigō gunjin] in Japan.  “After returning to the village, I need to act differently as a 45
reservist member... it would be useless if I am assimilated back to the village youth,” Xu 
Chongfa, who joined the Labor Corps in Hualian, also wrote in his diary five days prior to the 
end of his service.   46
It was already common to evoke the image of military service in Xinzhu's shūrenjō and 
seinendan activities. “When I was going to join the dojo [shūrenjō], —I hear that Japanese youth 
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are struck by solemn inspiration when they enter military service—I had a similar feeling,” one 
of the first trainees declared on a radio show.  Not only the shūrenjō participants, but the 47
instructors, too, took this to enhance the reputation of their program. “Citizens were all surprised 
by the vigorous marching of the shūrenjō trainees, singing military songs in a proud manner in 
and out of town, [they told us that] 'they look exactly like soldiers.'”   48
Career Opportunities and the Sense of Rivalry 
From the perspective of immediate interests, the point of going through the ladder of 
youth training—from local seinendan, the Xinzhu youth training center, to the Patriotic Labor 
Youth Corps—was not necessarily to gain respect as a Japanized, disciplined, soldier-like figure. 
More important was that this series opened up new job opportunities. 
The career prospects for Huang Yuanxing suddenly improved in colonial youth training. 
After returning to Beipu from Labor Corps service near Wushe in Taizhong, Huang immediately 
studied in the teachers' training program for four months and became an elementary-school 
assistant teacher in September 1943. In an interview nearly 70 years later, he emphasized that “I 
could only get a job because I went to the Labor Corps, but only the graduates of the shūrenjō 
were qualified to get in the Labor Corps... In order to go to the shūrenjō, they had to do well in 
the local seinendan... I felt lucky that, although I could not pursue school education, I was able to 
become a teacher just like those who went to middle school or normal school.” As the war 
continued, an increasing number of Japanese teachers and officials were conscripted, leaving 
positions open to local youth. Teaching was a popular occupation among rural youth, partly 
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because teachers had a significant presence in their everyday lives, and also because teachers and 
policemen could move onto other governmental positions.  Although he retained bitter 49
memories about his relations with the son of the Jiang family, he reflected that he had made the 
right decision in pursuing a career through youth training because, he said, “I did well in the 
end.” He continued as a schoolteacher until retirement 57 years later.   50
Although Huang Yuanxing's career development was more common, Xu Chongfa also 
excelled as a rural youth. After coming back from the Labor Corps in Hualian in 1942, Xu was 
recruited to become an assistant instructor at the shūrenjō. The Japanese teachers gave him his 
Japanese name, Nemoto Kenji, and under that name he played the role of the strict, sometimes 
intimidating, and spirited teacher until the end of the war. Even with his continuing belief in the 
value of Japanese-style youth training, Xu Chongfa reveals the importance of job prospects after 
training, saying that “the shūrenjō was popular because the graduates could become school 
teachers without going to normal school. Women could also become assistant nurses.” Another 
Xinzhu resident who did not even join the seinendan, let alone the shūrenjō, also remembers that 
“the Shinchiku shūreniō was famous because the graduates could become teachers.”  The 51
tightly controlled wartime economy caused a large number of people to lose their jobs both in 
Japan and its colonies. Despite the wartime slogan of “Eight Corners Under One Roof” (or “a 
world united under the Japanese emperor”), ethnic discrimination was rife in the job market. 
When “getting a job was extremely hard for Taiwanese people, and it felt like rising to heaven if 
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you could find a salaried job,” four months of intense training away from home—one month at 
the training center and three months at the Labor Corps—was a golden opportunity to broaden 
opportunity.   52
Seeking practical benefits does not mean that these youth saw the Japanization campaign 
only instrumentally. Rather they defined their self-value according to the metric of Japanese 
nationalism, in which Taiwanese youth competed against one another. The rank system of the 
Labor Corps, for example, fanned competitive feelings among youth from different provinces. As 
in the military, they all started as second-rank trainees, and they had two chances to move into 
the first-rank and then to the upper-rank. Xinzhu youth felt most competitive against those from 
Taipei province. “Because the 200 members are all energetic, a severe competition among 
provinces has been taking place,” a participant in the first-term Labor Corps program wrote to 
the shūrenjō teachers, “it seems that there are many getting sick among the Taipei team, but we 
on the Xinzhu team are fortunately all doing well without any accident... There was an 
announcement of our grades on April 23, and 19 out of 24 Xinzhu members passed to the upper 
rank, whereas 11 out of 40 Taipei people did.”  Newspapers frequently reported the number of 53
upper-rank trainees from Xinzhu, and the Xinzhu Governor also pressured the prospective 
participants to garner even better results.  Xu Chongfa's diary during his time in the Labor 54
Corps is filled with nervous feelings about the ranks. “I have to voluntarily engage in difficult 
works, and go home as an upper-rank trainee by any means!”  The first thing that Huang 55
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Yuanxing remembered about the Labor Corps is the pressure to become an upper-rank trainee. 
“Because the previous draftees from Xinzhu had achieved a good reputation and outstanding 
grades, I thought, as a Hakka youth from Xinzhu, I would do everything to become an upper-
rank trainee.”  He also thought the purpose of the shūrenjō was to train Hakka youth to beat 56
other Taiwanese in their achievements at the Labor Corps.  57
Provinces were not the only boundaries recognized by the competitors. They harbored 
animosity toward urban youth both in and outside of Xinzhu. “I thought those from urban areas 
have too many words but their practice does not live up to them,” Labor Corps reservists 
complained.  In contrast, aboriginal youth, once the formidable Other in Hakka immigrants’ 58
collective memory, were highly respected in youth training. They often wrote, “the Takasago 
zoku (aborigines) are pure and great.”  During his Labor Corps service, Xu Chongfa felt 59
ashamed when his skin was not tanned because the instructors often asked him to build furniture 
while other youths engaged in outdoor labor. Dark skin became a masculine symbol of 
hardworking rural youth, which also elevated the image of aboriginal youth.   60
At the same time, a sense of rivalry with intellectual youth grew stronger. Among urban 
youth, those who had higher education degrees made Xu and many seinendan youth defensive 
about their lack of formal education. It hurt Xu, who was confident in his academic ability, when 
someone with a higher academic degree beat him in youth training: “Qiu Renzhang became the 
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top student among 300 of us. Alas, it should not be surprising because he is a middle school 
graduate.”  When he late became the representative of all the upgraded trainees during the 61
Labor Corps, it meant more to Xu than just doing well as a Xinzhu youth, but as the achievement 
of someone who only had very basic schooling. Back in their villages, youth with only 
elementary education continued to hold the same feelings toward the well-educated. Huang 
Xiuying, a female graduate of the shūrenjō, wrote to Xu in July 1945, frustrated by the severe 
competition to get a position in the village office. “What is it in a graduate of the women's 
middle school that is superior to me? I believe I am by no means inferior to her. Seeing the 
person who wasted three years studying [in school], I felt really miserable, but the society is on 
their side. Facing this issue, I felt that society is so pointless.”   62
The formation of their identities and self-esteem as the rural, little-educated, hardworking 
Xinzhu youth evolved around the personal ties and affection that developed in the shūrenjō. They 
called it “the home of our hearts” [kokoro no furusato], where they shared the frustrations and 
excitement they later encountered in the Labor Corps and also back in their villages. The solemn 
melody of Umi yukaba—a martial song about being prepared to die for one’s lord—represented 
the bond that developed between teachers and trainees, as well as among the trainees, who wrote 
to each other long after graduation.  In their letters, they often said that they would work as hard 63
as possible in the volunteer labor and at local seinendan inspections because they did not want to 
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embarrass their shūrenjō teachers.  It seems that Xu Chongfa revealed his background as 64
Taiwanese to female trainees more frankly and kept in close touch with them, maybe because he 
expected to find a potential marriage partner.  These women called him “my elder brother 65
[anisama]” in return, and continued to seek advice from him.  
This ladder of youth training institutions offered Taiwanese youth a space that functioned 
in a similar way to the Rural Youth Industry in Japan. Although the institutional set-up, the way it 
provided job opportunities, and the way youth shared the identity of “rural youth” differed, 
Taiwanese rural youth gained a chance to “rise in the world” and challenge the dominance of 
urban youth through these institutions. They had no resume-writing experience as in Miyagi 
Japan, but they saw each training institution as a rung on a career ladder. This similarly 
transformed rural youth from perpetual farmers to career-seekers. 
The seinendan-based career opportunities were not available to all rural youth. On the 
one hand, after the participation in local seinendan groups became mandatory in 1937, it lost its 
attractiveness to upper-class youth who had appreciated the exclusive nature of the earlier youth 
groups.  Those who aspired higher education were not interested in seinendan activities even if 66
they resided in the countryside.  Autobiographical novels written later by Taiwanese 67
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intellectuals depict the role of village seinendan in a dismissive way.  On the other hand, 68
seinendan activities remained difficult to fully participate in for the poorest strata of farmers who 
struggled to survive. They could not afford leaving for four months for the shūrenjō and the 
Labor Corps. During wartime, new opportunities opened up mainly for second and third sons of 
rural families, especially those who owned a small farm or shop.  They could spare their labor, 69
but could not afford higher education, in the same way as the families of Xu Chongfa and Huang 
Yuanxing. The intensive kyōka campaigns during the 1930s pressured Taiwanese youth to 
Japanize themselves, and once Japanese teachers and low-rank officials were conscripted and left 
Taiwan, these youth had a good chance to fill their positions even when competing against more 
educated youth. 
The Start of Fully Militaristic Training 
The most significant change in seinendan activities after the late 1930s was the centrality 
of military drill. The GGT had been reluctant to promote overtly militaristic training until 
Kobayashi Seizō became the Governor-General in 1936.  Kobayashi did not immediately plan 70
for the conscription of Taiwanese youth, but he regarded military training as the most effective 
method of Japanizing the population. Upon his inauguration, he requested the army to train 
Taiwanese youth, saying that “it would be doubly beneficial if we train the finest Taiwanese 
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youth and those who demand military service in our army—the smelting furnace of Japanese 
spirit—and the GGT takes charge of those who finish the training and let them supervise local 
youths.”  Although the army refused his request, at the local level, simple military drills, mainly 71
marching and basic commands, had already been incorporated in the training of youth groups.  72
At the national level, the outbreak of the war in 1937 gave a go-ahead to seinendan supervisors.  
As the war situation worsened, military service commenced in Korea and Taiwan. When 
the Japanese cabinet passed the Army Special Volunteer Soldier Program Act for the colonies in 
1938, it was not implemented in Taiwan mainly because of concern about Taiwanese 
genealogical kinship with China. When the GGT finally launched it in 1941, army officials 
planned to start conscription in ten years after examining the result of the voluntary soldier 
program, but they decided to move the plan forward to 1944 in Korea, and subsequently began it 
in Taiwan in 1945.   73
This delay of recruitment compared to its earlier start in Korea worried the Taiwanese 
leaders and led to an overheating of the kōminka (Japanization) campaigns.  The movement to 74
implement the volunteer soldier program was popular not only among pro-Japanese Taiwanese 
elites. The demand to implement military service had been coming from home-rule activists who 
viewed military service as a way to achieve equality between Japan and Taiwan since the late 
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1920s. Historian Kondō Masami argues that the most decisive call was the editorial of Taiwan 
shinminpō, which used to be the loudest anticolonial voice in Taiwan, published on August 10, 
1940.  The article demanded that Taiwanese people “display their passion and sincerity in their 75
desire for military service.”  Youth were viewed responsible for making military service 76
possible in Taiwan. 
In order to show that they were prepared, local seinendan groups began working closely 
with Japanese army officers and practicing army drills. In December 1938, the Xinzhu (province) 
seinendan conducted city- and county-level inspections. Army Lieutenant Colonel Iwasa Hiroshi, 
later an instructor at the shūrenjō, evaluated every move of the youth in these inspections. 
“Regarding the straight-standing posture: 1. It is a pity that many move their eyeballs. Stare at 
one point and stand still. 2. Stretch the arms out fully. There are some whose mouths are open...” 
Dōkō reported the details of Iwasa's evaluations so that “the supervisors and leaders of seinendan 
would read carefully and learn for the future training.”  77
The army drills did not stop at the male young population. Female members of the 
seinendan also practiced basic drills. Dōkō reported, “[female students] used to be shy, and even 
avoided meeting teachers on the street, but recently female seinendan members do the training 
and troop marching confidently, emulating their male counterparts... During the inspections, they 
followed Lieutenant Colonel Iwasa's orders and commanded the troops in a very impressive 
way.”  Even though these women would not become fighting soldiers, the officials saw military 78
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drill as an opportunity to teach Japanese discipline and as a way to demonstrate that the entire 
society was ready for military service. The army's top official, Tanaka Kiyoshi, lectured on the 
radio in 1941 that the coming Volunteer Soldier Program required the entire population of six 
million in Taiwan, “the young, old, male or female,” to be trained properly, “like in Germany.” In 
order to produce good-quality soldiers, female bodies as mothers were particularly important.  79
The Warrior of Language and the Warrior of the Plow 
In the middle of the fever for yet-to-come military service, the actual participation in the 
battlefields began in the form of military personnel [gunpu]. A far larger population of young 
men became military personnel than soldiers by the end of the war.  Military personnel were the 80
lowest rank in the Japanese military, even below conscripted horses and dogs. Their death rate 
was ten times higher than (Taiwanese) soldiers.  Officials regarded them as “voluntary” 81
participants, but in reality, many of them were drafted, especially at the beginning, and the 
military learned of many attempts by Taiwanese youth to escape by deliberately falsifying the 
registration of their residence. Japanese officials consequently emphasized recruitment of those 
who were somewhat Japanized already, such as those in the seinendan. The army also provided 
draftees with compensation of one yen a day, equivalent to the pay of a regular salaried job in 
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Taiwan.  This strategy was effective and brought a rapid increase in voluntary participation from 82
103 participants in September 1937 to 1,953 volunteers the following month.   83
Among military personnel, the vast majority, tens of thousands of Taiwanese youth, were 
hired as translators.  Since the Japanese categorized Hakka as Cantonese, the Japanese army 84
recruited many educated Hakka youth in Xinzhu province as translators of Cantonese or as 
schoolteachers to work in the Japanese-occupied region of Guangdong in southern China. Pan 
Jinhe, who later became Xinpu village head, remembers that a group of young elites, including 
himself and Jiang Axin, a business leader from the Jiang family of Beipu, worked for the army in 
Guangzhou doing propaganda tasks. “Cantonese people do not speak Hakka although we 
encountered a number of Hakka people and we could communicate. Because of the military’s 
needs, they made us learn the Cantonese and become translators… We Hakka learned it a lot 
more quickly than the Japanese did.”  Once the Japanese forces occupied Southeast Asian 85
territories in the early 1940s, the scope of recruitment massively expanded to include little-
educated youth. According to the Japanese government the total number of recruits dispatched to 
China and Southeast Asia numbered 126,750 by the end of the war, although the number of 
translators remains unknown.  Xu Chongfa's second elder brother, Xu Chongyi, was serving the 86
Japanese military as an interpreter when he died on a battlefield in Burma. 
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In contrast to those interpreters, who were large in number but whose recruitment was an 
ad hoc process, the Taiwan Agricultural Corps [Taiwan nōgyō giyūdan] was more efficiently 
organized and served as a training program.  Upon request from the army fighting in mainland 87
China, officials in Taiwan recruited 1,000 Taiwanese farmers around 20 years old and formed the 
Agricultural Corps in April 1938. Their mission was to till the abandoned land and provide 
Japanese soldiers with fresh vegetables. They were stationed in Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuchang, 
Wuhan, later Anqing, and Hankou, for one year at a time, and were paid one yen a day.  Their 88
everyday life emulated the army; they had no freedom from 6 a.m. to 9 p.m., and between 
agricultural work, they learned how to stand straight, respond to orders, march, raise their hands, 
and look like real soldiers. The program stressed the educational aspect—the military officers not 
only gave lectures on the cause of Japan's war in China, but also brought the youth to the villages 
that were burned and destroyed in order to impress them with the devastation of the losing side 
of the war.   89
The stories of these youths were similarly symbolic and heroic compared to those of the 
Labor Corps in the articles of Dōkō. The editors had already been stressing that farmers engaged 
in agriculture were equivalent to soldiers fighting in a battlefield.  The Agricultural Corps was 90
the ultimate embodiment of the “warrior of the plow.”  Many pages of Dōkō printed the letters 91
from the Labor Corps and the Agricultural Corps participants together to report frontier 
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experience. Membership in the Agricultural Corps was not restricted to the seinendan, but many 
from Xinzhu province were seinendan members. They found the agricultural techniques in 
Chinese villages so primitive that “invigorating the production requires the use of Taiwanese-
style agriculture, and clearing and cultivating the land properly requires the involvement of 
Taiwanese youth.”  While developing their self-recognition as Taiwanese farmers superior to 92
their Chinese counterparts, the Agricultural Corps, typical to youth training facilities at the time, 
also provoked rivalry between provinces. The Xinzhu youth participants proudly reported to 
Dōkō that “we, from Shinchiku, are leading the other provinces and, with very few sick people, 
achieving good results. We enjoy a good reputation. I am so happy that we are doing better than 
those from the other provinces.”   93
The Agricultural Corps was not only the first exposure to the battlefield for many 
Taiwanese youth, but it also meant a major shift from the mountainous inner-land of Taiwan to 
lands beyond the island across the sea. Many of Xinzhu youth participated in the Agricultural 
Corps with an intention to remain in mainland China after the one-year program and become 
long-term agricultural colonizers.  Despite the difficult nature of the work, the Agricultural 94
Corps presented a new frontier to conquer, replacing the mountains in Taiwan with the Chinese 
continent, and later with jungles of Southeast Asia.  
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“Volunteer Soldier Fever” 
Once the Japanese army started recruiting Taiwanese volunteer soldiers in 1942, a 
“volunteer fever” swept the island, even creating a “blood-application culture” since many youth 
signed applications in their own blood to express their “pure loyalty.”  For 1,000 opening spots, 95
425,961 young people applied in the first year, and 601,147 in the second year. These were 
remarkably large numbers, considering the same “volunteer fever” in Korea saw 254,273 
applicants for 4,000 available spots in 1942. Scholar Kondō Masami points out that this means 
that most of the eligible young men applied. The majority of the applicants came from farming 
families, despite the fact that volunteer soldiers were paid far less than military personnel.  The 96
numbers of applicants suggest that the government conducted campaigns to the extent that a 
distinction between coercive and voluntary recruitment becomes meaningless.  
Social pressure was more severe in some cases than others. Seinendan members received 
the most direct orders and group pressure to apply. After a Japanese school principal encouraged 
the seinendan members in Xiangshan village in Xinzhu to apply, for example, every single 
member signed the form—male for the volunteer soldier, female for the volunteer assistant 
nurse.  Other seinendan units submitted the members’ applications in groups, hundreds and 97
thousands at a time. The hype for military service created in the various programs of youth 
training eliminated any real choice for graduates to decide for themselves whether or not to 
apply. Xinzhu’s official newsletter reported that youth rushed to the counter as soon as the city 
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hall started accepting applications, “almost like a battle scene.” The number of applicants in 
Xinzhu reached 20,586 in the first two weeks.  Being a proud imperial youth, Xu Chongfa felt 98
not only the need to apply, but also the pressure to successfully pass the highly competitive 
examination. While he was working at the youth training center, he expressed his desire to attain 
the honor of volunteer soldier in his notes, “staying in the shūrenjō makes me a quiet person. I 
really hope I will become a volunteer soldier next year!”   99
The seinendan provided an amplification effect for mobilization, in which their examples 
encouraged people to join the war effort, and that further increased the social pressure on 
seinendan members. The female gaze played a powerful role. Yang Qinghe expressed her 
excitement after watching youth play “Kokumin kaihei (All National People Are Soldiers)” 
presented in perfect Japanese by a seinendan group: “I was one of the audience moved so 
deeply… It was as if they had shown me a dazzling thing by suddenly opening a box… A feeling 
of intense surprise ran through my body. Taiwanese youth have matured so much!” Her 
excitement about seeing and hearing volunteer soldiers was almost a sensual one; “Late at night, 
when I hear military songs sung by those coming back from military drills, I immediately 
recognize ‘that is a soldier,’ and ‘that is a volunteer soldier!’” She was surprised to hear even her 
Japanese female friend exhibited a similar excitement, saying, “they are volunteer soldiers!”  100
Young women pressured their male counterparts in different ways. In the same way that young 
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women in the countryside of Miyagi formed an alliance against men who did not attend military 
drills, 140 female seinendan members in Zhudong country made an oath that they would not 
marry youth who did not apply for the volunteer soldier program.  Similar stories were 101
reported all over Taiwan. These reports pushed the previous campaign of abandoning arranged 
marriage even further, converting a woman’s right to choose her marriage partner into a woman’s 
power to influence “imperial defense” in Taiwan as well.  
The prestige of the volunteer soldier elevated the status of rural youth and exerted 
pressure on intellectuals, too. Literature that supported the Japanization campaign (kōmin 
bungaku) directly connected the model rural youth to the volunteer soldier. It suggested the 
superiority of rural farmers over intellectuals in the discourse among educated youth. In the 
famous short novel from 1941, Shinganhei (The Volunteer Soldier), the young author Zhou Jinpo 
treated the act of applying to the volunteer soldier program as the final test for the internalized 
Japanese mind.  Although the novel narrates the dilemma of Taiwanese intellectual youth with 102
deep sympathy, it ends in the triumph of the acts (submitting blood applications) of rural youth 
over the logic (rationalizing Japanese dominance) of intellectuals. Whether or not this idea 
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resonated among educated readers, the bodily mastery of Japanese-ness won high prestige in an 
array of value in intellectual discourse. 
Still, farm youth, selected after severe competition, soon discovered the same bitter 
feeling held by intellectual youth toward the consequence of Japanizing themselves. When the 
successful applicants joined the Japanese army after six months of additional training in Taipei, it 
was their first experience living within a Japanese social structure. Their superiors were mostly 
conscripted Japanese. Taiwanese volunteer soldiers found themselves far better qualified as 
soldiers than their Japanese colleagues, and yet the Japanese superiority in status was absolute. 
They encountered violence and bullying on a daily basis from older Japanese soldiers.  Their 103
sense of humiliation was exactly what elite Taiwanese youth had experienced in the middle 
school and other Japanese dominated institutions of higher education since the 1920s.  The 104
more interactions with the Japanese they had in their cohort, the more frustrated Taiwanese youth 
became, especially knowing that they were the select few in their own society. 
Total Mobilization and Social Change 
The volunteer soldier program prompted change in social relationships. For average farm 
youth, it was the quickest way to subvert their peripheral position. But once total war 
mobilization started, labor and mandatory army conscription destabilized many social 
relationships in different ways from the volunteer soldier program. As the dependence of the 
imperial machine on colonial youth deepened, the relationships between colonizer and colonized 
and between the young and the old, in particular, found new dynamics.  
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The devastation of the final years of war became apparent when the recruitment of 
factory boys [shōnenkō] started in 1943. Thousands of young boys—mostly thirteen- and 
fourteen-years old—were mobilized to build aircraft in Japanese navy factories. They responded 
to the earnest and forceful recruitment calls of their elementary school teachers in the Taiwanese 
countryside. Promised attractive pay and an engineering diploma within five years, 
approximately eight thousand Taiwanese boys headed to the “Navy C Factory” in Yamato city, 
Kanagawa, in Japan. Once trained there, they were sent to factories across the country. These 
teenagers found harsh living condition, severe air raids, and frequent corporal punishment.  105
The beginning of military conscription, although it was not planned when the volunteer 
soldier program started, did not surprise the Taiwanese. The government put it into effect in 
September 1944 and officially conscripted youth in April 1945, mere four months before the end 
of the war. Taiwan had become a battlefield in March 1944 and saw severe air raids starting in 
October of that year. When the first conscription examinations began on January 16, 1945, 
Taiwan had just experienced another round of massive air raids that made it plain to all how 
organized and large in scale these attacks had become.  Xinzhu was one of the areas hard hit by 106
air raids.  Beipu residents remember that air raid alarms went off nearly everyday and children 107
had no time or mind to sit in classroom or study.  108
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Despite Japan’s lagging fortunes in war that betrayed the Japanese military’s sense of 
devastation, official publications advertised conscription and labor recruitment as the final stage 
of complete Japanization. Under such propaganda, the social hierarchy of Taiwanese and 
Japanese populations was being re-defined. Author Ōsawa Sadakichi argued that the inevitable 
next step after mandatory conscription was to encourage Taiwanese-Japanese inter-marriage. He 
advocated it in order to “improve the genes of our offspring by mixing blood” and to provide 
Taiwanese with “experiences with truly Japanese feelings and environments.”  He anticipated 109
that children of the resident Japanese families would marry Taiwanese locals and serve as hubs 
of communication between remote villages in the Taiwanese countryside.  Conscription raised 110
the expectation for Japanese residents to match the locals’ effort to become Japanese. In response 
to a Taiwanese commentator who argued that the perfecting of the Taiwanese people’s Japanese 
required more cooperation from Japanese residents, self-defense group [sōteidan] leader Li 
Meishu complained in a roundtable discussion in Shinkensetsu, “I really want Japanese people to 
stop using sloppy Taiwanese language. Rather than speaking Taiwanese with weird accents, it is 
more important to speak Japanese all the way.”  His condescension came out in the contrast 111
between the proficiencies in each other’s languages. The devotion of Taiwanese to the cause fed 
a sense of moral superiority over their colonizers. 
Universal conscription was a different animal than the volunteer soldier program, or even 
the recruitment of factory boys that promised a school diploma. The “mandatory” aspect of it 
was the opposite of the exclusivity accorded to the volunteer soldier, which was the key element 
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that had stirred volunteer fever. Still, the mood that celebrated masculinity and the excitement of 
wartime influenced many rural conscripts. Huang Yuanxin was one of those who readily 
accepted his conscription notification which he received while working as an assistant teacher at 
the Beipu elementary school.  But there were many cases in which Taiwanese youth tried to 112
escape the call to duty. Even in Beipu, where no clear anti-Japanese feeling existed since 1907, it 
was said that two young conscripts out of thirteen swallowed a bottle of soy sauce at their own 
send-off party and were sent to the hospital. The angry Japanese village head allegedly grabbed 
two middle-aged men in the crowd, one barber and one Chinese medical doctor, and pushed 
them into the car to make up for missing conscripts.  Huang does not remember this incident, 113
but recalls that there were people who tried to escape conscription.  Whatever the truth of these 114
rumors, they convey the frustration and fear aroused by fanatic mobilization among the villagers. 
They were already subjected to the rationing of food, forced donation of every metal object, 
mandatory savings, not to mention the daily air raid alarms.  
Ironically, the best way to escape conscription duty was to become a cog in the 
production line of soldiers. A well-known postwar author, Zhong Zhaozheng, a Hakka born in 
the same year with Huang Yuanxing in Xinzhu, intentionally escaped the conscription by 
entering a youth teachers school. This new program trained students specifically to become 
teachers of military youth schools [seinen gakkō] that were in great need in wartime. Zhong was 
“the Other” kind of youth with whom Huang Yuanxing had contrasted himself—one of those 
educated in middle school who begrudgingly became an elementary schoolteacher in the 
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countryside of Xinzhu. Typical among educated youth, he maintained a cynical view toward 
wartime mobilization. In his autobiographical novels and memoirs, he describes the youth 
teachers school as “a crappy school,” because it was full of Japanese students whose only goal 
was to avoid conscription like himself.  115
During these last few years when Japan increased its reliance on youth, the colonial 
government expanded the cleavage between the younger and older generations more markedly. 
Government officials attempted to maintain the pretense that youth and officials were on the 
same wavelength, calling on the “pure” youth to persuade their “ignorant old parents” if they 
opposed the youth’s desire to apply for the volunteer soldier program.  Schoolchildren had 116
served as the model for the rest of society in moral suasion campaigns, and they continued to do 
so during wartime. Nagata Tomiki, a teacher at the Beipu elementary school, noticed that it was 
popular among students to call each other by their Japanese names, even in letters. Contrasting 
this to Taiwanese elites whom he heard saying “even if we adopt Japanese names, we do not get 
any rights or one sen of profit,” the teacher deplored “why would they not be able to join the 
children and try harder?”  Some Hakka parents considered this apparent divide-and-rule of 117
generations a threat to their ethnic heritage. To stop their children’s rapid Japanization, some elite 
Hakka parents started teaching them about the historical roots of the Hakka. Yet, this did not 
close their generation gap. Huang Guohui recalls that he developed hostility toward his father 
who preached to him about the proud historical origin of the Hakka in the Central Plain of the 
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Yellow River. “I thought, ‘my father is uneducated and ignorant, is very conceited, likes empty 
talk, and gives me all kinds of bullshit orders,’ and began to despise him.”  He even took out a 118
Japanese scholar’s book that his brother brought back from Tokyo and showed his father that his 
stories were mere myths or legends, “borrowing the authority of books and printed words.”  119
The wartime mobilization made a scientific mind and unconditional faith both markers of 
Japanized youth. By fanning the generational gap, the state attempted to ensure an effective 
alliance with youth and nationalize the empire. 
Conclusion 
The ladder of youth training programs—from village seinendan, the shūrenjō, the Labor 
Corps, and the Agricultural Corps, to the volunteer soldier—finally created a space of upward 
mobility in the late 1930s in Taiwan that resembled the Rural Youth Industry formed in Tōhoku 
Japan a decade earlier. Taiwanese youth shared a common identity as rural youth, found career 
opportunities, and attempted to subvert local social hierarchies. The high rate of schooling and 
literacy, as well as the significant presence of Japanese teachers in village life, contributed to the 
rapid establishment of this occupational and discursive space of rural youth. Like in Japan, the 
colonial government attempted to mobilize every individual in Taiwan in the last few years of 
colonial rule. Despite the large scale of mobilization, the Taiwanese version of the Rural Youth 
Industry did not lead to a complete collapse as seen in Miyagi’s countryside. When Japan 
surrendered, youth like Xu Chongfa and Huang Yuanxing were still trying to enhance their 
careers.   
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70 years later, Xu and Huang still do not hesitate to admit their embrace of Japanese 
nationalism, even arguing that Japanese-style youth training is superior to today’s school 
education. Yet they came to internalize the ideology of Japanese nationalism not because they 
evaluated and considered the ideology of the empire convincing, or because they were 
brainwashed by Emperor-centered preachings. No matter how emotionally committed they 
became, their motivations originated in more localized social contexts. The stories and records of 
Xinzhu youth show how powerfully their grudge against the educated urban youth affected them, 
and only then they found the imperial preaching attractive. At the same time, this was not only 
about the grudges or resentment of the marginalized people. Urban intellectuals faced increased 
pressure because of the enhanced stature of uneducated rural youth. The colonizers were also 
pressured to match the effort of the Taiwanese populace. The war and its widespread nationalistic 
propaganda destabilized social hierarchies—urban-rural, educated-uneducated, gender, 
generational, and ethnic divides. The hope to improve one’s social positions by aligning with the 
state underlined the mechanism of Japanization in wartime Taiwan.  
!!!!
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Chapter 7:  
The Making of the Model Rural Youth in Colonial Korean Village—
Kwangsǒk in South Ch’ungchŏng, Korea (1890s-1930s) 
!
Korea is often regarded as an industrialized colony in contrast to predominantly 
agricultural Taiwan. Yet the majority of the population lived in farm villages in the late 1930s 
even after the governmental investment in heavy industry in northern cities. The agriculturally- 
centered southern provinces in particular played an important role in meeting the empire’s needs 
for food. Agrarianism was a foundational ideology for the Government-General of Korea (GGK), 
especially in the Rural Revitalization Campaign which began in 1932. As in the earlier Local 
Improvement Movement (1906-1918) and the concurrent Rural Revitalization Campaign in the 
metropole, military ethos, agrarian ideals, and Japanese nationalism came together in the colony. 
Until this agrarian campaign, however, young residents in rural villages were isolated 
from the intellectual discourse on the rise of youth. Neither colonizers nor Korean local notables 
mobilized the pre-colonial hamlet youth gatherings for modernization projects as their 
counterparts had done in Japan. The youth activism for Korean independence popular in county 
capitals in the 1920s did not spread to remote villages, although it influenced some youth of 
landlord families. The story of Korean village youth until the 1930s was one of isolation from 
national movements—with the important exception of the March First Independence Movement 
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of 1919—from state and county capitals, from rural modernity, and also from opportunities for 
social mobility. In the 1930s, with the onset of the Rural Revitalization Campaign, the center of 
gravity of youth groups shifted from county capitals to rural villages like in Taiwan, and these 
groups became a vehicle of Japanese nation-building.   
Examination of the changes in the social status of “rural youth” between 1910s and 1930s 
in one local case, Kwangsǒk village, South Ch’ungch’ǒng, reveals the multiple internal 
boundaries that separated Koreans from one another. When Japanese colonizers settled in Korean 
villages, local societies had long been stratified through the centuries of Chosǒn rule 
(1397-1897). Internal divisions based on location, occupation, education, class, gender, and 
generation shaped a complicated social structure for colonial authorities that sought assimilation 
of population. For this reason, the youth training programs in the Korean countryside, which 
turned into a space that I call the “Rural Youth Industry,” did not affect a wide range of farm 
youth. Yet those who could go to elementary schools constituted a new “middling-class” in the 
countryside and were able to use the ladder of youth institutions to create new social values, 
statuses, and opportunities. The story of an individual in Kwangsǒk, Kim Yǒng-han, shows how 
the new generation and class thrived in the Korean version of the Rural Youth Industry. Like Xu 
Chongfa and Huang Yuanxing in Taiwan, Kim associated the youth training institutions with his 
career opportunities. Village youth like Kim internalized Japanese agrarian nationalism to assert 
their superiority over older generations and narrate their careers in local offices as success 
stories.  
Many historians of colonial Korean villages discuss the colonial government’s 
suppression of Korean ethnicity, the capitalist exploitation of tenants, and the everyday resistance 
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of villagers. Without denying the importance of these aspects of village life, looking at changing 
generational identities and aspirations for social mobility provides a different perspective on the 
colonial experience. The GGK could not mobilize the rural population for war without 
capitalizing on the psychology of rural youth. This does not mean that there was no resistance, or 
that all policies were successful or justifiable. A social history of rural youth mobilization in 
Kwangsǒk shows that there were diverse experiences even in one village, and, at the same time, 
similarity across the empire in the way some young men turned state mobilization to social 
opportunities in their local contexts. 
Kwangsǒk village in South Ch’ungch’ong 
Japanese intervention in Korean politics and economy began before the formal 
annexation in 1910. Kwangsŏk village in the Nonsan region in the central part of what is now 
South Korea saw a sudden influx of Japanese settlers at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Villagers resisted these settlers violently when necessary. Despite these colonial tensions, 
Nonsan region had more in common with Shida village in Miyagi than with Beipu in Taiwan.  
Nonsan was a prominent agricultural producer, known for its massive fertile plain created 
by the Nonsan River and the larger Kŭm River.  The Nonsan Plain belonged to the Sannam 1
region (the “southern three”), which reportedly produced 70% of all rice consumed in premodern 
Korea.  The Plain alone produced nearly 45,000 tons of rice annually during the 1930s.  The 2 3
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Kŭm River, which runs to the Yellow Sea, had long been an artery for goods and people. From 
the seventeenth century until the 1910s, when new railroad systems replaced water 
transportation, the commercial hub of Nonsan region was a river port town, Kanggyŏng.  4
Kanggyŏng was the last port where large ships could enter the Kŭm River. From there goods 
were re-distributed further inland on small boats. Because the town was also located on the 
inland route between Seoul and Chŏlla, Kanggyŏng was a hub of regional circulation. Rice, 
grains, cotton cloth, tobacco, fish, and a variety of products were traded in Kanggyŏng, and rice 
and grains from the region were sold as far away as Seoul and Cheju Island.   5
After the Chosŏn government was forced to open its ports to foreign powers in the 1890s, 
the commercial opportunities in Kanggyŏng attracted dozens of Japanese settlers. After the Sino-
Japanese War in 1895 gave Japan privilege in Korea, more Japanese merchants came and formed 
a settler community protected by Japanese troops. The mixed communities of Korean locals and 
Japanese settlers became common in provincial cities, where the settlers built their schools, 
shrines, and commercial unions separate from the Korean community. These merchants often 
ignored the agreements between the Korean and Japanese governments, illegally acquiring real 
estate and expanding their business, virtually creating a foreign concession in Kanggyǒng.  6
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When Japan formally annexed Korea in 1910, the number of Japanese residents already 
exceeded one thousand, steadily increasing until the 1940s.   7
In contrast to the urban settlement in Kanggyŏng which resembled the foreign settlements 
in Chinese port cities, the Japanese settlers in the Nonsan Plain saw their migration more as 
pioneering open land.  This was despite that the southern provinces of the Korean peninsula were 8
densely populated, and Nonsan could certainly not be characterized as “open land.”  The first 9
Japanese settler in Nonsan, a native of Okayama, Miyake Suejirō, moved to Nonsan village from 
Kanggyŏng in 1899. He sold merchandise to Korean farmers, particularly Japanese farming 
instruments such as tools for hulling rice. Other immigrants followed, but it was only after 1910 
that the number of Japanese households surpassed a hundred.  Nonsan attracted them because 10
the introduction of railroads gave it easy access to major cities—it was less than 25 minutes to 
Kanggyŏng and two hours to Taejŏn and Kunsan.   11
The early settlers considered their experience a conquest and emphasized the danger they 
faced on a daily basis in their chronicle. The pioneer Miyake had to “avoid fiendish insurgents” 
to conduct his business.  Nonsan was the frequent target of bandits who torched houses and 12
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robbed valuables. The Righteous Army, anti-foreign local volunteer troops, attacked the Japanese 
residents in Nonsan in 1907.  A short chronicle written by Nonsan’s Japanese settlers in 1914 13
argued that security was a serious problem for both Japanese and Korean residents. In 1906, 
when there were only eleven Japanese households, they requested that the provincial government 
establish a police post. The chronicle highlighted the mistrust between Korean and Japanese 
residents. In one episode, Korean vendors panicked at the alarm bells rung by the Japanese to 
warn of approaching bandits, believing that the Japanese were going to enslave them as 
laborers.  Through anecdotes of miscommunication, mistrust, lawlessness, and the slow pace of 14
Korean agricultural production, the Japanese settlers depicted Nonsan as a new frontier to 
conquer. 
The Japanese settlers created the image of an “uncivilized land” perhaps to counter the 
self-image of local notables in South Ch’ungchŏng. The area along the Kŭm River was once the 
political and strategic center of Paekche, one of the ancient Three Kingdoms (52-668). Chinese 
culture, religion, and technology was transmitted from this region to Japan.  Yǒnsan in Nonsan 15
was considered a candidate for the capital of the new Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1897). The region 
was famous for its tradition of neo-Confucian scholarship (Kiho school), and a large number of 
literati yangban families lived in the Ch’ungch’ŏng provinces—nearly 41% of the entire 
yangban class.  These scholarly families were considered themselves a bastion against 16
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modernization programs promoted by new generations in Seoul at the turn of the twentieth 
century.  They often looked down on Japanese settlers—many of whom came from lower social 17
strata—as uneducated, materialistic barbarians.   18
How did the environment of villages in Nonsan compare with the villages in Taiwan and 
Japan? A typical farm village on the northern edge of Nonsan county, Kwangsǒk, had a stark 
difference with Beipu in Taiwan in the nature of the local community before colonization. Beipu 
was a frontier for Hakka immigrants where the youthful talent and physical courage were highly 
valued. The presence of conflicts between the Hakka and the aboriginal peoples enabled 
Japanese colonizers to use their position to mediate between them, while Hakka residents took 
advantage of the colonial partnership to expand their dominance and business. In contrast, rural 
areas in Korea had long established class and generational hierarchies with landlord families 
standing between the central state and peasant communities.  The Japanese settlement in 19
Kwangsǒk, which was four times larger than that in Beipu, caused a sudden disruption to the 
existing social dynamic.   20
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Japanese schools and schoolteachers in Korean villages did not establish roots as quickly 
as those in Beipu and they had less interaction with their Korean neighbors even in the 1920s. In 
Korea, the education system had long been monopolized by the yangban literati class. Kwangsŏk 
had 29 yangban families in 1909.  The elite scholars of the village studied in the Nogang 21
Academy and ran small private schools [sŏdang].  After the Japanese victory in the Russo-22
Japanese War (1904-5), the prominent yangban and largest landholder (about 3.5 km2) in 
Kwangsŏk, Yun Chi-byŏng, established a new private school in 1911.  The Usin School 23
provided six years of education to relatively well-off residents, both male and female, including 
training in the Japanese language and agricultural skills. Yun Chi-byŏng’s son, Yun Hŭi-jung, 
continued to develop its curriculum over the years. But unlike the school in Beipu, which 
became a public elementary school after three years of colonial rule, the Usin school remained a 
private institution until 1929.  24
Japanese police remained a powerful presence in the Korean village especially during the 
uprisings of the Righteous Army before the annexation in 1910 and during the March First 
Independence Movement in 1919. In Kwangsŏk, 200 people gathered to demonstrate in 
Ch’ŏndong hamlet on April fourth of 1919. The Japanese police cracked down on them, shooting 
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and killing one of the villagers.  The presence of the police remained strong in the 1920s. 25
Scholar Edmund de Schweinitz Brunner wrote a report on rural conditions in Korea: “Japan’s 
greatest social influence on the local community [was] exerted through the police.” He observed 
that the police took charge of a wide range of regulations from burial permits to passport 
applications.  Although the police had similar functions in Taiwan, at least the Hakka people in 26
Xinzhu perceived them as playing a mediating role between them and aboriginal groups, whereas 
in Korea, they deepened the gap between the colonial authorities and the local residents.  
The social environments of Kwangsŏk, including the role of young people, had more in 
common with those of Shida village in Miyagi. Both were predominantly rice-growing farm 
villages, adjacent to county centers, Nonsan and Furukawa, respectively. Kwangsŏk’s access to 
provincial cities— Kanggyŏng, Taejŏn, and Kongju—was similar to Shida’s to Sendai. Both 
villages had patriarchal family institutions, the yangban in Kwangsǒk and landlord families in 
Shida, which maintained local labor relationships and prevented the fragmentation of land.  27
Korean and Japanese hamlets also depended on horizontal ties that allowed peasants to preserve 
space separate from the ruling class. Indeed, the Korean social guilds, kye (), much 
resembled the guild associations [keiyaku kō] in Miyagi. Under the kye, 10-20 people formed 
labor-sharing units, ture (). They were similar to Japan’s pre-Meiji youth groups, as they 
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were associations of working-age men, whose activities were not limited to agricultural labor but 
included entertaining, dancing, drinking, and other kinds of peer bonding.  The fact that groups 28
of ture in multiple hamlets cooperated with one another, even coordinating peasant and political 
uprisings in the nineteenth century, was similar to the political activism of the Japanese hamlet 
youth groups in early Meiji.  The ture, however, were not mobilized for modernization projects 29
like the youth in Shida. A few colonial officials who attempted to transform kye to do so did not 
succeed until the 1930s.  30
Despite the similarities, there is no indication that the Japanese settlers in Kwangsǒk 
recognized these aspects of Korean rural villages. They showed little interest in discussing the 
Korean community in their chronicle. It was not until Japanese ethnographers conducted 
research on Korea’s farm communities in the 1920s that they started to record the functions of 
the guilds and labor-sharing groups. This increased attention to rural communities among 
Japanese bureaucrats and scholars coincided with a nation-wide movement to mobilize local 
youth groups by Korean nationalist and socialist activists. 
Youth Groups in Nonsan in the 1920s 
During the 1920s, national movements focusing on “rural youth” expanded rapidly. Anti-
colonial nationalist and socialist leaders viewed the spread of local youth groups in county 
capitals as their expansion of influence. But the groups in Nonsan engaged mainly in 
generational power struggles rather than ideological ones. Like the Taiwanese elite youth groups 
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that swung between colonial and anti-colonial affiliation, the ideology did not necessarily occupy 
the minds of local leaders. The rise of “rural youth” in the intellectual discourse in the 1920s, 
mainly used by local leaders already in power as well as the younger educated elites to establish 
their sphere of influence, did not accompany mobilization of average farm youth in remote 
villages. 
In county capitals, a number of new youth groups were established after the crackdown 
of the March First Movement. Their missions were cast in the language of political ideologies—
self-strengthening, anti-colonial nationalism, class struggle, or hyǒksin (progressive reform). For 
the newly-launched Korean-language newspapers, the Tonga ilbo and Chosŏn ilbo, the rapid 
spread of youth groups was a sign of a new politics. Urban centers of the Nonsan region joined 
this nation-wide trend, with the formation of the Kanggyŏng Youth Group, the Nonsan Youth 
Club, the Taejŏn Youth Club, and many others. At the same time, these groups were organized by 
local leaders already in their fifties and even sixties. They showed a strong continuity, rather than 
a break, with earlier years and reinforced the old social hierarchy. Some of them were simply 
“renewed” from previous groups, whose members were colonial bureaucrats, schoolteachers, and 
county local officials.  The first youth group in South Ch’ungch’ŏng, Nonsan Youth Group, was 31
established in 1917. Its leader, Ch’oe Tal-sun, was a land survey technician working for the 
GGK. Ch’oe continued to preside over the Nonsan Youth Club when it was “re-established” in 
1920.  The goals echoed the familiar phrase of Japanese seinendan activists, “moral training 32
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[suyang] of the spirit,” rather than promoting social change or Korean nationalism.  The 33
historian Ji Soo-gol [Chi Su-gŏl] calls these groups “advisory institutions for county 
governance”  because the members tended to have their careers in local offices, such as village 34
advisory councils and credit unions.  
Their ambiguous political color showed the unclear boundary between colonial and anti-
colonial movements in provincial towns as in 1920s Taiwan. The close association of older 
leaders with colonial administration did not necessarily hinder them from supporting the Cultural 
Movement advocated by Tonga ilbo and nationalist leaders. They emphasized the importance of 
modern knowledge, moral training, and physical health. They invited students from Seoul for 
public speeches and organized amateur plays to spread enlightenment ideas to fight “feudal” 
customs. In fact, they did not have to choose between a pro-GGK or pro-nationalist position as 
long as they adhered to the enlightenment and modernization goals advocated by both sides. 
Potentially, night school courses might reveal political leanings, but the youth groups in Nonsan 
did not provide many night classes.  Local youth groups often showed their active support for 35
the movements initiated by nationalists to establish a private university and promote domestic 
production.  But these goals reflected an elite vision of national sovereignty and soon foundered 36
without gaining much support from the people. 
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Compared to the local youth groups aligned with the anti-colonial movement of the 
Taiwan Cultural Association, youth groups in Korean provincial towns appeared more active but 
also more confrontational with one another. The hyǒksin (reform) movement in 1925 sparked 
generational conflicts in Nonsan. Younger members saw the generation in power as obstacles to a 
new Korea. In their eyes, the older members lacked the will to change the old social order. The 
young members in Nonsan youth groups advocated new age limits of 16-30, but could not expel 
the older members. In most cases, older generations continued in power, forcing the newer forces 
to break away from the group. By 1927, Nonsan had eight (conservative) youth groups, two 
proletariat youth groups, two labor youth groups, and two “equality” [hyŏngp’yŏng] youth 
groups.  The newly formed youth groups competed against one another, leading at times to 37
violence.  The leftist youth groups in regional towns rose and fell until they were completely 38
crushed by police forces by the end of the 1920s.  
While generational conflicts, cloaked in ideological rhetoric, divided local leaders in 
county capitals, in Kwangsǒk the rise of “rural youth” only influenced the son of the largest 
landlord in the village, Yun Hǔi-jung. Like Katō Einojō in Miyagi, Yun’s initiative 
simultaneously had pro-establishment and rebellious characteristics. He converted his house to a 
night school classroom to teach Japanese, Korean, math, and the Chinese classics. More than 80 
children and working youth gathered to study. His brother-in-law, Cho Dong-sun, served as the 
main teacher.  Like Katō, Yun and Cho were in their twenties and might have considered their 39
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night school a youthful, rebellious act. A local historian argues that both were sympathizers of 
leftist thought to the extent that Cho and Yun’s family members later migrated to North Korea 
during the Korean War.  Perhaps his educational programs incorporated socialist ideas. Perhaps 40
Yun Hǔi-jung was motivated by an in-family generational tension or other personal agenda, as 
was the case for Katō Einojō. In any case, Yun’s leadership made little change in the class 
hierarchy, but reinforced it. Despite his interest in socialist activism, Yun stayed away from the 
youth group politics in adjacent towns and did not mobilize ordinary village youth to confront 
colonial rule. 
The Rural Areas in Assimilation Policies 
During the 1920s, the GGK attempted to control youth groups by cracking down on the 
leftist and Tonga ilbo-led youth groups and by offering workshops and study tours for other, less 
subversive, youth.  The greatest obstacle in this effort came from Japanese settlers, whom Jun 41
Uchida calls the “brokers of empire.” Many Japanese settlers opposed the assimilation programs 
advocated by the colonial government since the 1910s. Their attitudes did not help the GGK to 
reach the Koreans, but instead intensified hatred for the Japanese.  Although the shock of the 42
March First Movement led some settler organizations to advocate ethnic harmony, everyday 
encounters between Japanese and Koreans were characterized by ethnic tension, particularly in 
the cities.  In 1921, a top GGK bureaucrat Moriya Eifu pointed out the problematic behavior in 43
Korea in a lecture to middle school principals: 
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Japanese rule is successful in developing industry, improving administration, and 
maintaining order… Korean people always say that they appreciate these developments, 
but they prefer that Japanese people give their hearts and deep trust to Koreans to the 
extent they could die together… The attitude of Japanese toward Koreans has been 
carping in big and small details, almost like that of a stepmother. It is said that Russia, 
like a stepfather, is more likable than a stepmother Japan that pokes everything with a 
sharp needle.   44!
 The GGK perceived the situation in the countryside differently. Although earlier settlers 
had had an attitude of conquerors, those who settled as tenant farmers had been cooperating 
closely with Korean farmers. While pointing out shameful behavior of city residents, colonial 
officials applauded Japanese tenant farmers for building friendship with the locals. One of the 
settlers in Kwangsŏk village, Aoki Kihachi, received a page of praise in the government journal, 
Chōsen (Korea), for his assimilation to the community. He settled in Kwangsŏk in 1911 and 
became a tenant of 16,000m2 of the Kunitake Farm Company. 
Mr. Aoki learned Korean as soon as he arrived in Korea, associates with Korean people 
with politeness, does not produce discrimination … He always does manual labor 
together with Koreans, does his best to attend their gatherings, never opposes 
community activities, invites hamlet residents to drinks and cakes on the New Year’s 
Day, and never changes his attitude.  45!
Rural areas were better positioned to achieve the assimilationist goal in the eyes of GGK 
officials. Building village youth groups, in particular, was a way to reach their everyday lives. 
The spread of elementary schools, however, which had been a prerequisite for youth training in 
Japan, was slow in Korea. Because colonial officials did not readily approve public elementary 
schools, and also because the pre-colonial tradition that linked education to elite male culture, 
access to elementary education was extremely limited in the countryside. In this milieu, private 
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schools run by local elites, sŏdang, appeared to have potential for developing youth groups. In 
the report on youth group guidance, South Chŏlla officials argued, 
The sŏdang is already the place of learning for youth in hamlets and villages between 
farming seasons… Although the students of sŏdang do not identify themselves as youth 
groups yet, but we think that, in the future, they might offer the most appropriate 
conditions should we want to form successful [youth] groups.   46!
In Kwangsǒk, Yun Hǔi-jung and his Usin School were seen as facilitators of rural assimilation. 
After the Usin School became a public elementary school in 1929, it did indeed serve as a basis 
for the youth training institutions that developed in the 1930s. 
Shifting attention to the countryside in the 1920s, the GGK produced a series of studies 
on Korean rural lives. In 1922, for example, Kon Wajirō, an architect and folklorist then 
specializing in Japanese rural houses and a student of Yanagita Kunio, traveled through Korea to 
study living conditions. With his trademark detailed sketches, he offered a fresh look at Korean 
housing in both urban and rural settings. Throughout his study, he stressed the rationality and 
natural beauty of Korean houses, and sometimes their superiority to those of the Japanese. In the 
introduction to his report he wrote, “I saw slums. I saw that they were unexpectedly beautiful… 
not like the dirty ones we see in Japan.”  In the countryside, he was fascinated by the ondol 47
(floor heating): “In Korea, no matter how primitive the house is, there is ondol. Japanese 
primitive houses do not even have tatami mats.”  Other scholars studied different aspects of 48
Korean rural life.  Most famously, Zenshō Eisuke, GGK’s leading researcher of Korean affairs, 49
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compiled massive volumes on various kye, hamlet organizations, social customs, and clan-based 
communities, as well as Korean economy and industry in the 1920s.  The GGK attempted to 50
revive the traditional characteristics of Korean village organizations as units that could 
implement moral suasion campaign at the grassroots level. Although similar romanticism of local 
cultures led to associationism in other empires, the Japanese empire celebrated local 
characteristics to achieve the assimilationist goal. 
The Rural Revitalization Campaign 
In the depression, Korean villages became increasingly impoverished. Governor-General 
Ugaki Kazushige launched the Korean version of the Rural Revitalization Campaign in 1932. As 
the rhetoric of wartime urgency increased over the course of the 1930s, the GGK demanded 
greater cooperation from the wider population for the sake of national-imperial survival and 
promoted moral suasion campaigns across the peninsula.  The GGK centralized the 51
organizations and programs of “social education” under a network called rengōkai (the 
federation) established in 1935.  At the village level, the Rural Revitalization Campaign and 52
new hamlet organizations created conditions in which rural youth began to see new opportunity. 
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A version of the Rural Youth Industry emerged in the Korean countryside once the colonial 
government came to rely heavily on village youth. 
The Rural Revitalization Campaign became an emblem of GGK’s administration. In an 
article in their journal Chōsen, the officials situated the campaign within the increasing 
international tensions: 
The full development of Korea, which is filled with potential, will be a great 
contribution to the empire toward the goals of securing its glorious position and 
continuing to expand in the face of the difficult international situation. If the empire’s 
authority stays firm and rock-steady, the peace of East Asia will be maintained, and the 
uncertainties of the world will be naturally lessened. Pursuing this grave international 
mission of the empire requires the energetic industry of Korea and the souls of 20 
million well-trained masses. Indeed, it has to be, “light comes from Korea.” This is the 
international basis of the Rural Revitalization Campaign.  53!
Defined in such grand language, this campaign did indeed mobilize the population on an 
unprecedented scale, much as occurred in the agrarian campaigns in Japan. Triggered by imperial 
expansion and rural depression, the moral suasion programs mobilized the core of hamlet 
communities for the first time. Officials conducted studies on the economies of households and 
regulated daily life through social organizations. By 1934, 7,861 hamlets established associations 
called shinkōkai (or chinhŭnghoe in Korean: revitalization groups), which also organized 
subgroups for women and (male) youth. By mobilizing traditional hamlets, the GGK expected 
the shinkōkai to mobilize farm communities more efficiently. As in Japan, the campaign in Korea 
assumed that Japanese nationalism coupled with Ninomiya Sontoku agrarianism would make 
people more productive and “self-reliant.”  
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This hardwork-ism appeared everywhere in articles of Jiriki kōsei ihō (Self Revitalization 
News; 1933-1941), an official newsletter of the campaign published by the GGK. In addition to 
farming methods and techniques, the belief in efficient use of resources, time, and labor 
constituted the core of the message.  This was also the moment in which the colonial 54
government announced that the countryside, not the cities, was the champion of assimilation 
effort. Governor-General Ugaki complained that cities “tend to lag far behind farm and fishing 
villages in promoting national spirit and self-reliance.”  Comments like this sought to foster a 55
divided identity between urban and rural leaders and shake the supremacy of urban intellectuals 
and culture. 
The campaign in Korea was not merely a transplant of the earlier Japanese rural programs 
like the Local Improvement Movement after the Russo-Japanese War, but reflected the 
contemporary conditions of the 1930s. According to the scholar Gi-wook Shin, the middle-class 
peasants initiated tenant protests in the mid-1920s to secure tenancy rights.  After the depression 56
struck, the price of rice in 1931 fell to only 39% of what it had been in 1925, driving many 
owner-cultivators into tenancy. Tenant disputes became smaller in scale, more focused on their 
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basic survival, more frequent, and more widespread.  The Tonga ilbo described the rural 57
devastation as “a starving hell.”   58
The predicament of the rural population had been a topic of discussion for GGK officials 
for a long time.  In the early 1920s, they conducted detailed research on the practice of tenancy 59
around the peninsula and adopted some legal measures to mitigate landlord-tenant tensions. 
South Ch’ungch’ŏng province published a report on tenant practices in 1930, confirming once 
again the problems that had been well-documented since the 1910s, such as the slave-like 
relationship between tenants and their landlords and the exploitation of tenants by the Korean 
middlemen who worked for the landlords to the extent that they were called “government-
general of the countryside” and “evil demons.”  The GGK set up official arbiters in provinces 60
and enacted a tenancy law in 1933, before a similar law was enacted in Japan, in an attempt to 
guarantee long-term, stable tenancy for Korean farmers. Scholar Pak Sŏp argues that these 
measures formed the basis of the Rural Revitalization Campaign because GGK officials believed 
that unstable tenancy prevented farmers from improving cultivation.  61
The associations, shinkōkai, also preceded the Rural Revitalization Campaign. Ohara 
Shinzō, a Japanese bureaucrat and governor of South Ch’ungch’ŏng, advocated shinkōkai groups 
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in 1916—around the same time that Xinzhu Governor Mimura Sanpei attempted to build youth 
groups in Taiwan. Ohara transformed the kye into groups to promote the reform of old customs, 
modernization of agricultural production, moral training, public hygiene, and so on.  He also 62
tried to introduce the agrarian ideology of Ninomiya Sontoku to the Korean countryside. Ohara 
visited yangban families, proffering government policies in the form of a written prayer at 
Confucian shrines to gain support from powerful local elites. His attempt at rural reform soon 
slowed, but in 1920, another governor, Tokizane Akiho, again advocated the establishment of 
hamlet shinkōkai. By 1923, the provincial government was boasting about the rapid development 
of shinkōkai, saying that the number of shinkōkai groups increased from 761 (67,482 members) 
to 1,415 (104,345 members) between 1917 and 1922.  Under the supervision of provincial, 63
county, and village officials, these groups put out a long and detailed list of daily life rules, such 
as, do not forget to clean the toilets, save some money every month and one-third of 
supplementary incomes, return borrowed things as quickly as possible, shoo sparrows away 
when you walk along rice paddies, and the like.  The list resembles what kyōka (moral suasion) 64
groups advocated in villages of Xinzhu in Taiwan around the same time, and shows that 
shinkōkai were already promoting moral suasion a decade before the Rural Revitalization 
Campaign began. 
Kwangsŏk had one of the most famous groups in Korea, the Kalsan shinkōkai. It was 
honored with an award 14 times for its activities between 1918 and 1930 and was introduced in 
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journal and newspaper articles. Kalsan hamlet differed from the rest of Kwangsŏk in that 
Japanese companies owned most of its land. The large presence of Japanese companies 
transformed the hamlet community and gave rise to Korean middlemen [malŭm] as new local 
leaders. Kalsan’s middlemen, Pang Chong-ku and O Yi-sŏn, established a community reform 
group in 1915, which was renamed a shinkōkai when Governor Ohara issued his decree in 1916. 
They created a new kye to regulate customs and finances for funerals, established a private 
school for children, banned alcohol, and offered free guidance on new agricultural methods. 
Kalsan was highly regarded because neither Pang nor O exploited the tenants—a behavior 
widespread among the majority of middlemen in similar positions. Reportedly, they even re-
distributed land among small tenants at their own loss.   65
Although Kalsan became nationally famous, its model of development clashed with the 
plan of the GGK. The Rural Revitalization Campaign aimed at reviving the old hamlet 
communities under the control of government offices. However, in Kalsan, Pang and O 
represented a new class of leaders rather than traditional landlords, and did not rely much on 
government authorities, either. More traditional in the sense of landlord leadership, Yun Hŭi-jung 
also established a shinkōkai, but combined it with the progressive reform [hyǒksin] movement, 
promoting both socialist and governmental goals at the same time. “The first and critical task of 
our society is to reform women’s society,” he argued and established a shinkōkai specifically for 
female villagers.  Despite the leftist aspects of the group, its leader, Cho Dong-sun, was 66
recognized as a “model shinkōkai leader” by colonial officials in 1929. 
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Although government officials offered funding and set up county- and provincial-level 
associations, halmet shinkōkai groups functioned mainly as private groups for local notables. As 
obvious in Kwangsǒk’s examples, only locally-grounded leaders had the ability to form 
shinkōkai in the hamlets.  Many of them were established before the government-endorsed 67
programs. While staying clear of the nationalist and socialist movements prevalent in urban 
areas, these rural notables eagerly absorbed both the resources of colonial authorities and the 
inspiration for modernization derived from nationalist and socialist activism in the 1920s. Their 
choice was not “either-or” between colonial and anti-colonial positions, but rather whether they 
could adapt to the given conditions and maintain their sphere of influence and social statuses. 
A Generational Shift in Rural Villages 
Relying on local notables and their hamlet shinkōkai did not enable the GGK to reach the 
broader rural population. In Japan’s nation-building, the key to mass mobilization rested in the 
creation of “pillars of youth” in the countryside. As of 1932, the colonial government recognized 
that many Korean youth groups were still too “left-leaning” to implement its plan of total 
mobilization of Korean youth.  In the same year, the GGK notified the provincial governors of 68
“the basic principle” of youth group guidance: “the fundamental mission of youth groups is to 
improve personal character and increase physical strength through the power of mutual moral 
training [shūyō] of youth.”  69
The government established two programs for young men in the countryside between the 
late 1920s and 1930s: the guidance of elementary school graduates [sotsugyōsei shidō] and the 
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revitalization youth groups [shinkō seinendan] under shinkōkai supervision. In 1935, 12,736 
became model graduates,  and in 1938, 156,761 Korean youth became members of 3,056 shinkō 70
seinendan.  If these numbers of participants reflected reality, these programs easily surpassed 71
the reach of nationalist and socialist youth groups that had grown “like bamboo sprouts” in the 
early 1920s. This was because the target population of the new governmental programs was not 
the most privileged elite youth, but elementary school graduates. Although still limited in scope 
to young men who could afford elementary education, these groups under the Rural 
Revitalization Campaign began to form a version of the Rural Youth Industry which provided 
social mobility to elementary school graduates.  
The story of Kim Yŏng-han, a villager born in Kwangsǒk’s Ch’ŏndong hamlet, shows the 
ways in which a youth’s life evolved around the Rural Revitalization Campaign. Although he 
was not wealthy enough to pursue education beyond elementary school, Kim Yŏng-han came 
from a relatively prominent family. His great grandfather had been a lower-rank bureaucrat 
[muban] who took a position of a village head in 1900, and his grandfather was a sǒdang 
teacher.  Although most of their land was lost in the grandfather’s generation, Kim Yŏng-han’s 72
father attended the Usin School. Its modern-style education gave its graduates an opportunity to 
enter new occupations such as schoolteachers and village officials. But because his brother-in-
law was an imprisoned independence activist, Kim Yǒng-han’s father was blocked from 
obtaining an official job and instead worked at exchange markets in port towns. Born in 1920, 
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Kim Yŏng-han faced the combined pressure of financial difficulty and a proud family lineage. In 
1928, he entered the Usin School as his father had done before him. When the school became a 
public elementary school the following year, he passed the exam to become a second-grader. 
Since the Kwangsŏk elementary school had only a four-year program, he entered into the fifth 
grade of the Nonsan elementary school in 1932 and commuted three miles everyday until he 
graduated two years later. 
Kim received his first official title when he finished the four-year program as one of the 
two model graduates of the elementary school. The model graduate program reflected the 
changing focus of education starting in 1924 from academic knowledge toward agricultural 
training.  Schools first established vocational (or agricultural) programs to teach farming 73
techniques and the use of new fertilizers.  The guidance of graduates began in ten schools (102 74
graduates) in Kyŏnggi province in 1927 as a pilot program. With the success of its expansion to 
41 schools and 900 graduates, the other provinces adopted similar programs between 1930 and 
1932.  Kim Yŏng-han belonged to the first generation of model graduates in South 75
Ch’ungch’ŏng province.  
As a model graduate, Kim became a walking advertisement for the Revitalization 
Campaign. He had to attend ceremonies as a new “pillar” of the village. “It was quite 
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troublesome because every time the school had an event, they called up model graduates,” he 
recalled, “no matter how busy you are, you cannot not go.” He also remembered that “there were 
many benefits as well.” One of them was easy access to fertilizer and livestock.  The model 76
graduate program encouraged new agricultural methods characterized by the heavy use of 
fertilizer.  With these techniques and knowledge, the model graduates were supposed to 77
challenge the advantage of wealthier farmers, including Japanese, and raise the morale of 
average Korean farmers.  78
The model graduate guidance was the first step in creating “pillars of youth” in the Rural 
Revitalization Campaign, and colonial bureaucrat Masuda Shūsaku called it an outstanding 
program unique to Korea.  This guidance, of course, emphasized moral training in addition to 79
productivity and scientific farming. Yahiro Ikuo, a leading bureaucrat in Korean rural social 
work, summarized the purpose of the graduate guidance: “to foster good farmers, good villagers, 
useful people, and people who contribute to the village.” The greatest importance was placed on 
the spirit of hard work. “Never spare a moment but work” was the core principle.  In the ideal 80
scenario, the young graduates would transmit their high morale to their families and 
communities. Yahiro argued that these graduates had already had a great impact: 
[Among the model graduates’ families] there are many that fell into financial difficulties 
because the fathers did not work diligently and wasted money. Once a model graduate 
made a serious effort to restore the family business and showed  good results, his father 
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began to work together with him. So did his mother and younger siblings, leading the 
entire family to hard work. In another family, even a blind brother was led to operate a 
rope-weaving machine and make straw storage bags with his wife… In many places, 
graduates teach writing and math to uneducated children in the neighborhood in night 
classes. Others teach how to make compost. This is a spark of the youth’s resolution to 
do something [for their communities].  81!
The program marked a new phase in which rural youth gained the opportunity to subvert 
one particularly stubborn sort of social hierarchy—one based on age. Japanese bureaucrats 
repeatedly noted that the rigid age and class hierarchies of the yangban families remained 
unchanged in the villages. “It is truly not an easy thing for young people around 20 years old to 
stand above older leaders to lead the hamlet,” Masuda argued as late as 1936.  A governmental 82
report argued that because Korean society “despise[d] young people,” youth organizations had 
been hampered in their development.  The graduate guidance program was therefore designed to 83
“recruit those who share a same age-cohort feeling.”  Kim Yŏng-han remembered that, as a 84
model graduate, he did receive unusual respect from villagers. Although he also said that the 
“model graduates did not have the power to guide others,” as the Japanese bureaucrats claimed 
they should, the experience planted in him an identity as a leader of a new generation.  Yet, the 85
program did not touch the class hierarchy and may even have helped to reinforce it, since most 
model graduates came from relatively well-off farming families.  The schooling rate for Korean 86
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male children in the countryside in South Ch’ungch’ŏng remained as low as 30 % in the early 
1930s, and 80% of the villagers were illiterate in both Korean and Japanese.  Graduates in rural 87
villages were thus not the average farmers, but a newly emerging “middling class”—those who 
could attend an elementary program, but were not wealthy enough to pursue higher education in 
the city and a position in colonial bureaucracy.  88
Being more privileged than average farmers, these model graduates hoped to pursue an 
educational career more than the GGK had anticipated. Kim Yŏng-han wanted to obtain more 
education in an engineering school in Japan. He went to a couple of private schools to prepare 
for the standardized exam while working part time as an agricultural instructor affiliated with the 
village office. In the local Yungjŏng School, village youth preparing for various exams taught 
one another without a teacher. Kim used mail-order lectures from the middle-school program of 
Waseda University in Tokyo, like Xu Chongfa in Taiwan. He tested his progress by sending his 
answers to the sample exams to the Japanese journal, Shikenkai (The Exam World), which then 
mailed him back his score.   89
Regardless of his aspirations to leave the village, Kim’s profile as a local leader expanded 
when he joined the shinkō seinendan. While preparing for the exam and working as an 
agricultural instructor, he was selected to be a member of the shinkō seinendan at the age of 16. 
Kim Yŏng-han explained that every village shinkōkai chose about 20 out of 100 youth and 
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formed shinkōkai seinendan to promote the custom reform and agricultural improvement. A 
Korean schoolteacher became the leader of the Kwangsŏk shinkō seinendan, and its members 
experimented with modern agricultural techniques in the school-owned collective farms.  They 90
also helped large landholders in farming to make collective savings. Like the model graduates, 
the shinkō seinendan members were given preference in the land re-distribution sponsored by the 
GGK to create owner-cultivators and in livestock loan programs. Despite the similarity of these 
activities to those of Japanese seinendan of the 1900s and 1910s, Kim Yǒng-han described the 
agriculture-centered shinkō seinendan in Korea as quite different from the Japanese seinendan, 
which had adopted military training early on. In our interviews, he corrected me repeatedly when 
I omitted the word “shinkō” in front of “seinendan.”  91
In his memory, the shinkō seinendan occupied a leadership position in village affairs and 
offered him a higher status than the model graduate program had done. Membership of shinkō 
seinendan was restricted to those widely recognized as accomplished farm youth. They wore 
new uniforms and caps, increasing their sense of being part of a select few. Kim recalled, 
“wearing the uniform made us feel very different. People whispered, ‘he is a model youth.’”  
Members regularly provided “hamlet guidance,” explaining current affairs and war situations to 
the villagers, most of whom were illiterate. Another responsibility of shinkō seinendan members 
was teaching farming techniques to female villagers. Women were rarely involved in agricultural 
production before the Revitalization Campaign, and many villagers remembered this change as 
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one of the most revolutionary aspects of the period.  After two years of work in the village 92
shinkō seinendan, Kim Yŏng-han found a job in Taejŏn, but because he was also a former model 
graduate, he returned to the village frequently to help out in seinendan activities.  93
Improving the status of young people without disrupting the local order was a 
prerequisite for the success of the Rural Revitalization Campaign. Local officials recognized 
that, while enforcing new life styles and work ethics, younger generations might meet opposition 
from older, traditional forces. When they were re-organizing hamlet shinkōkai groups, they tried 
to include both generations in leadership positions to mitigate the tension. Organizing youth in a 
separate group was one way to increase the space for youthful leadership without directly 
confronting the older generation.  In Kwangsǒk, the shinkō seinendan developed without 94
disrupting the order around the powerful landlords. Kim Yǒng-han recalled, “there was no 
opposition to the seinendan’s activities. Our work—mostly instruction in agriculture—did not 
evoke any resistance.”  Defining the role of the shinkō seinendan within the agricultural 95
production campaign helped to raise the status of youth without creating generational conflict. 
As in the Japanese and Taiwanese villages, the elementary school and schoolteachers 
were the center of both the rural campaign and youth organizations in Korea. But the function of 
the elementary school and the composition of student body differed. Compared to the 1930s in 
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Taiwan and the 1910s in Japan, the schooling rate in Korean villages remained low.  Students of 96
the elementary school already cleared the hurdle of devoting the cost and time to education. 
Graduates naturally cultivated their cohort identity as young leaders in the village, enhanced by 
the model graduate program and shinkō seinendan activities.  
In the Rural Revitalization Campaign, colonial officials tried to raise schooling rate and 
expected schoolteachers to influence the entire community. “Teachers go around to the model 
graduates’ homes in their leisure time—after finishing work on weekdays and on Saturday 
afternoons and Sundays. Even on boiling hot or severely cold days, they show up, get a plow, 
and take some compost to work together with the model youth. In fact, they do not ‘guide’ them 
but ‘work together,’” as the official Yahiro Ikuo explained the “grave mission” of teachers.  An 97
official in Kyŏnggi province, Cho Wŏn-hwan, argued that rural seinendan should develop based 
on the trust between teachers and students. “Only schools can serve as the source of youth 
guidance,” he argued, “youth guidance is about unconditionally influencing the youth through 
the virtue and feeling of the teachers.”  Thus, in the 1930s, the responsibility of teachers 98
extended far beyond teaching in the school curriculum. In some cases, “social education” was 
emphasized more than the school curriculum. In the mid-1930s, when the GGK started to 
support shortened elementary courses, consisting of one teacher offering two years of literacy, 
math, and vocational education in remote hamlets, local officials described the appropriate 
attitude of the teachers—“You have to be ready to be a father, not only a teacher, to children 
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from underprivileged families,” and “your entire family should be ready to be teachers to the 
whole hamlet.”  Teachers were considered almost like religious missionaries of assimilation 99
during the Rural Revitalization Campaign. 
The Post-1920 Generation  
Horizontal networks already existed among village youth in labor-sharing associations 
(ture) before Japanese rule. In a way, the colonial rural programs attempted artificially to 
reestablish old ture groups among graduates of the elementary school under colonial supervision. 
At the same time, the generation of Kim Yŏng-han represented a new type of villager who grew 
up in a different social environment. These young people were born after the March First 
Movement of 1919 and had no first-hand memory of youth politics, socialist mobilization, or 
governmental crackdowns in the towns during the 1920s. For them, colonial rule was an 
established fact and Japanese settlers were their neighbors. Their future prospects depended on 
how well they managed within the existing system. 
For this generation, the Japanese were no longer a monolithic colonial ruler—or the 
“Other,” as perceived by anti-colonial intellectuals of the 1920s—but a group with a variety of 
characteristics. In Kwangsŏk, Kim Yŏng-han developed amicable relationships with Japanese 
residents. He remembered that they had shared community life with Korean farmers, organizing 
seasonal festivals together, for example. “The rent charged by the Japanese landlords and the 
Oriental Development Company was half what the Korean landlords charged,” he repeatedly 
claimed. Overall, “the Japanese lived well with us,” he recalled.  This seems in stark contrast to 100
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the confrontation of Koreans and Japanese in the early 1900s and during and after the March 
First Movement. His interactions with the Japanese as a “pillar of youth” and local official 
allowed him to observe the dynamics in the Japanese community: “They still labeled themselves 
as ‘former-samurai’ class or ‘new citizens’ (former outcasts),” he remembered, and “those from 
Tokyo were arrogant,” often making fun of those from Okinawa.  His observations of Japanese 101
residents were sensitive to class, origin, occupation, and personal traits rather than casting a 
categorical image of colonial ruler. 
In fact, class became a larger source of frustration for Kim, and ethnicity (and race) 
became a subordinate category to class. Kim Yǒng-han was not only a part of the post-1920 
generation, who were the protagonists of rural youth mobilization of the 1930s, but also in the 
new “middling class.” They were better off than average farmers, but begrudged the line between 
themselves and those who could pursue higher education toward a bureaucratic career. Kim 
Yŏng-han’s situation was typical of sons of formerly wealthy but declining families. As the first 
son, he was under pressure to recover the family name and financially support the household. For 
many like him, the crackdown on nationalist and socialist activists—mostly college-educated 
elite—in the 1920s opened space for upward mobility. From his perspective, the Kwangju 
Student Movement between 1929 and 1931 seemed to belong to a different class because most of 
the activist youth came from the upper strata. Once they were blacklisted, their family members 
and relatives were blocked from official positions in the same way that Kim Yŏng-han’s father 
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had been.  With the harsh colonial crackdown and the youth training programs that started in 102
the 1930s, class hierarchy was shuffled, providing new opportunities to rural youth of his 
background. 
Overcoming class differences was a goal of other villagers as well. In the course of the 
1930s, average male villagers competed to join this newly emerging “middling class.” Many 
families sought elementary school education despite the financial burden. The schooling rate 
expanded especially in the average-to-lower strata of farmers. Between 1922 and 1932 in South 
Chǒlla, for example, the schooling rate of owner-tenants increased from 1.5% to 38.8%, and that 
of tenant farmers increased from 1.8% to 22.3%, while that of land-holding farmers remained the 
same (68% for landlords, 45% for owner-cultivators). Scholar Kim Puja argues that the boost in 
the national schooling rate in the 1930s—from 30% to 47.4% between 1930 and 1937—came 
from the “schooling fever” of average-to-lower farmers in the countryside and it continued until 
the end of the war.    103
The identity of model rural youth, separate from that of activist youth, was also shaped 
by the limits on information from Seoul and other cities to the countryside. In Kwangsŏk, only 
the school and hamlet heads subscribed to one national newspaper (Asahi shinbun) and one local 
(Chūsen nippō), and most villagers did not read them. Kim Yŏng-han did not even know that 
there were other newspapers like Tonga ilbo and Maeil sinpo until he was in the fifth-grade and 
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the names appeared in a school play. The shinkō seinendan were an important source of 
information, from which he learned about such things as the achievements of Korean athletes in 
the 1936 Olympics, news he relayed to other villagers through hamlet guidance. Apart from this, 
Kim had to depend on relatives in Seoul to send his family newspapers. He particularly liked 
reading serialized novels in these papers, but he did not know any nationally-famous authors, 
including Yi Kwang-su.  The limited exposure to news sources isolated these youth not only 104
from anti-colonial activism, but also from developing a sense of belonging to a wider colonial 
network of rural youth. South Ch’ungchǒng province published monthly newsletters, Kinnan 
geppō (Kinnan Monthly) from 1925 and Chūnan shinkō geppō (South Ch’ungch’ǒng 
Revitalization Monthly) from 1934 to encourage moral suasion programs in rural villages.  But 105
these publications did not create a shared discursive sphere in the same way that seinendan 
newsletters did in Japan. 
Nonetheless, this generation of this middling class suited the GGK’s policy of social re-
organization and the new emphasis on the “pillars of youth.” The colonial official Masuda 
Shūsaku divided central village figures into two groups: the older, wealthier, well-established 
leaders, and the “pillars of youth” from ordinary families. He warned that since the family 
reputation and age hierarchy formed the heart of local leadership, youth should not try to take the 
place of older leaders. However, his article emphasized the way to create pillars of youth through 
youth programs. In fact, the Rural Revitalization Campaign gradually turned middling-class 
farming youth into leading figures in village affairs. In the 1928 governmental list of central 
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figures in the shinkōkai, almost all were government officials or the landlord classes. In contrast, 
in the 1936 list, these strata were represented by only 29%.  There was a conscious effort on 106
the part of both the GGK and the youth themselves to shift the leadership role from traditional 
leaders to younger, less wealthy, farmers. 
Conclusion 
Through elementary schools, the model graduate program, and the shinkō seinendan, 
Kim Yǒng-han’s aspiration for local reputation, access to education, and job opportunities at the 
local office grew. Kim represented a new generation and a new middling class that regarded 
these colonial institutions as advantageous, rather than as a threat to their ethnic identity or social 
status in the way intellectual activists had in the 1920s. 
The “model rural youth” were limited by the low rate of schooling and literacy in Korea. 
The competition to get into elementary school was fierce among average villagers despite the 
GGK’s policy to expand elementary schools especially after they recognized that elementary 
school was a window for social opportunities. In South Ch’ungchǒng, schools could 
accommodate only 60,000 students out of 190,000 school-aged children in 1936. The newspaper 
Chosǒn chung’ang ilbo argued that the remaining children were in “an illiteracy hell.”  107
Graduates thought of themselves as a select group and pursued further education opportunities 
outside their home villages. Kim Yǒng-han’s story reveals that the lack of information flow 
between cities and the countryside prevented a common identity from developing across villages. 
The two leading Korean-language newspapers of the time, Tonga ilbo and Chosǔn ilbo, were 
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unknown even to Kim, who was an eager reader and an ambitious young man. This made 
villages more isolated in Korea than in Taiwan or Japan. 
At the same time, much like young men in rural societies in other parts of the Japanese 
empire, a particular class of the post-1920 generation aligned their interests with colonial 
programs. In Miyagi, rural youth generated a collective identity and found job opportunities in 
youth training institutions, creating the “Rural Youth Industry.” In Taiwan, relatively well-off 
elementary school graduates viewed the seinendan beneficial to obtain office jobs in the 
mid-1930s. After 1937, the ladder of youth training institutions created its own version of a Rural 
Youth Industry for average agrarian youth. In Korea, although it was available only to a limited 
number, young men like Kim Yǒng-han began to view themselves as local leaders and associated 
youth programs with social mobility in the early 1930s. The psychology of these youth, 
including their aspirations for educational success, desire for financial opportunity, feelings of 
marginalization, pride as select youth, and envy of urban students, led to the making of the 
“model rural youth”—the central force of assimilation in the eyes of GGK officials, or the 








Chapter 8:  
The Mobilization of Korean Rural Youth for Total War (1930s-1945) 
!
In the 1932 Rural Revitalization Campaign, the Government-General in Korea (GGK) 
began recruiting the younger population in the countryside for grassroots “kyōka” (moral 
suasion). A specific group of rural youth—those born after 1920 who graduated from elementary 
school—responded to the GGK’s strategy with a degree of enthusiasm since it provided new 
social opportunities. As a result, some Korean villages witnessed a change in the generational 
power relationship, even if small and slow, and a rise in the status of young men. The model 
youth had an authoritative voice when they relayed national news to illiterate villagers, and 
“revolutionized” women’s role when they taught agricultural methods to women. In the mid-to-
late 1930s, colonial authorities continued establishing youth training institutions to create ideal 
Japanese subjects in the Korea countryside, reflecting the acceleration of nation-empire building. 
As in other parts of the Japanese empire, the presence of the military and war in 
particular brought a major shift in the value of young male bodies. Since the agrarian ethos 
preached by the GGK always included a martial aspect, the slogans and methods of training for 
rural youth in the early 1930s did not suddenly alter when the Japanese empire entered the phase 
of total war in 1937. The alliance between colonial authorities and the “model youth” in the 
countryside culminated in the volunteer soldier program, which was celebrated as the most 
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prestigious achievement for male rural youth. The prestige of volunteer soldier guaranteed access 
to salaried jobs and respect from villagers. But because the war demanded total mobilization of 
the Korean population, the expansive scale of youth recruitment diminished the prestige of 
“model rural youth.” Just as military conscription in Taiwan had a different effect from the 
volunteer soldier program, the universal character of youth mobilization at the height of Asia-
Pacific War drove ambitious young men away from their alliance with colonial authorities. 
Instead they used their ability to find loopholes in the colonial system in order to maintain a 
sense of control over their own destinies. The location of the Korean peninsula, lying between 
the Japanese metropole and Manchuria, “the lifeline of the empire,” made Koreans more 
vulnerable to changes in the war situation than the Taiwanese. In the early 1940s, when Xu 
Chongfa and Huang Yuanxing in Taiwan reached the top of the ladder of youth training 
institutions, Kim Yǒng-han moved from cooperation with the state to a maneuver to escape labor 
conscription. This manifested the demise of the Rural Youth Industry, the mechanism that had 
linked mobilization and empowerment of youth. 
Recently, scholars such as Takashi Fujitani and Brandon Palmer have detailed the 
recruitment of Korean soldiers, the experiences of Korean youth in the Japanese military, the 
literary and cinematic propaganda, and state programs that forcibly integrated the Korean 
population into the wartime empire.  Here the perspective is inverted from the state to the 1
recruits and what these changes meant to their life decisions. The focus remains on the social 
sphere during the mobilization for total war. 
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The Merging Militaristic and Agrarian Youth Training 
The shinkōkai (revitalization groups) under the Rural Revitalization Campaign were 
assigned an intermediary role between the GGK and hamlet society in the early 1930s. They 
carried the message of Japanese agrarianism and re-organized agricultural labor at the household 
level. As in Japan, agrarianism and militarism were twinned from the start. More similar to Japan 
than to Taiwan, the influence of the military was visible in the daily life of Korean village youth. 
The central mission of the shinkō seinendan was to train youth for agrarian leadership 
under the banner of the Rural Revitalization Campaign. But military recruitment occupied an 
important place in designing the membership and activities. The membership had a strict age 
limit of 20 “because the officials assumed that members would join the military afterwards,” 
Kim Yǒng-han recalled.  He also considered that “the shinkō seinendan cultivated loyalty to the 2
state” in preparation for war mobilization.  Whether that was true or not, many of shinkō 3
seinendan members and model graduates of elementary schools became volunteer soldiers once 
the colonial government began recruiting them in 1938.  
Although training at the village level was largely focused on agricultural production, at 
the county and provincial levels, the shinkō seinendan conducted military drills. Once a year, 
village seinendan gathered in the country capital, Nonsan, for a week to practice drills. At the 
province-level, an army officer who usually taught middle school students offered “group 
training” in provincial cities, Kongju and Kapsa.  These training camps gave youth contact with 4
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other shinkō seinendan members. The instructors gave prizes based on their performances, 
raising a sense of rivalry between groups or counties. But these camps were too short to nurture a 
collective identity as “rural youth” or “South Ch’ungch’ŏng youth” unlike the symbolic “Xinzhu 
youth” in Taiwan.  
Throughout the empire, agrarian and military disciplines developed in sync. But owing to 
the life-long passion of Governor-General Ugaki Kazushige (1931-1936), the GGK promoted the 
fusion of agrarian and military values more deliberately than in Taiwan. A protégé of Yamagata 
Aritomo and Tanaka Giichi, Ugaki firmly believed in the role of the army in leading the masses 
to achieve national goals.
 
In 1925, for example, he expressed in his diary:  
Party politics is like a three-cornered battle and interrupts the flow of events. Only one 
party can hold power at any time. Thus, the work of leading our seventy million fellow 
citizens under the throne as a truly unified and cooperating nation in both war and peace, 
however you think about it, has been assigned to the army. The navy has but limited 
contact with the populace. Only the army, which touches 200,000 active soldiers, 
3,000,000 reserve association members, 500,000 to 600,000 middle school students, and 
800,000 youths, has the qualifications to accomplish this task.  5!
Following his own words, Ugaki established youth training centers [seinen kunrenjo] in 1926 
when he was the Army Minister. During his tenure as Governor-General of Korea, he initiated 
the Rural Revitalization Campaign, the elementary school model graduate guidance, and the 
shinkō seinendan for the goal of simultaneously promoting agrarian and military values.  
Besides these two main youth programs, the GGK and provincial governments promoted 
a number of training institutions specifically targeting young men in the countryside. Starting in 
1931, the GGK organized the All Korea Local Pillars of Youth Training Session for seven to ten 
#  288
 Ugaki Kazushige, Ugaki Kazushige nikki I (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1968), 497-498, in A Social Basis For Prewar 5
Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community, Richard Smethurst (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1974), the front cover.
days every year.  In 1933, Kyŏnggi province established the first agricultural training center in 6
Korea.  In South Ch’ungchŏng, an institution for rural female youth preceded that for male youth 7
by two months. In the Rural Women’s Training Center, founded in April 1934 in Yusŏng, for nine 
months 30 women between 17 and 22 years of age who had the elementary school degree 
learned the basics of agriculture, sericulture, apiculture, stockbreeding, and housekeeping 
techniques.  The Rural Youth Training Center in Yusŏng for male youth trained a larger group, 8
60 men between 20 and 30 years of age, also for nine months.  It adopted the popular camp 9
training advocated by the Japanese shūyōdan (The Moral Training Group), dividing the trainees 
into twelve households consisting of five family members, and forming two mock hamlets with 
six households each. Through this self-rule exercise, youth were supposed to learn methods of 
collective farming, agricultural renovation, effective financing, and a disciplined farmer’s life.  10
Within two years, South Ch’ŭngch’ŏng built two more rural youth training centers in Sŏch’ŏn 
and Yesan to train 30 young men each.   11
The main focus of the training in these institutions was to spread agronomic knowledge 
and nurture agrarian patriotism. The Yusǒng Rural Youth Training Center stated that it would by 
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no means turn into a school, but would remain as a “training dojo”  to teach the “Way of 12
Imperial Farmers.”  The trainees started each day at four a.m. with a prayer for the prosperity of 13
the nation ruled by the Emperor.  These institutions hung Ugaki Kazushige’s famous slogan 14
“shinden kaihatsu” (“spiritual field cultivation,” a pun on the “virgin field cultivation” policy of 
the Tokugawa era), which stressed the mastering of Japanese spirit. According to Ugaki, success 
in agricultural production had to accompany moral training through rituals at Shinto shrines and 
an embrace of religious faith, as well as learning the virtues of frugality and hard work.   15
The emphasis on the spiritual education of rural youth through these institutions 
seamlessly continued into the wartime mobilization after 1937. In September 1937, 241 
participants of the All Korea Pillars of Youth Convention gathered at the Chōsen Shrine to pray 
for the Japanese army’s success. The convention consisted of a number of lectures on rural 
youth’s responsibility in the time of war.  Policymakers advocated establishing more “farmers 16
dojo” [nōmin dōjō] because “farmers are the foundation of the nation and the source of people’s 
fresh blood.” Referring to German and Italian policies of dispatching urban youth to work in 
rural cultivation, an official of South Kyǒngsang province Ōno Kenichi equated the strength of 
rural youth with that of national defense. Ōno cited General Ishiwara Kanji, saying that “the 
basis of the military rests in the rural village, and the rural problem centers on the issue of 
morality,” highlighting the importance of moral education of rural youth.   17
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Career-Pursuing Rural Youth 
Did these youth training institutions in Korea affect young people’s lives as powerfully as 
those in Taiwan? In the Xinzhu youth training center, the trainees developed strong emotional 
ties with the instructors, based on which they cultivated a firm identity as “Xinzhu youth,” as 
well as “uneducated rural youth,” when they interacted with their counterparts from other 
regions. Young men in Xinzhu also considered the ladder of youth training programs as a path 
for new job opportunities. In these programs, they learned to embrace and voice Japanese 
nationalism both as a faith and a means that allowed them to compete effectively with urban 
youth. Some of these characteristics can be seen in the Korean youth institutions as well. For 
instance, there was a similar ladder of youth training institutions—from the graduate guidance to 
the shinkō seinendan, and then to the rural youth training center. In order to attend the rural 
youth training centers, youth had to be model members of village shinkō seinendan and be 
recommended by provincial governors.  18
Unfortunately, there are few accounts of what Korean youth experienced and how they 
felt in the training centers of South Ch’ungchŏng or anywhere else. The Japanese instructors 
claimed to develop emotional ties with the Korean trainees. The head of the training center in 
Yusŏng stated, “it is my principle that, as an instructor, my attitude toward trainees is based on 
sincerity and a warm heart as well as a relationship resembling fathers and sons.”  Their training 19
periods were significantly longer (nine months) than that in Xinzhu (30 days). Theoretically, the 
Korean trainees could develop warm, personal ties with one another and with the instructors.  
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Even if they had formed a personal bond, an identity as “uneducated rural youth” 
probably did not develop or provide an incentive to embrace Japanese nationalism to overcome 
feelings of inferiority. One main reason for this was that these trainees were relatively well-
educated youth. Just as model graduates and shinkō seinendan members came from a pool of 
relatively well-off families in the village, the trainees in the rural youth training centers were a 
new “middling class.” Even in 1938, the shinkō seinendan represented the “intellectual” class in 
many villages.  The training centers for rural young women, in particular, were regarded as 20
upper-class institutions. They required an elementary school diploma—rare among Korean 
women in the countryside.  “[The Rural Women’s Training Center] was the fashion center of the 21
village. These women, with the clicking of their high heels on the way to classes, appeared 
beautiful to me as a child,” one witness recalled.  After graduation from these institutions, most 22
men took job positions of village secretaries.  Although these youth were supposed to become 23
agricultural leaders in the village, because of the persistence of a strict age hierarchy, “no matter 
how much they spoke, the older villagers did not listen to them,” Kim Yǒng-han recalled. These 
youth found a better career path in clerical positions in local administration.  As a result, the 24
Korean young men who had climbed up the ladder of youth training did not have interactions 
with those from other parts of the peninsula. After their training at rural training centers, unlike 
the Taiwanese graduates who went on to the national Patriotic Volunteer Labor Corps Program, 
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they returned to the village and stayed there. Without much direct competition against their urban 
counterparts, the trainees retained a stable identity as new local “elites” in their villages.  
These men did not criticize urban youth as morally inferior, but envied their educational 
opportunities. “For seinendan members, graduates of middle schools and other higher education 
were the object of admiration,” Kim Yǒng-han remembered, “but it was unimaginable to go to 
middle school when graduating from elementary school was already so difficult.”  Despite the 25
hurdle, Korean youth could hardly abandon the hope of educational advancement, which was the 
most common path for urban, wealthy youth.  
This was counter to Ugaki and Japanese instructors who deemphasized careers based on 
higher education. Yet the state and ambitious youth continued to share an interest in creating (or 
being) the model rural youth. Kim Yǒng-han maintained a strong desire to pursue education, and 
when this was not feasible, his career path was set in local administration. At each step, his 
association with the model graduate guidance program and the shinkō seinendan served him as 
an asset. Kim found himself under increasing financial pressure after his father’s death in 1939. 
To support eleven members of the household, he first worked in a filature factory in Taejŏn. After 
a few months, when a Japanese official in the county office found out that Kim was a former 
“model youth,” he referred Kim to a Japanese coal retail company, Mikuni shōkai, where he 
nearly quadrupled his salary. Kim Yǒng-han began to use a Japanese name before the official 
policy of name change was implemented. He picked Kanayama as his surname because his 
relatives in Japan had been already using it, and the storeowner Nakashima Tōchi gave him the 
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first name, Eiichi, after the famous Japanese industrialist, Shibusawa Eiichi. Kim quit the store 
after two years because he wanted to take the exam for entering an engineer school in Osaka. In 
the meantime, the Nonsan county administrative office hired him and persuaded him to postpone 
going to Japan and continue working for the office. “I really wanted to start studying since I was 
already 21,” he said while showing me the school brochures that he requested from Japan. But 
his mother fell ill, and the war against the US started soon afterwards. Kim Yŏng-han realized, 
“there was no way I could go to Japan any more.”  26
Becoming a village secretary was the most popular route for ambitious young men in the 
countryside in the early 1930s. In the course of the decade, elementary school graduates 
outnumbered those of middle schools (or equivalent) in posts of village and town administration. 
By 1937, 86% were either elementary school or sŏdang (private schools) graduates.  Kim Yǒng-27
han also tried to become a village secretary right after his schooling, but had to wait until he 
would reach the age of 20 based on the regulation. A large number of village officials came from 
families with financial difficulties but prominent backgrounds like Kim. “To recover the lost 
status of the family” was a common pressure for them.   28
These youth were extremely eager to pursue higher positions and further education. They 
studied mail-order lectures from Japanese universities, discussed different types of standard 
examinations, and often submitted opinions to the journal Chōsen chihō gyōsei (Korean Local 
Administration) instead of sharing essays and poems with village youth like their Taiwanese and 
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Japanese counterparts. Perhaps because of their desire for upward mobility, the turnover of these 
posts was high, reaching 20% in the year 1937 alone.  At every turn in his life, Kim Yǒng-han 29
looked into multiple career options. At one point, he considered becoming a police officer 
because, although the salary was lower than village office positions, police officers appeared 
powerful in local affairs. As it turned out, the background check and physical examination were 
too strict for both Kim and his father. He investigated the elaborate requirements to become a 
teacher. Unlike Taiwan, in Korea the youth training institutions did not mean selective treatment 
for entry into a teaching career. It was nearly impossible for those without middle or normal 
school training to meet the requirement of passing exams in sixteen subjects in three years.  30
Kim was also keen on career paths available for middle school students. Becoming a military 
officer trainee, for example, was “such an accomplishment” for them.  Later, when there were 31
more kyōka training institutions for local officials and teachers in the 1940s, Kim recognized 
them mainly as a tool for promotion.  This career-oriented attitude among people of this class 32
and generation led them to see the shinkō seinendan and rural youth training centers as an 
attractive route to success. But their primary aspiration was entering a school in the city or Japan. 
Thriving in a Rural Youth Industry was not the only, or the most desirable, option for them.  
Through their pursuit for educational and career development, many Korean rural youth 
adopted the rhetoric of Japanese agrarian nationalism in public and private writings. In the Korea 
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Local Administration, young villages officials expressed a love for their home villages, showing 
their determination to “remain in a periphery and devote myself to agricultural development,” 
“bring benefits and happiness to the village,” and “be ready to bury my body here.”  The diary 33
of O Chǒn-bok, a young man who grudgingly became a farmer in South Chǒlla after quitting an 
upper-level elementary program, shows his embrace of Japanese agrarian teachings. While 
waiting to be hired by the village administration, he repeatedly reminded himself of the sanctity 
of hard work to overcome his everyday misery.  The popular ideas about love for one’s place 34
and a dedication to agriculture influenced these youth one way or another. They derived pride 
from the fact that they had overcome adversity by studying hard, echoing the typical story of 
Meiji Japan’s “risshin shusse” (“rising in the world”).  But many appeared to believe that they 35
deserved better, and their expressed determination “to remain in the village” often had a tone of 
self-sacrifice rather than the embrace of a dream occupation. 
Although they did not share an identity as the “uneducated,” their generational identity as 
“youth” seems to have grown significantly over the course of the 1930s. In the same way that the 
youth groups in county capitals in the 1920s was a disguise of generational power politics, one 
could observe a generational divide in village administration in the early 1930s: village advisors 
consisting of the old landlord class on the one side and an increasing number of young village 
secretaries on the other.  The young generation struggled to expand their power. They used the 36
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journal the Korea Local Administration to affirm their generational identity and assert the 
superiority of youth by advocating, “set up a youth group of village officials!” and “hire 
secretaries directly from model youth of the village” because the youth could bridge the 
administration and villagers much more effectively.  While age hierarchy remained the principle 37
of the village social system, the position of village secretary—and access to journals like the 
Korea Local Administration—provided these youth with more confidence than was possessed by 
the model graduate guidance or shinkō seinendan.   
Centralizing the Village Seinendan  
During the Rural Revitalization Campaign put forth by Governor-General Ugaki, youth 
training programs to inculcate agrarian ideals and patriotism spread and offered a ladder of social 
mobility to a new “middling class” of rural youth. This route of career development did not give 
these youth much occasion to compete against those from outside their village, county, or 
province. Although they used slogans and rhetoric of Japanese agrarian nationalism, their social 
environment was too isolated to feel responsible for the future of the empire at large. In Miyagi, 
the village seinendan played a central role in providing its members with a sense of direct 
connection to the empire. When the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, GGK officials 
established a central association of seinendan in order to strengthen a similarly direct tie between 
seinendan members and the imperial state. 
In 1937, GGK Ministries of Education, Agriculture, Police, and Home repeatedly issued 
notices to provincial governors to expand seinendan institutions, transferring the affiliation from 
the shinkōkai to country and provincial administrative offices. The start of the all-out war against 
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China added a sense of urgency to these notices: “Since the Northern China Incident… the 
gravity of the mission of the seinendan increased day by day… The seinendan is the most 
powerful organization to respond to national crises and conduct disciplined activities to meet 
social duties. Particularly in Korea, when reflecting upon the surrounding situation, this is felt 
even more deeply.”  These notices emphasized the shared destiny of Japan and Korea in the war. 38
At the same time, colonial officials hesitated to recruit all village youth because the seinendan 
had developed based on their exclusive, “elite” character. They still recommended that the range 
of the membership be limited to “those with solid principles among graduates of public 
elementary schools”  and continued to expand elementary schools in the meantime.  39
The gatherings of the centralized seinendan association were thoroughly militaristic, 
aiming at the transformation of young farmers into national soldiers. The inauguration ceremony 
of the Chōsen Seinendan Federation was held on September 24, 1938. More than 4,000 
seinendan members in their khaki uniforms marched and sang the Japanese anthem as well as 
Umi Yukaba, a song about preparing to die for one’s lord sung by Japanese and Taiwanese youth 
of the same period. They recited the “Oath As Subjects of the Imperial Nation” [kōkoku shinmin 
no seishi], prayed at the Chōsen Shrine, and gave three shouts of banzai (long live) to celebrate 
the solidarity of 150,000 Korean youth. They also visited the brand-new volunteer soldier 
training center and met the first Korean recruits. One member from North Kyŏngsang expressed 
his flush of emotion when he exchanged words with the volunteer soldier trainees.  
[When I heard their words,] so many emotions overwhelmed my heart, and I could only 
shed tears. We could not help but pray for their advancement and cry out from the 
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bottom of our hearts, “Volunteer soldiers! Please represent the youth of the peninsula 
and pursue the mission of an imperial subject.” I also deeply understood the degree of 
seriousness the authorities are giving to the seinendan movement.  40!
The names of two European fascist nations often appeared to support this centralization 
effort. The news on German and Italian youth activities provoked a sense of a global youth 
network. North Kyǒngsang provincial seinendan associations, for example, announced that they 
adopted the German Arbeitsdienst (labor service) as a “groundbreaking” program to train Korean 
youth.  The new German phrase gave a fresh image to the old slogan of “hardwork-ism” despite 41
that, in reality, volunteer labor programs had been widely practiced in the shinkō seinendan all 
over the peninsula and in other parts of the Japanese empire.  A gathering of the Chōsen 42
Seinendan Federation in April 1939 reminded a newspaper reporter of “the flourish of the Fascist 
group led by Mussolini, as well as the endeavor of young national heroes who contributed to our 
nation’s [Meiji] Restoration.” The article continued by arguing that “our Japanese seinendan is 
based on the Yamato spirit and is a unique organization which should be separated from the 
Italian Black Shirts, but there is no difference in the purpose of nurturing solid thoughts.”   43
The militaristic character was even more central in another major institution promoted by 
the GGK, youth training centers [seinen kurenjo]. It was the same institution initiated by Ugaki 
in Japan in 1926 that coexisted or merged with agricultural training programs in rural Japan. 
Youth training centers (separate from the “rural” youth training centers in Korea, which were 
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established by provincial governments) were introduced to Korea in 1927 to allow Japanese 
reservist associations to provide military training privately to Japanese settler youth.  In 1929, 44
the GGK started building youth training centers as attachments to elementary schools. Although 
these centers focused on Japanese youth residing in Korea, a portion (one-third to one-seventh) 
of the trainees were Korean men.  The total number of youth training centers remained low 45
(around 50-60) in the first half of the 1930s, but in 1938, the GGK planned to rapidly expand 
them. The youth training center became “the only institution” to prepare a large number of 
Korean youth, who did not have conscription duty, for war.  The GGK had built more than 46
2,000 centers by the end of the war,  and since 1940, every elementary school was supposed to 47
have one youth training center attached to it.  Its purpose was also re-written to target Korean 48
youth: 
The purpose of the youth training center is to provide the working youth who did not 
continue into upper school after elementary school and who are engaging in some 
occupation with teaching and training during time between their work in order to 
enhance their quality as imperial subjects, share their occupational skills, as well as 
conduct basic military training, and increase the defensive ability of the nation. On this 
point, it is the same as the youth school [seinen gakkō] in Japan.  49!
The emphasis on localities as the flip-side of centralization, widely seen in Japanese and 
Taiwanese wartime mobilization, became a trend in 1930s Korea as well. The compilation of 
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local histories and chronicles by schools and provincial governments became a widespread 
phenomenon around this time. Writings on South Ch’ungch’ǒng province often emphasized the 
tie between the ancient kingdom Paekche and Japan. Ugaki’s successor, Minami Jirō, argued that 
Paekche’s princes came to Japan and became top-rank bureaucrats in the Asuka period 
(592-710), and Japanese generals served the Paekche kingdom. He presented these exchanges as 
the foundation of “Nai-Sen ittai” (“Japan-Korea Unified Body”).  The locality of South 50
Ch’ungch’ǒng, often provoked in youth training in the province, was mobilized as part of Japan’s 
empire-wide nation-building. 
The centralization of the seinendan, the expansion of youth training centers, and the local 
chronicles all aimed at nurturing an identity as Japanese national-imperial subjects. In turn, the 
youth expanded their presence in imperial affairs through these institutions. As the Government-
General and the Japanese army increased their dependence on youthful manpower, they engaged 
Korean youth with a hope to control them through a strategy of co-optation. Youth themselves 
were well aware of the combination of risk and opportunities of wartime mobilization. The 
negotiation between the state and youth was most clearly exhibited in the volunteer soldier 
program. 
The Elite Volunteer Soldier Program 
 The Korean Special Volunteer Soldier System was introduced in February 1938, three 
years earlier than in Taiwan. In the first year of recruitment, 2,946 Korean youths applied for 400 
open slots, and both the numbers of applicants and slots increased to 303,394 and 6,300 
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respectively (in a ratio of 48:1) in 1943.  Although the ratio did not rise as high as that in 51
Taiwan, many Korean applicants, either voluntarily or forced, submitted applications signed in 
blood as well. In August 1944, the volunteer soldier program was absorbed into the conscription 
system and the first group of Korean conscripts entered the Japanese Army in December 1944.   52
The introduction of military service in Korea arose more from the need for youth 
education and governance of the wider population than from a shortage of military manpower.  53
In 1932, coinciding with the start of the Rural Revitalization Campaign, the Chōsengun, the 
standing army in Korea and a part of the Japanese army, considered the future possibility of 
soldier recruitment in Korea.  The army did not expect any significant boost in combat capacity 54
through this program. In fact, the number of slots the Chōsengun initially prepared was too small
—400 in 1938 and 600 in 1939—to be considered a serious expansion. Opinions Concerning the 
Korean Volunteer System, a 35-page report submitted to the Ministry of Army in Tokyo by top 
Chōsengun officials in June 1937, also stated that “it is absurd opportunism to regard the 
volunteer program as a sheer means to increase manpower.”  Instead, the primary goal was the 55
socialization effect of training select Korean youth in the Japanese army, as both Ugaki 
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Kazushige and Minami Jirō had believed since much earlier in their careers. These young men 
were expected to enhance the morale of society and propel further Japanization of the 
population, or in other words, provide a strong push for moral suasion [kyōka] campaigns. 
Another Chōsengun report showed its confidence in the role that the Korean volunteer soldiers 
would play in their home villages: 
Including Koreans in the army and making them directly experience and foster the 
imperial spirit will not only train and develop the volunteers’ own spirit, but will also 
have a tremendous impact on society after they are discharged and start to play the role 
of the chūken (pillars) of Korean youth back their home.  56!
The timing of introducing military service appeared optimal to officials of the GGK with 
the start of the Sino-Japanese War.  After all, Japanese officials had to be cautious in handing 57
weapons to Korean youth, who had shown more active anti-colonial movements than their 
Taiwanese counterparts—they had not forgotten the March First Movement two decades earlier 
or the Kwangju Student Movement more recently. The GGK and the Chōsengun carefully 
assessed the reactions of the Korean people to the new war situation. On the one hand, many 
Korean intellectuals had been demanding that the GGK open a path for military service for 
Korean youth and, subsequently, universal suffrage for the Korean population.  On the other 58
hand, there were “those who consider that the Japanese would strip them of their rights and 
exploit them as cannon fodder on the battlefield.”  Colonial officials had to fend off both 59
reactions to attain the best ideological effect and produce loyal Japanized citizens ready for total 
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mobilization. At the same time, some of the demonstrations that demanded military service 
struck colonial officials as sincere and real. The colonial police department reported about a 
meeting attended by 33 renowned Korean intellectuals in Seoul in November 1937 to organize a 
celebration for the introduction of military service. The report claims that they argued, 
“considering the international situation in East Asia, Koreans would remain an inferior race in 
East Asia if they missed this opportunity to stand up and serve in the military as Japanese 
citizens.”  Although the police and Chōsengun decided to disallow the celebration event, 60
“looking at the way they began the meeting with the Oath as Subjects of the Imperial Nation and 
‘Long Live the Emperor,’ as well as the sincere attitude of the presenters, the atmosphere of the 
place seemed more serious than any time before.”  The optimistic and celebratory tone 61
prevailed as the empire entered the war, which provided a favorable environment for initiating 
the militarization of Korean youth. 
As primarily an institution of moral suasion, the volunteer soldier program also adopted 
dojo-style training. Through six months of group living, the select trainees went through a rigid 
schedule from 5:30 a.m. to 9:45 p.m.  They prayed for the Emperor, cited the Oath as Imperial 62
Subjects, and sang Umi Yukaba. They had three or four hours of training time in every morning 
and afternoon, which consisted of spiritual lectures, academic subjects such as history and 
economics, military drills, and volunteer (construction) labor. They finished each day with seiza 
formal sitting to “reflect upon the training of the day at the center and pray for the happiness of 
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parents at home.” The center advocated “comprehensive lifestyle guidance,” which viewed even 
mealtime as an opportunity for acquiring Japanese mannerism (“do not make noise while 
eating,” “do not waste a drop or a grain of food”), understanding hygiene (“wash your hands,” 
“chew thirty times every time”), and gaining scientific knowledge (of nutrition, digestion, and 
parasites), as well as to think about larger national issues (agricultural renovation, knowledge of 
fertilizer, national food security), and so on.  As such, physical training was only a small part of 63
the trainees’ daily life. The main focus was to instill a solid identity as Japanese subjects by 
living an idealized Japanese regimen. 
Like the graduates of other youth training institutions, the ex-volunteer soldiers were 
expected to play a leadership role in village society. In August 1939, provincial governments set 
up “promotion corps” [suishintai], formed by the discharged volunteer soldiers, graduates of the 
volunteer training center who had not served in the army, and youth who went to other youth 
training institutions. They received special treatment as local leaders and the emblem on their 
shirts symbolized their elite status in the countryside. By November 1940, 1,500 young men 
worked in promotion corps to facilitate wartime mobilization. Many of these youth also became 
the heads of patriotic units [aikokuhan] that tied each household to the mass mobilization 
machine throughout Korea.  64
At the same time, the volunteer soldier enjoyed unparalleled prestige and obtained a 
clearly different status in the minds of Korean youth. Despite that the “volunteer fever” based 
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itself on many applicants who were more or less coerced to apply, once selected as volunteer 
soldiers, they were treated as national heroes.  It was by far the most admirable achievement for 65
rural youth to attain, to the extent that every time Kim Yŏng-han mentioned anything about the 
volunteer soldier program in interviews, he could not help but repeat that the “volunteer soldiers 
boasted of their status so much!”  Newspapers devoted entire front pages and more to reporting 66
the inauguration of the volunteer soldier training center, calling it “a historic first step” and “an 
epoch-making event in the history of rule of Korea.”  Such propaganda deployed by the GGK 67
and Korean intellectuals alike contributed to the renown of the volunteer program and directed 
nation-wide attention to the select trainees. Most of the trainees received cash from the “special 
volunteer soldiers support associations” and wealthy notables in their home counties. One trainee 
was reportedly sent off at the train station by a crowd of more than 4,000 people, and another 
received more than 800 yen.   68
The establishment of the volunteer soldier program and the nationalization of the 
seinendan and youth training centers were closely linked to each other. The majority of the 
volunteer soldiers were from the agricultural sector and graduated from six-year elementary 
schools. This pool of youth overlapped with members of the seinendan.  The GGK called the 69
seinendan the “central force” of national mobilization that would make the volunteer soldier 
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program and universal education possible.  Applicants to the volunteer program were also 70
encouraged to go to youth training centers beforehand because the training at the volunteer 
soldier training center was “like its review.”  The seinendan also took advantage of the prestige 71
of the volunteer program in order to attract public attention. It was not a coincidence that the 
inauguration of the Chōsen Seinendan Federation took place only three months after the nation-
wide celebration of the volunteer soldiers training center, where the seinendan members had an 
arranged meeting with the brand-new volunteer soldier trainees. 
Through these institutions, the GGK aligned closely with male youth of Korea. “The old 
leaders long grounded in the Chinese classics are deeply affected by the thought that ‘soldiers 
should be despised.’ They could not understand the volunteer soldier program,” Governor-
General Minami Jirō commented.  Emphasizing the generational divide, the GGK attempted to 72
establish a direct tie with Korean rural youth. Resembling the ways in which being “young” was 
translated into a superior status in the wartime Taiwanese and Japanese countryside, the 
masculine body of the volunteer soldier was taken to symbolize a dramatic change in status for 
young men in the Korean countryside. 
Unique in the reception of the Korean volunteer soldier program, however, was youth 
seeing it in the context of their aspiration for educational achievement. From the beginning, 
flashes of academic prestige associated with the program inspired the trainees. The first group of 
trainees stayed on the campus of Imperial University of Keijō, the only national university in 
Korea, for three months until the training center’s facility was completed. The instructors noticed 
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that the trainees were awed by the academic setting and felt deeply proud of this experience.  73
Many of the trainees planned to continue schooling, especially in the military establishment, 
after their service. In an interview, the trainees expressed that “[as for the prospect after the 
service], I am not sure about the situation yet, but would like to go to the upper school in the 
army,” and “many of us want to go to military officers’ school in Tokyo or other army-related 
schools.”  Chosǒn ilbo reported that some of them, indeed, were admitted to the army’s 74
engineering school.  75
The trainees’ aspiration for school-based careers was not what the GGK originally 
intended. Colonial officials had expected to recruit youth from upper-class and educated families 
and turn them into pillars in their local areas because they were the ones who had demanded 
military service in Korea.  The result was the opposite. They ended up recruiting mostly rural 76
agrarian youth and turning them into more school-seeking youth. The GGK accommodated and 
took advantage of the desire of these ambitious young men from the countryside, but did not hide 
their contempt for the wealthy class: 
From the fact that sons of those with high status, academic degrees, or wealth are 
extremely few [among applicants] shows that Korea still has the tendency to look down 
upon military service. People of the wealthy and leading classes enthusiastically 
welcomed the proclamation of the [volunteer soldier] program. But when it comes to 
volunteering, do they not commit a contradiction by recommending others but not 
allowing their own sons [to apply]?   77!
#  308
 “Chōsen shiganhei kurenjo sankanki” Chōsen no kyōiku kenkyū 121 (October 1938): 86.73
 Kuramoto Hiroshi, “Shigansha kunrenjo hōmonki,” Chōsen chihō gyōsei (December 1938): 44.74
 “Chiwonbyŏng Yi-kun: Yukkun konggwa e hapgyok” Chosǒn ilbo, December 19, 1939, 2, for example.75
 Palmer, Fighting for The Enemy, 44-45.76
 Kaida Kaname “Shiganhei seido no genjō to shōrai eno tenbō,” Konnichi no Chōsen mondai kōza 3 (Seoul: 77
Ryokki renmei, 1939): 27-28.
The disappointment in upper-class youth only increased the value of rural elementary 
school graduates. Comparing them with most middle school graduates who did not even apply, 
an editor of Maeil sinpo argued that, “I express respect for the pure patriotism of elementary 
school graduates” who rushed to apply.  At the local level, too, middle school graduates were 78
notorious for being lazy and unproductive when hired by village offices.  The interactions 79
between colonial officials and middle school graduates convinced the GGK even more of the 
reliability of “model rural youth.” 
In addition to being viewed as a step toward educational advancement, the volunteer 
program brought a benefit in job prospects, especially for the early trainees. Like their Taiwanese 
and Japanese counterparts, they were promised a special advantage in obtaining jobs after 
discharge, particularly in the police force and local administration.  “Early applicants 80
encouraged one another to apply, saying that they could become village secretaries afterwards,” 
Kim Yǒng-han said.  For the first few years, not all volunteer soldiers served in the military 81
after training, let alone deployed to the battlefield. Once they returned to their home villages and 
became village secretaries or police officers, they were exempted from further military service.  82
In other words, one way out of military service, seen better in retrospect, was to graduate from 
the volunteer soldier training center early on and get settled as local officials during the process 
of war mobilization.  
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Youth under Total Mobilization 
The various youth training programs focused on elementary school graduates to cultivate 
a reliable layer of national “pillars” in the early 1930s. But the war drove the GGK to build a 
more inclusive network for total mobilization. Soon the youth programs were transformed into 
institutions that would reach every young male villager. The series of new regulations and 
programs in the 1940s moved toward total inclusion. Although historical scholarship has tended 
to depict the state steadily intensifying its control over the population through the 1930s until the 
end of war in 1945, from the viewpoint of the youth, total mobilization was not a continuation 
from previous programs that opened up new career opportunities. It required new strategies to 
counter the state power over their lives. Rural youth like Kim Yǒng-han maneuvered to avoid 
control by the state by choosing which cog of the war machine he would become.  
Total mobilization on the Korean peninsula was largely managed by the Chōsen League.  
Established as a semi-governmental organization in 1939, it promoted the programs of National 
Spiritual Mobilization and built a network of aikokuhan (patriotic units) to reach every 
household in Korea. Aikokuhan, similar to the tonarigumi in Japan or the baojia strengthened in 
Taiwan, oversaw mutual cooperation and policing among ten or so households to fulfill the 
mandatory contribution of rice and metal, reform daily customs, and reinforce thought policing 
of their group.  Compared to the revitalization groups [shinkōkai] of the Rural Revitalization 83
Campaign, which were supposedly voluntary organizations, aikokuhan groups were compulsory 
and left little space for initiative of the villagers. 
#  310
 Kokumin seishin sōdōin Chōsen renmei, Chōsen ni okeru kokumin seishin sōdoin (Seoul: Kokumin seishin sōdōin 83
Chōsen renmei, 1940), 1-58. 
Ideologically, Spiritual Mobilization did not depart from what former Governor-General 
Ugaki Kazushige founded in the 1930s. His famous slogan of shinden kaihatsu (spiritual field 
cultivation) functioned as the moral basis of the new movement.  In 1939, Korean agriculture 84
was damaged by a severe drought, and more than half of the farming population harvested less 
than 30% of the average annual yield. Even the drinking water in wells dried up.  To recover 85
from the famine and turn Korea into a “military base for the continent,” increasing agricultural 
production became an even more urgent task assigned to the villages. Journalists echoed the 
importance of “the re-organization of agriculture” to accelerate the programs initiated by the 
Ugaki administration.  Although industrial production was expanded in the northern part of 86
Korea to meet military needs, agrarianism and the “farmers’ spirit” lost no importance in the 
campaign. Agrarian ideals and militarism were still twinned. “The farmer’s dojo is a military 
camp for farmers,” argued Watanabe Toyohiko, who happened to be a former director of 
education in Miyagi who became an expert in agricultural development in the GGK 
bureaucracy.   87
The seinendan was also transformed from “middling-class”-centered institutions to an 
all-inclusive network. In January 1941, Vice Governor-General Ōno Rokuichirō issued a decree 
to re-organize the seinendan through the provincial governors. Now called the Chōsen Seinendan 
(Korean Youth Association), it included all male youth between the ages of 14 and 30 who were 
not attending school and, for the first time, unmarried female youth between 14 and 25 years of 
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age.  Unlike the earlier seinendan, the central goal was to teach uneducated children and youth 88
Japanese language and military discipline.  As always, the question of universal schooling 89
accompanied the discussion of military service and total mobilization, but even with a rapid 
increase in school facilities, the schooling rate barely reached 50% in the 1940s.  The previous 90
seinendan for elementary school graduates were re-named “seinentai (youth corps)” as branch 
units of the Chōsen Seinendan. The new regulation included the earlier emphases on Emperor-
centered nationalism, the unity between Japan and Korea, group discipline, and improvement of 
agricultural production. It also stated that the main character of the new organization rested in 
nurturing “the ideologies of national defense.”  To achieve this goal, the youth corps and youth 91
training centers were expected to closely coordinate their military training programs.  
On paper, with the help of the network of aikokuhan (patriotic units), the expansion of the 
seinendan led to a rapid increase in participants. At the same time, the jump from the pre-1941 
seinendan was so significant that it widened the gap between reality and the fantasy of official 
statistics. Kim Yǒng-han argued that the years when he participated (1936-1940) were the most 
active for the village seinendan, but as war mobilization progressed, many youth had to leave 
their villages for military and industrial service. Based on his experience, Kim did not believe 
that the village seinendan functioned as a mandatory institution although he knew it started to 
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recruit youth with no schooling.  For him, village youth groups continued to refer to the 92
exclusive groups of model youth until the end of the war. Newspapers of the time reported that 
many Koreans mistrusted the intentions behind the change in the nature of the seinendan, 
worrying whether it would send youth to other places as forced labor or young women to 
Manchuria for forced marriage.  Overall, the establishment of universal seinendan to train 93
uneducated youth seems to have failed entirely.  
The peak of total mobilization for the young male population was mandatory military 
conscription, which began in Korea upon request of the Tokyo government in 1944.  The 94
conscription program was different fundamentally from the volunteer soldier program in a way 
that resembled the Taiwanese case. Minami Jirō had already expressed his hope to implement 
universal conscription in Korea when he became Governor-General of Korea in 1936.  It was 95
not a surprise, therefore, when the conscription program was announced in 1942, but it triggered 
a mixture of expectation, confusion, and resistance throughout the peninsula. For Korean 
intellectuals, the conscription decree provided leverage for negotiation when they pressed for 
suffrage and universal education. Both issues gained approval from Tokyo toward the end of the 
war.  For the youth themselves, the decree gave very little incentive other than the hope that 96
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they might be better fed in the army than in their villages should they be hit by famines like those 
of 1939 and 1942.  
The campaigns of moral suasion had not prepared impoverished Korean farmers for 
mandatory conscription. The increase in elementary schools in the 1930s came too late. In the 
1940s, more than 70% of the male population of conscription age did not understand Japanese.  97
If recruited, they would need basic training in the Japanese language. Because the new seinendan 
managed to do so little to address this problem, on the eve of the start of conscription, the GGK 
hurried to find a solution. In Japan and Taiwan, this was not a significant problem since 
elementary schools were widespread, and night schools and the seinendan helped to maintain the 
academic level of the graduates. Lacking a similar capacity, the GGK had to start a new program 
in 1942, the renseijo (training facility), for youth with little schooling.  In the training facility, 98
working youth received Japanese language training for 12 hours a week, 600 hours a year.  But 99
this makeshift program had little effect. In 1944, 68% of conscription-aged youth still did not 
understand Japanese and the government had to give the conscription exam in Korean.  100
Since the government intended Korean manpower mainly for use as industrial labor, the 
scope of enlistment was much narrower in Korea than in Japan.  Still, the loopholes in the 101
system had the effect of filtering out those with sufficient means to maneuver through it. As a 
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result, the majority of conscripts came from the poor strata of farmers, which then lost manpower 
in the already desperate rural conditions. Korean conscripts were mostly deployed in 
administrative roles and as rear support troops, and many anecdotes indicate that Korean youth 
frequently evaded the conscription exam or deserted from the army.  Japanese officials issued a 102
statement that the confusion was normal considering that Japan too had met resistance when it 
first implemented universal military service in the Meiji era.  But this only underlined the 103
difficulty of recruiting Korean youth from poor families and transforming them into reliable 
soldiers.  
Larger in scale of mobilization was the employment of military employees [gunzoku] and 
forced labor that absorbed young manpower from rural villages. As in Taiwan, many who were 
hired as military personnel between 1937 and 1941 had relatively high educational background 
or technical skills. They served as interpreters, technicians, sailors, and drivers.  After 1941, the 104
scale of recruitment for military contractors expanded. Some Koreans became prison guards for 
POWs in Southeast Asia and were convicted as Class B or C war criminals by the Allies in trials 
after the war. Others were construction workers who built military bases in newly occupied 
South Pacific islands.  Between 1937 and 1945, Japan employed 4.1 to 7 million Koreans as 105
laborers, either in private companies or government agencies, and later as conscript laborers. 
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Millions were re-located to Japan, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. Most came from rural areas, 
and sometimes they were conscripted so suddenly or forcefully that they could not even inform 
their families.  Since the families of labor conscripts were not allowed to talk about it, villagers 106
did not know how many youth went as laborers, or where they went, but Kim recalled that “most 
of my seinendan friends either went to the military or were recruited as laborers.”  
The result of the labor mobilization—nearly 10% of the Korean population were forced 
to relocate to China, Manchuria, Japan, or the Pacific—was a rapid disappearance of people from 
rural villages.  Combined with voluntary migration, almost no young people of around 20 years 107
of age remained in the southern parts of Korea by 1943, a mobilization officer witnessed.  The 108
age makeup in a village in South Chǒlla in 1944 shows the disappearance of working-age men 
and women—mostly between 20 and 40 years of age. The clear prospect of leaving the village 
deprived new institutions like the all-in seinendan and training facilities of any real effect on the 
village life. In this situation, the Rural Youth Industry was at its demise— the end of village 
youth leadership both in ideological terms and as available manpower. 
The Last Dream of a New Frontier: “Rural Elite” Youth and the Totalitarian State 
As wartime mobilization engulfed the lives of a large number of Koreans, the middling-
class youth who previously took advantage of the governmental youth training institutions in the 
countryside found themselves in a difficult position. The emphasis on “youth,” which had earlier 
helped young men counter the age hierarchy in village society, continued in slogans and 
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propaganda. But in the time of “national emergency,” it had a new meaning—the demand that 
youth submit to state control.  
One way to avoid the complete loss of independence was to find the loopholes in the 
mobilization system. Becoming a village secretary, for example, provided young people with 
some protection from mobilization. Another option, especially if they clung to a dream of 
educational success, was to join a prestigious program like the volunteer soldiers. The GGK 
prepared a few new programs with high prestige to co-opt the sense of elitism, such as the Young 
Volunteer Corps for the Development of Manchuria-Mongolia [Manmō kaitaku seishōnen 
giyūgun] and the Korea Agricultural Patriotic Service Youth Corps. 
Kim Yǒng-han had been jumping successfully from one position to another over the 
course of the 1930s. When the Pacific front of the war began in late 1941, he was working at the 
Nonsan county office. He was content with his work, recalling that “many villagers envied me 
because I was only 20 years old or so and had already become a local official.”  As the war 109
progressed, he noticed that “Japanese were disappearing” from his workplace as they were 
conscripted into the military.  In 1944, he was surprised by the news that even the son of his 110
Japanese superior studying at Tokyo Imperial University had become a “volunteer student 
soldier.”  When military conscription was about to start in Korea, Kim missed the mandatory 111
conscription age by one year. A more likely fate for someone in his situation was labor 
conscription. Like many other youth in his position, Kim studied the exemption rules carefully: 
“village and town secretaries, police officers, and higher-rank officials were exempted… many 
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middle-school graduates suddenly rushed to apply for positions of village secretary for this 
reason.”  His official job in Nonsan county would not exempt him. 112
He found a way around the rules by joining a new position managed by the county office. 
Kim remembered that “the county office needed me to stay so it sent me to a local unit of the Air 
Defense Guards—they did that to many good employees.” He first had to pass an exam on the 
identification of different models of aircraft, but once he joined the Air Defense Guards, it 
guaranteed him an exemption from labor conscription. His life as a guard involved around-the-
clock three-hour shifts of training, watching, and resting. He considered it “exactly the same as 
the military, with uniforms and caps all provided, like the seinendan.” Some former seinendan 
members also joined local units that consisted of 70 to 100 guards each. The Air Defense Guards 
not only helped him remain in Nonsan county, but also offered the possibility of promotion. “The 
supervisor told us that, if Japan wins, the guards who worked hard would receive the Eighth 
Order of Merit,” said Kim and explained how honorable that would have been. In the end, there 
were no serious air raids in Korea, only a few minor bombings near Nonsan, which destroyed a 
bridge and construction materials. Kim Yŏng-han was still serving in his unit when he heard the 
news of the Japanese surrender in August 1945.   113
Besides seeking a position in which they could escape state control, many middling-class 
youth chose to join other programs outside Korea that would potentially bring better social status 
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and job prospects.  Manchuria, which appeared to many to be a solution to domestic problems 114
in Japan and Korea, including lack of resources, inter-ethnic tensions, and persistent rural 
poverty, was depicted as a new frontier for model rural youth. The government set up “the Young 
Volunteer Corps for the Development of Manchuria-Mongolia” first for Japanese rural youth, but 
invited Koreans to join in 1940. The GGK called this program the foundation for the 
development of Manchurian agriculture and the realization of Manchukuo ideals of racial 
harmony. Admission was highly competitive and the trainees were selected from elementary 
school graduates between 15 and 20 years of age. They went through eight months of training in 
Kangwŏn province and three months in the famous Uchihara training center in Ibaraki, Japan, 
before spending a year and six months in training facilities in Manchuria. This program was 
solely for training purposes and only provided three yen salary per month in addition to basic 
daily needs. The greatest attraction emphasized by the GGK was that Korean youth would share 
the experience with Japanese youth, embodying the “racial harmony” upon which Manchukuo 
was alleged to be built.  The stress on the power of “youth” in the new frontier and the strict 115
qualification requirements boosted the prestige of the program in the eyes of middling-class 
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youth, quite unlike the mass migration of poorer peasants to Manchuria that the GGK conducted 
simultaneously.   116
Another frontier advertised by the GGK to ambitious rural youth was the Japanese 
countryside. Especially after the beginning of the Pacific war, traveling to Japan as something 
other than a laborer became unimaginable, forcing Kim Yǒng-han to abandon his plan to study in 
Japan. Unless they had significant capital of their own, study trips through the seinendan or local 
village offices were the only way to visit Japan. 70 years later, Kim still wished that he had had a 
chance to join a study trip to Japan as a model seinendan member, a program that did not exist in 
Kwangsǒk village. What helped increase the morale of youth like Kim was the Korea 
Agricultural Patriotic Service Youth Corps. It began in 1940 and dispatched rural youth to Japan 
to learn Japanese agricultural practices. Fifteen times between 1940 and 1944, a group of 
between 20 and 300 youths were sent to rural villages and lived for one month mainly with the 
farming families whose sons or fathers were away or died in the military. The participants were 
selected from the graduates of rural youth training centers.  
Journalist Kagawa Tomomi called them the “troops of the sacred plow”—they marched 
in an orderly fashion in their military-like uniform, sporting a seinendan-like flag.  In addition 117
to capitalize on the desire of youth to travel to Japan, the program produced many “beautiful 
anecdotes” as they called, which depicted the harmony between Japan and Korea for propaganda 
purposes. GGK officials reported such comments of the participants, as “I was so moved because 
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the families welcomed us in the rain as if we were returning soldiers”  and “Japanese elderly 118
work very hard. They work nearly three times harder than Korean youth. I wonder how they can 
work so much.”  Women’s labor and the centrality of ancestral worship intrigued these 119
youth.  The Japanese families also offered enthusiastic comments about the sincerity and 120
diligence of Korean youth. They were often amazed at their mastery of the Japanese language 
and their politeness. Many villages were divided about accepting Korean farmers, but after they 
lived with the trainees, “their doubt turned to gratitude… the villagers understood the real 
Korean people.” “An aged grandmother was exhilarated to have a Korean young man as if her 
grandson had come back.” “Our bonds deepened over the short period of one month. We grew 
close to each other, and it felt as if I was sending off my own son at their tearful departure.”  121
These programs to maintain the morale of rural elite youth notwithstanding, the 
contradictory reality of intensifying total mobilization overwhelmed the GGK’s intentions. In the 
county office, Kim Yǒng-han confronted the sabotage of mobilization efforts by government 
agencies and villagers alike—the provincial government rarely provided the full amount of food 
stipulated to by rationing to county or village offices, and villagers often tried to escape the 
mandatory contribution of food and other materials. In this widening gap between the state and 
villagers, the model rural youth who had earlier managed to bridge both worlds as “pillars” of 
the nation lost their leverage in village society. State efforts to align with rural youth were at an 
end. 
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Did the Rural Youth Industry in South Ch’ungch’ǒng, flourishing in a short period of 
time between the 1930s and very early 1940s, instill an identity as Japanese subjects in rural 
youth, particularly? This is a difficult question to investigate today because, unlike Xu Chongfa 
and Huang Yuanxing in Taiwan, their Korean counterparts would avoid the topic to protect 
themselves from being accused as colonial collaborators. Yet, descriptions of Kim Yǒng-han’s 
everyday life indicate that they did not question or react against the rhetoric of Japanese 
nationalism. Kim’s favorite reading was battlefield reports written by a popular Japanese author, 
Hino Ashihei. He enjoyed a lecture by Japan’s leading agrarian activist and scholar, Yamazaki 
Nobuyoshi. Kokumin sōryoku (Total Strength of the Nation), the GGK’s wartime magazine, was 
Kim’s primary source of news. He remembered that he was greatly inspired by a story in the 
magazine about an entire class of female students in Maizuru (Muhak) Woman’s High School in 
Seoul applying to join the women’s volunteer corps [teishintai].  Like Taiwanese and Japanese 122
rural youth in the early 1940s, Korean youth like Kim incorporated the prose and propaganda 
used by the state into their lives, finding even entertainment and inspiration in them. Youth 
programs lost attraction as a source of social opportunities for Kim Yǒng-han, and he did not feel 
the same pressure to become a volunteer soldier as Huang Yuanxing. Nonetheless, in the youth 
training and pursuit of successful career, he came to accept the rhetoric and ideology of Japanese 
nationalism through a similar mechanism that produced a nationalistic population in other parts 
of the Japanese empire. In other words, it was despite the brutality of total mobilization—not 
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because of it—that a group of ambitious youth internalized a sense of Japanese agrarian 
nationalism based on their aspirations and emotions created within their immediate social 
surroundings. 
Conclusion 
The mobilization in 1930s Korea rested on the belief of Governor-General of Korea, 
Ugaki Kazushige, that agrarianism and militarism constituted the foundation of the Japanese 
national spirit. For Ugaki, an army general and national politician, Korea was a field of operation 
where he could demonstrate his abilities as a capable leader.  When the Sino-Japanese War 123
began in 1937, Taiwan had claimed to be more successful in raising the schooling rate, which 
added to a sense of rivalry between the two colonies.  To compensate for the low literacy rate 124
in the Korean countryside, the GGK hurried to expand youth training programs and elementary 
schools.  
The total nature of the mobilization, including military personnel, labor conscription, and 
patriotic units networks, however, had a reverse effect of preventing ambitious youth from 
devoting themselves to the imperial cause of war. In Korea, the “middling-class” youth of the 
post-1920 generation created the Rural Youth Industry of a smaller scale during the Rural 
Revitalization Campaign. After the start of the war, unlike Taiwan, where its own version of the 
Rural Youth Industry had just begun to emerge, total mobilization in Korea reduced their access 
to the means of social advancement. In the same way experienced by the Japanese countryside, a 
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large number of Korean young men relocated outside their villages for mobilization. Despite the 
intensive institutional effort, mobilization did not lead to an expansion of the Rural Youth 
Industry, but instead, to its demise. 
The end of the mutual co-optation between model rural youth and the GGK does not 
make the Japanese agrarianism expressed by the Korean youth during the 1930s any less “real” 
compared to that of their Japanese and Taiwanese counterparts. The prose of the state 
empowered these youth in village politics, giving them a voice of authority against older leaders. 
In fact, the combination of pragmatic benefits in pursuing success and a feeling of moral 
superiority over the social establishment drove youth like Kim Yǒng-han to accept the rhetoric of 
Japanese nationalism. This was similar to the mechanism seen in Miyagi and Xinzhu. 
The analysis of “model rural youth” with attention to their generational and geographical 
backgrounds offers an important intervention to the issue of colonial collaborators. The 
collaborator has been a political topic especially since the democratization of South Korea in the 
1990s. The presidential truth-finding committee listed hundreds of “pro-Japanese collaborators” 
in 2005 based on the assumption that the upper-strata of Koreans exploited the lower-strata by 
selling their ethnic identity for personal benefits.  But in the 1930s, all classes tried to achieve 125
better lives through governmental mobilization, and among them, the new middling class, where 
Kim Yǒng-han belonged, was successful in particular. More importantly, the Korean ethnic 
identity, however strongly embraced, did not function as a moral obligation to resist colonial 
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mobilization for many people. Kim did not think that he had pursued his career at the expense of 
the Korean ethnic community. Until the war was over, he did not see Korean-ness and Japanese-
ness as mutually exclusive. The social mobility and dynamics of rural villages seen from the 
viewpoint of agrarian youth cannot be captured by the retrospective definition of “collaborators” 
and “betrayal against the Korean nation.” Rather, they highlight the fluid nature of class and 
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[Kim Yǒng-han at the Shinkō Seinendan Training in Kapsa (August 1940)] !




[Yusǒng Rural Youth Training Center]  !






















[Expansion of Seinendan in Official Statistics] !
Top: Numbers of Seinendan groups in 1932 and between 1936 and 1943 (Korea and South 
Ch’ungch’ǒng.) !
Bottom: Numbers of Seinendan members in 1932 and between 1936 and 1943 (Korea and South 
Ch’ungch’ǒng.) !
Sources: Chosen nenkan 1932, 1937-1943; Chōsen sōtokufu, Chōsen shakai kyōiku yōran (Seoul: 
Chōsen sōtokufu, 1937), 93 for the data of 1936. !
Official statistics show a jump in 1941, mainly because statistics included figures for the young 
women’s groups and the younger boys’ groups. It is also because seinendan participation 
became mandatory, but Kim Yǒng-han’s memory and the recruitment process of army 
conscription reveal the reality in which all-in participation was not readily reinforced. 
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Higuchi Yūichi, Senjika Chōsen no nōmin seikatsushi 1939-1945 (Tokyo: Shakai hyōronsha, 1998), 
97. A graph based on the date in “Nōka no rōdō jōken ni kansuru ichi chōsa,” Chōsen nōkaihō, 






























The Japanese empire built a number of training institutions for young men in the 
countryside to spread agrarian nationalism, create hardworking farmers, and turn them into loyal 
and capable soldiers. Mobilization relied on the paradox of empowerment and control—unless 
agrarian youth found social opportunities useful in their local contexts, state mobilization could 
not discipline or persuade them. 
The large scale of rural youth mobilization reflected the widely-shared drive for “nation-
empire” building. In all the three locations discussed in this dissertation, the avowed 
commitment to nationalization and assimilation influenced policy directions and mindsets of 
officials and schoolteachers. Even after a number of failed attempts, they increased their effort to 
analyze rural societies from within, stimulate generational and regional identities, and convert 
them into national “pillars of youth.” Japan established an unusually large bureaucracy and a 
thick ruling apparatus in the colonies not only to implement authoritarian policies generated in 
Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul, but also to work within peripheral communities and create a new 
generation of local leaders. 
I coined the term “Rural Youth Industry” to highlight the mutual attempts of co-optation 
between the state and youth. In the Rural Youth Industry, youth interpreted the state policy in 
their local contexts and diverse social relationships. Because of the multifaceted nature of their 
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incentives, their reactions to mobilization defy terms like “brainwash” and “resistance.” The 
Rural Youth Industry allows us to examine the social dynamics that lay under the rhetoric of the 
state. At the same time, it also shows how powerfully state mobilization operated through the 
capacious concept of “rural youth.” The job opportunities created by state training institutions 
altered the lives and self-images of village youth. Job prospects produced both pragmatic and 
psychological incentives. Turning mobilization into mobility was often an emotional process—
they developed affective bonds with instructors and peers, overcame envy for urban intellectual 
youth, and confronted their parents. The state ideology provided them with a moral basis to 
assert superiority over the urban, the educated, and the old. In short, they internalized the 
ideology of Japanese nationalism as a moral compass while enhancing their self-value by 
pursuing careers as “model rural youth.” 
The preceding chapters attempted to show both similarities and differences in the 
development of the Rural Youth Industry in three locations. The politics of creating ideal “rural 
youth” followed a broad pattern—the role of local modernizers moved from dominant landlords 
to the privileged youth, and then to elementary school graduates. The processes of 
nationalization of Japanese village youth and assimilation of Taiwanese and Korean village 
youth relied on the common social position of youth, determined particularly by the rural-urban, 
educated-uneducated, and generational divides. In the 1930s and early 40s, Xinzhu’s village 
youth, for example, developed a similar kind of self-image with that of Miyagi’s village youth 
rather than that of Taipei youth. The empire took advantage of the category of “rural youth” that 
crossed ethnic differences to facilitate nation-building. 
The new identities created were not limited to the geographical conditions and the age of 
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youth. Generations, defined by people who were born in specific decades, created their own 
dynamics in each place. Among many different generations, those who grew up during the 
intensive kyōka (moral suasion) campaigns—after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 in Japan 
and Cultural Rule of the 1920s in Taiwan and Korea—became the protagonists of the Rural 
Youth Industry.  
As products of social tensions, Japanese nationalisms expressed by the Japanese, 
Taiwanese, and Korean village youth carried a similar range of emotions. The degrees of 
internalization, passion, and skepticism cloaked in nationalistic phrases varied from person to 
person and from time to time. Their differences were not determined by their “ethnic identity” 
predating mobilization, however, as often presumed by nationalist historians today. It depended 
on more complex social environments—or in other words, whether their everyday social 
relationships benefited from the category of “rural youth” impacted youth’s acceptance of 
Japanese nationalism. 
Of course, there were many differences between Japan and its colonies and between 
Taiwan and Korea. The colonial setting determined a significant proportion of the social 
conditions found in Taiwanese and Korean villages, such as the slower spread of school 
education and ethnic discrimination in the job market. Grudges and desperation among 
Taiwanese and Korean agrarian youth were often products of colonial rule—the empire did not 
“rescue” them from the indigenous social dynamics through rural youth mobilization. The 
structures of the Rural Youth Industry in Taiwan and Korea also reflected the colonial status. In 
Japan, mobilization was more inclusive and comprehensive, whereas in Taiwan and Korea, it 
was more exclusive and competitive. The window of opportunities available for colonial agrarian 
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youth was more limited by design. 
The comparison of “rural youth” identity and the formation of the Rural Youth Industry 
might also offer a historical explanation for the divergence in colonial memory. The widespread 
“pro-Japanese” attitude among Taiwanese people and the “anti-Japanese” sentiment among 
Korean people are often attributed to postcolonial political conditions—the new “Taiwanese” 
identity against the Guomindang regime made the experience of Japanese rule a positive marker 
of identity, whereas in South Korea, colonial “collaborators” have been accused of facilitating 
authoritarian rule after 1945. The postwar narrative of “Japan as a victim” and the Japanese 
people’s ignorance of the imperial past propelled the postcolonial sentiment of the Taiwanese and 
Koreans to develop in opposite directions. Yet questions arise: is this strictly an issue of memory 
construction developed after 1945? Or did the colonial experience in the pre-1945 period 
contribute to this divergence?  
Based on the examination of rural youth mobilization at the village and personal levels, I 
argue that pre-1945 experiences, including pre-Japanese-rule social settings, have a profound 
impact. In Taiwan, the racial and ethnic tension in remote mountain villages led to quick 
acceptance of colonial administration and early establishment of Japanese language and 
elementary schools. Although Japanese education was popular by the 1930s, the colonial 
government postponed recruiting Taiwanese youth because of the ethnic kinship with the target 
of invasion, China. This in turn added fuel to the fanatic Japanization campaign. In contrast, in 
Korea, because of the initial confrontation between Japanese settlers and local leaders and the 
highly stratified social system in which education was associated with the privileged class, 
schools spread only slowly in remote villages. Despite that, Governor-General Ugaki 
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Kazushige’s firm belief in agrarian mass mobilization and Korea’s location linking Japan and 
Manchuria led to a premature start of mobilization of elementary school graduates. These 
trajectories culminated in the difference in youth’s attitudes toward mobilization at the moment 
of Japanese surrender in August 1945. In Taiwan, the Rural Youth Industry was still growing, 
whereas that in Korea—more limited in scope in the first place—had collapsed. In the 
interviews, their impressions of Japanese rule at the moment of its demise seemed to have greatly 
impacted the narratives of their experiences. 
The individuals introduced in this dissertation reflected on their days in Japanese youth 
programs on multiple occasions since Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945. Almost 70 years 
later, they chose to narrate youth training as a transformative experience in their lives, isolating 
the positive consequences of youth training from the hardship associated with colonial rule and 
war mobilization. They faced dramatic political upheavals that required resilient adjustments in 
the postwar period. In Japan, Katō Einojō lost most of the family inheritance during the land 
reform under the Allied occupation, but was elected as a city council member and took charge of 
education affairs. In Taiwan, Huang Yuanxing and Xu Chongfa immediately learned Mandarin 
Chinese—Xu attended a language course offered by the Youth Group of Three People’s 
Principles [sanminzhuyi qingniantuan], newly formed to celebrate the “return” of Taiwan to 
mainland China. Huang went back to the teaching career in the Beipu elementary school, while 
Xu founded a tea leaf export company in the countryside of Xinzhu. In Korea, Kim Yǒng-han 
continued working in local administrative offices and later collected local cultural and historical 
materials for the South Ch’ungch’ǒng government and the National Institute of Korean History. 
Their records and interviews showed their dismay and regret in having encouraged many youth 
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to participate in Japan’s war effort. At the same time, they continued to value the traits of “model 
rural youth”—now decoupled from wartime Japanese nationalism— during the coming few 
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